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INTRODUCTION

HEN Thomas Jefferson spoke of King George III with
these words in the Declaration of Independence he bespoke an ethic of freedom of growth that became one of our
society's most basic tenets:
He has endeavored to prevent the population of these states;
for that purpose obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration
hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of land.

Growth, and the inherent goodness to it, is more than a philosophy; it is a theology. "Watch Us Grow" is the proud hope on
the first sign we see at Averagetown, U.S.A. Towns, counties,
and states have historically competed with each other to attract new business and new residents with the unquestioned
assumption that to be bigger is to be better.
Suddenly there has been a startling reversal of this longstanding assumption. Based on a survey taken for them by the
Opinion Research Corporation, the Rockefeller Commission on
Population Growth and the American Future has reported:
fifty-four percent of Americans think that the distribution of
population is a "serious problem;" half believe that, over the
next 30 years, it will be at least as great a problem as population
growth. 1

There have been efforts in state legisatures to study the efficacy
I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN
FUTURE 44 (Signet ed. 1972).
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of the "growth-is-good" ethic. 2 Some states have passed resolutions calling for population stabilization.3 Legislation has been
passed in some states which would discourage growth in certain locations. 4 States which have long had legislation and promotional agencies encouraging industrial and population growth
are changing those policies. 5 At least two governors are discouraging some forms of growth. 6 Citizen-initiated referenda
seeking to stabilize their political subdivisions' populations have
been introduced. 7 Thirty-six U.S. Senators have introduced a
joint resolution calling for an early stabilization of the U.S.
population.8
The new skepticism about growth has been stated by the
California Environmental Quality Study Council:
We simply have to slow down our growth and stabilize the population of our regions according to their carrying capacities. This
may be hard to accomplish, for growth has served us well in this
country since its beginnings. But the harsh reality is that unrestrained growth and environmental quality have become uncompatible. 9

The Colorado Environmental Commission, in even stronger
language, has warned: "Colorado's future is threatened by
overpopulation." 10 The Commission, speaking of rapid population growth, said:
See S. Bill No. 155, Florida Legis., 1972 Sess. (introduced Feb. 1, 1972).
Senator Knopke presented this bill to create a commission to investigate
the impact of population growth; referred to Florida Senate Ways and
Means Comm. on Feb. 2, 1972. See H. Bill No. 734, Hawaii Legis., 1972
Sess. (introduced Feb. 18, 1971); H. Bill No. 1322, Hawaii Legis., 1972
Sess. (introduced Mar. 10, 1971). These bills were presented to create
a permanent commission on population stabilization which would have,
among its purposes, the determination of an optimum population distribution within the state. See S. Res. No. 355, Hawaii Legis., 1970 Sess.
wherein a temporary commission on population stabilization was created.
This commission's report was made public in January 1972.
3 See Assembly Res. No. 110, Cal. Legis., 1971 Sess.; J. Res. No. 14, N.M.
Legis., 1971 Sess.
4 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 683 et seq. (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 6001 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
5 See S. Bill No. 51, Colo. Legis., 1971 2d Sess. (introduced Feb. 29, 1972)
which changes the policy of the Department of Commerce and Development to emphasize the development of "rural" Colorado. See also the
emphasis on "balance" rather than "growth" contained in the various
state environmental policy acts; e.g., ch. 109, [1971] Wash. Laws 623.
For a compilation and analysis of state environmenatl policy acts, see
COUNCL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY, 102 MONITOR, July 1971; id. May
1972.
6 Gov. Tom McCall, Ore.; Gov. Russell Patterson, Del., as quoted in FORBES,
June 15, 1971, at 22.
7 Denver Post, Nov. 1, 1971, at 18, cols. 1-2.
8 S.J. Res. 108, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
!'CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY STUDY COUNCIL (1971) cited in SPE2
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[It] will place strains on our human and natural resources unlike
anything we have ever experienced before in Colorado. We are
totally unprepared for this kind of an onslaught. Our lack of
preparation can only lead to chaotic conditions.11

Colorado is urged by this Environmental Commission to adopt
a policy of population stabilization and rural development to
12
reverse the current maldistribution of population.
There is a growing awareness that our urban and rural
crises are directly related to population maldistibution and that
methods which would direct growth from urban to rural areas
would help to alleviate both crises. President Nixon implied
this relationship in his first State of the Union Address where
he stated, "The result is exemplified in the vast area of rural
America emptying out of people and of promise-a third of
our counties lost population in the sixties. 13 President Johnson
similarly stated:
The cities will never solve their problems unless we solve the
problems of the towns and smaller areas.
So consider the problem of urban growth. If the present
trend continues, by 1985 as many people will be crowded into
our cities as occupy the entire Nation today- in 1960. That
means people enough to make five more New Yorks, or that
means people to make 25 more Washingtons.

Many will migrate to the cities against their will, if we con14
tinue to allow this to happen.

Should this prediction prove true the implications for the
quality of life in our cities are not pleasant. The sense of community loss entailed in this growth pattern has been identified
as two problems apart from overpopulation and technological
change by Philip Hauser.1" Population displosion and population
implosion must be addressed as crises equal to the population
explosion to find a truly effective solution. Displosion is the
uneasy jamming of ethnic groups thrown together into small
areas of urban space, dealing with each other in situations of
continual tension. Implosion is the distributional problem alluded to by Presidents Nixon and Johnson above.
Metropoitan areas until recently have assumed that growth
was desirable and that they should compete for a new "tax
11 Id. at 37.
12 Id. at 47.
'3 Pres. Richard M. Nixon, State of the Union Speech, 116 CONG. REC. 738,
740 (1970).
14 President's Remarks at Ceremonies Marking the 100th Anniversary
of Dallastown, Sept. 3, 1966, 2 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
DOCUMENTS 1216, 1217 (1966).
15 p. Hauser, On Population and Environmental Policy and Problems, June
8, 1970 (transcript of talk at First National Congress on Optimum Population and Environment in Chicago, Illinois).
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base." There is evidence now that this might not be in the
area's best interest, at least in many places. Many of America's
large cities are now faced with a deteriorating quality of life,
uncontrolled urban sprawl, seemingly insoluble financial problems and possibly irreversible decaying inner-city cores.1" Additional growth too often exacerbates these ills rather than
solving them. There is a growing body of evidence which, while
not conclusive, shows that cities beyond a given point experience what economists call "diseconomies of scale" resulting in
higher per capita taxes.1 7 In every tax category-property, general sales, selective sales- the per capita tax rate increases for
cities between 200,000 and 500,000 people when compared with
communities of less than 50,000. All these rates increase again
when comparing the first group with cities of over one million
in population.' A city will have to spend more money per capita
to provide its residents with adequate services in education,
highways, public welfare, hospitals, health, fire and police protection, parks and recreation, housing and urban renewal, libraries, and financial administration the larger its population
becomes.' 9 Those who have studied the relationship of per
capita spending and city size have found this relationship to
be more than coincidental. 20 One student of the problem has
stated: ". . . there is also evidence to indicate that increased
levels of per capita spending and employment are related, at
'21
least in part, to city size."
Policies are needed to reverse the accelerating concentration
of people on a small portion of the land, and at the same time
reverse the forces which are causing an estimated 500 U.S.
counties to actually lose population at this time.2 2 This need for
new policies is pointed out by the National Goals Research
Staff, which found:

16 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN

FUTURE, supra note 1, at 207.
17 See generally

ADVISORY COMMISSON ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

BULL. No. 70-8, SIZE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE

16, 1970).

-A

RELATIONS,

CLOSER LOOK

(Sept.

18 Id. at 13.
19 Id.
20 See Gabler, Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Urban Public Sectors 45 LAND EcON. 425; Watt, Growth in Malibu, NATIONAL REPORTER,
July 1971, at 8; Kenneth Watt, "A Model of Society," Ford Foundation,
New York, 1970. See also COUNCIL OF PLANNING LIBRARIANS, Ex. BIBL.
No. 169, OPTIMUM City-SIZE AND MUNICIPAL EFFICIENCY for a list of
over 50 readings addressed to this relationship.
21 Gabler, supra note 20, at 433.
22 REPORT

OF THE NATIONAL GOALS RESEARCH STAFF,
QUANTITY WITH QUALITY 42 (1970).

GROWTH:

TOWARD

BALANCED
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[T]he choice of no change in public policy would run the high
risk of bringing about the kind of future in which the communities of both urban and rural America would further deteriorate. It means that hundreds of American towns will continue
to lose young people and economic opportunity; and that the
large metropolitan areas, already burdened with social and fiscal
problems and characterized by fragmentation of governmental
responsibility, may reach a size at which they will become
socially intolerable, politically unmanageable, and economically
23
inefficient.

This article will suggest that public policy should adopt
the alternative suggested by the above study, i.e., that of seeking "a different spatial distribution of the population by means
of a decisive public policy."214 To effectuate spatial distribution
implies the limitation of growth in certain areas, the inducement
of growth in others. There is a myriad of available land use
controls and alternatives to more closely approach these goals.
Among these controls are those that are available at the local,
intrastate, regional, state, and federal levels of government.
We seek to survey these land use controls and to suggest at
what governmental level they may be best exercised. Our focus
is the range of methods that might be adopted to control
growth, encourage population dispersal, and preserve open
space.
I.

LOCAL LAND USE ALTERNATIVES

Traditionally, the sphere of local governmental responsibility has encompassed the areas of subdivision exactment and
regulation, zoning, and open space preservation. Where states
continue to allow local autonomy, local governments can use
these methods to afford environmental protection to land resources, preserve open space, and thereby affect growth while
encouraging population dispersion. In addition, local governments can exploit entirely new spheres of control and new
methods of control within these traditional spheres. The choices
available to the local government are discussed below. To the
extent that these programs are implemented, state governments should exercise supervisory power to insure minimum
standards of environmental protection for the state's land resources.
A.

Growth Moratoriums

Although a growing number of communities have initiated
the search for "optimum size," and despite the fact that the
"optimum size" question has become a much-discussed con23 Id. at 54.

24 Id.at 53.
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cept, 25 there is little ongoing research into this question. Some
states 2 and municipalities 27 have actually investigated "optimizing" types of land use planning, including a number of
communities which have declared moratoriums in both zoning
changes and in the issuance of building permits.2 8 The city of
Boulder, Colorado, recently listed a partial catalogue of the
techniques available to affect growth rate and to balance qualitative and quantitative aspects of community growth. 29 To buy
time for the discussion of various policy implications surrounding these techniques, it declared a building moratorium. Fairfax
County, Virginia is seeking to limit population growth in housing by strictly controlling linkages to public sewerage-a necessity for high density development-while exploring other
methods of control through subdivision limits, zoning, and restricting building permits. 30 Dade County, Florida, voters have
recently passed a building moratorium ordinance allowing the
county commissioners to declare a halt in certain areas while
environmental studies are made.31 These methods should be
evaluated in light of the developing law concerning "exclusion'32
ary zoning.
One traditional method by which local governments have
provided open space and parkland for their citizens-thus conBlayney, A Clinching Case for Open Space, CRY CALIFORNIA 3 (Winter,
1971-72: "In any discussion of urban problems today, the desirability
of controlling growth is ritually proposed. The idea of limiting population in metropolitan areas has been almost universally accepted as the
solution to many of the problems that now confront our major population centers."
26 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 20 (1972).
27 HOUSE AND HOME, May 1972, at 28.
25

28

Id.

See memorandum of June 3, 1971 from the Boulder City Administration
to the Boulder City Council, which outlined some of the city's choices:
Reevaluation of present zoning standards and densities, reexamination of
areas presently zoned industrial, identification of community costs from
new development as reflected in fee schedules, a fresh look at user rates
and charges, reassessment of taxes and assessment policies on vacant
ground in the Boulder Valley, a review of the city's position with respect
to annexation and extension of utilities, a restructured real estate transfer tax, the possibility of a land bank policy to purchase development
rights to property, an increase in the capability of the greenbelt program
to use debt financing and acquisition of land, possible reincorporation
of the City of Boulder to include the entire City and County area, and
reallocation of existing revenues to acquire properties in harmony with
a limited growth policy.
3, Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1971, § B, at 1, col. 4. Recently the mayor of
St. Petersburg, Florida, recommended that St. Petersburg be limited to a
300,000 population limit, as that figure would be "the ultimate growth
figure for planning purposes." He stated that zoning would not necessarily be the mcst successful method of growth control and that a city
might be forced to refuse sewer and water connections to prevent the
city from "outgrowing" the capacity of the two utility systems. St.
Petersburg Times, Feb. 12, 1972, at 3, cols. 1-3.
31 HOUSE AND HOME, supra note 27.
32 See discussion in text p. 9 infra.
29
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trolling density-has been to require developers of subdivisions
to set aside land for parks or to make payments in lieu thereof.8
B.

Zoning

To stabilize population or reduce the growth rate, cities can
also explore zoning regulations which combine minimum lot
requirements, limitations on the percentage of a lot which can
be occupied by a building, height restrictions on buildings, maximum cubic content limitations, limitations on numbers of rooms
per building, and minimum floor area per room. The combination of these restrictions could be expected to limit the population density of a community as it preserves the open space
and greenery.
The combination of a minimum lot requirement and limitation on the percentage of a lot which could be occupied by
a building insures open space preservation and limits population density. Combining requirements for each individual
dwelling unit with height restrictions on a residential dwelling
limits the number of person who can reside in a building, which
limits population density. Placing similar limits on commercial
and industrial buildings helps to limit the number of community
members, thus indirectly controlling the population of that community and of others within commuting distance.
Courts are divided with respect to the constitutionality of
minimum lot zoning. Five-acre minimum lot zoning requirements have been upheld by several courts.3 4 Other courts have
held that a 3-acre minimum residential zoning ordinance, combined with minimum floor area and cubic content requirements,
was not a justifiable method for preserving the aesthetics of a
community3 5 and that a 4-acre minimum lot zoning ordinance
was not a valid means of creating a "greenbelt."3 6 Another holding, balancing the rights of a private owner with the needs of
the community, invalidated a 5-acre minimum lot zoning re87
quirement.
Because of the public policy reasons for attempting to stabilize a community's population, courts should uphold the constitutionality of minimum lot zoning requirements which are
33 Forer, Preservationof America's Park Land: The Inadequacy of Present

Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1093 (1966): Note, Municipalities: Validity of Subdivision Fees for Schools and Parks, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 974 (1966).
34 E.g., County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967); Fischer
v. Bedminster Tp., 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
35 Hitchman v. Oakland Tp., 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951).
36
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
37 National Brick Co. v. County of Lake, 9 Ill. 2d 191, 137 N.E.2d 494 (1956).
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not a method of racial discrimination,3 8 and which do not constitute a taking of property without just compensation, in violation of the fifth or fourteenth amendments, by so limiting the
uses to which the property can be put so as to make the property "wholly useless, '39 or "to deprive the owner of all or most
of his interest in the subject matter. .... -40 As long as a property
owner is left with at least one profitable use of his land, such
41
zoning restrictions should not be invalidated.
Minimum floor area standards which were applicable to
42
residential, business, and industrial districts have been upheld,
and a zoning ordinance restricting building heights in St. Paul,
Minnesota, has been upheld-though based only upon aesthetic
considerations. 43 Congress has, since 1910, limited the height of
buildings in Washington, D.C., to 130 feet.4 4 The public, however,
must be willing to support such ordinances. In elections of November 2, 1971, a proposal to limit all new buildings in San
Francisco to six stories was defeated by a 2 to 1 margin, while
the voters of Boulder, Colorado approved a resolution to limit
the height of buildings to 55 feet at the same time they defeated
45
a resolution to stabilize population.
A developing body of case law points to a contingent obligation upon municipalities to open their doors to low and moderate income housing. Some commentators argue that exclusionary zoning violates the "right to travel" guaranteed by

See 2 T. EMERSON, D.

HABER, & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
UNITED STATES 1599-1600 (stud. ed. 1967). See, e.g., Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Anderson v. Town of Forest Park, 239 F.
Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
3 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (dic38

THE

tum).

40 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
41 See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d
932 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539,
193 A.2d 232 (1963); Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412 (1931);
Greenhills Home Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E.2d 192
(Ohio Ct. App. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 5 Ohio St. 2d 207, 215
N.E.2d 403 (1966). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
42 Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). See Haar, Zoning for
Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1051
(1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply,
67 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1954); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?
- Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HAnv. L. REV. 967 (1954).
43 City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969).
44 Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1971, § B, at 1, col. 2.
45 Id., Nov. 4, 1971, § A, at 12, col. 2.
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Shapiro v. Thompson.4 6 This case law and scholarly comment
must be taken into consideration in the proposal of any growth
control measure.
Zoning as a device for growth control is coming under increased scrutiny by the courts to insure that it does not exclude
racial groups and certain economic groups. 47 Pennsylvania has
gone farthest in fashioning the early racial discrimination cases
into a body of law to combat most types of exclusionary zoning.
In National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn the court stated:
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the
way cf the natural forces which send our growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to
live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary
purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facilities cannot be held
48
valid.

The court, however, did recognize zoning as a legitimate
measure to insure orderly and rational development.49 The court
further expanded on National Land in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. where it stated:
The implication of our decision in National Land is that communities must deal with problems of population growth. They
may not refuse to confront the future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to near present levels.
It is not for any given township to say who may or may not not
live within its confines, while disregarding the interests of the
entire area.5 0

Contrarily, a recent New York Court of Appeals case held
that a municipality had the right to freeze development of vacant land until town officials are prepared to provide sewers
and other services, though this might take as long as another
generation. The court found:
Ramapo asks not that it be left alone, but only that it be allowed
to prevent the kind of deterioration that has transformed wellordered and thriving residential communities into blighted
46

394 U.S. 618 (1969); see Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9, 2125; see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941); Davidoff &
Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYR. L. REV. 509 (1971); Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The
Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.J. 732 (1970); Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the

Indigent, 21

STAN.

L.

REV.

767 (1969).

See Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347 (1949); Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d
390 (1959). But see Vickers v. Township of Comm. of Gloucester, 37
N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
48 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1966).
49 Id.
50439 Pa. 466, 469, 268 A.2d 765, 768 (1970).
See also Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
47
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ghettos with attendant hazards to health, security and social
stability .... 51

Without avoiding the obvious conflict between these two
lines of cases, it would appear that if a municipality is to adopt
growth control devices, those devices had best apply to all
development equally, rather than be tainted by a similarity to
52
methods of racial or economic discrimination.
There remain, however, strong public policy arguments for
allowing communities to set nondiscriminatory population limitations. Various communities and geographic areas have different capacities to accommodate growth. In the West, for example,
water is scarce and often unobtainable. Additional municipal
water must be obtained at the expense of the agricultural
sphere or at the expense of another geographic area. A community must eventually have the right to prevent its own
destruction by balancing its available resources with its population growth. 53
C.

Open Space Preservation

California empowers cities and counties to use zoning laws
to regulate open space for purposes of recreation, enjoyment
of scenic beauty, and use of natural resources.5 4 Its cities and
counties are required to adopt local open space plans to provide
for "comprehensive and long range preservation and conservation of open space land within their jurisdiction, 5 5 and such
open space plans must include specific implementing programs.
The issuance of building permits, subdivision approval, and open
space zoning ordinances must comply with such provisions.
California also requires the general plans of local planning
agencies to consider open space requirements and to provide
for the conservation, development, and utilization of natural
resources (including harbors and forests).56
By state law, Maine land areas within 250 feet of the normal high water mark of navigable waters are subject to local
51 Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). See
also Lee Jackson Dev. Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 3 ENVIR. REP.
1961 (Va. Cir. Ct., Louden Cty., 1972).
52

Some states have adopted legislation directed at this problem. See MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. URBAN DEVEL. CORP.
LAW §§ 6251, 6266(3) (McKinney 1971).

But see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE
AMERICAN FUTURE, supra note 1, at 208. "[A]ccommodation of future
population is a public responsibility which must be shared by all communities and dealt with on a broad scale."
54 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (a) (West Supp. 1972), amending (West 1966).
55 Id. § 65563 (West Supp. 1972).
56Id. § 65302 (d) - (e) (West Supp. 1972), amending (West 1966).
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zoning and subdivision control. 57 The regulations are authorized
to protect spawning grounds, fish, aquatic life, birds, and other
wildlife habitat; to control building sites, the placement of
structures, and land use; to conserve shore cover; and to provide
visual as well as actual access to inland and coastal waters and
points of natural beauty. If a municipality fails to adopt such
ordinances, the State Environmental Improvement Commission
(which authorizes the Attorney General to enforce the statute
providing for statewide control of industrial development 58) and
the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission (which enforces
the statute regulating development in unorganized and deorganized townships 59) are directed to adopt suitable ordinances
to be administered and enforced by the municipalities. This
statute thus allows local municipalities to participate in the control of Maine's coastal wetlands, but their ordinances are subject to approval of the state. In addition, a locality's issuance of
permits for wetlands development is subject to veto by the
Wetlands Control Board under provisions of another Maine
statute.6" This latter veto provision thus allows state agencies
to exercise control over each individual wetlands development
project authorized by local communities, while the former provision enables state control of local ordinances through which
individual development projects are authorized. Maine has also
required municipal subdivision regulations and subdivision plans
to prevent undue adverse effects on scenic or natural beauty,
61
aesthetics, historic sites, or rare and irreplaceable natural areas.
In general, muncipalities cannot constitutionally use zoning
for open space to reduce the market value of land in order to
condemn the property in the future at lower cost.62 In addition,
zoning regulations imposing indefinite moratoriums on the development of land, subject only to variances at the request of
the owner, are probably unconstitutional takings of property
without just compensation. 63 To avoid holding a zoning regulation intended to preserve open space an unconstitutional taking
of property without just compensation, either on its face or as
57 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4811 (Supp. 1972).
58 Id. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1972). See also text accompanying notes 144
& 145 infra.
59 Id. tit. 12, §§ 683 et seq. (Supp. 1972). See also text accompanying note
146 infra.
60 Id. tit. 12, § 4702 (Supp. 1972).
61 Id. tit. 30, § 4956(3) (I) (Supp. 1972),formerly ch. 365 § 2, [1969] Laws
of Me. 974.
62 See, e.g., Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 208-13 (1961).
63 Id. at 187.
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applied to a particular case, courts should permit a municipality
to condemn a fee or lesser interest in the property and uphold
6 4
the land use regulations imposed by the zoning law.
D.

The Krasnowiecki & Paul Open Space Proposal

A theory of open space preservation which integrates traditional zoning principles with satisfactory legal compensation
is suggested by Krasnowiecki and Paul 5 Under their theory, a
community determines which privately owned areas should be
preserved as open space, and then values such properties under
the same principles by which property is valued in condemnation proceedings. The local government guarantees these values
to the property owners. The total amount of these guarantees
equals the compensation which is paid to the property owners
if their fee were condemned on the date when the open space
program became effective. Instead of condemning the fee, however, the local government promulgates detailed regulations to
control the use of the property for open space purposes. The
owner is paid, through the local government's guarantee, the
amount by which such control reduces the value of his property
for the uses to which it is actually being put at the time the
open space controls are imposed. Unlike the acquisition of easements, this program does not have local governments pay a
landowner for the value of his property for future development
-values, real or imaginary, which the property owner may or
may not have intention of realizing.66
If such open space controls reduce the value of the property
for other than existing uses (i.e., the value of the property for
future development), the owner is compensated by the government through an administratively-supervised public sale in an
amount by which the guaranteed value of his property exceeds
the price paid to him for his land at the public sale. The governmental guarantee for that particular property is reduced by
the amount of damages or compensation paid by the government to each successive owner after each public sale. Consequently, the damages and compensation paid by the government
for open space preservation under this program would not exceed the guaranteed value of a particular piece of property.
This method of open space control does not compensate a
landowner for the development value of his property for pur64

Id. at 190-92.

65

Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan
Areas, 110 U.

PA.

L. REV. 179 (1961).

60 See generally discussion of Conservation Easements in State Alterna-

tives section in text p. 36 infra.
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poses other than those to which the property was being put on
the effective date of the program. Because the owner is paid, at
the date the program becomes effective, for the decrease in value
of his property for its existing uses, the compensation paid him
after the public sale would represent the loss of the value of
his property since the time the controls were imposed.
Krasnowiecki and Paul believe that requiring a property
owner to sell his property before receiving compensation for its
future development value is a fair balance between the governmental interests and the rights of the property owner, and
would thus be constitutional. The authors, however, would pay
compensation in some cases where the fifth and fourteenth
amendments do not require such compensation. They justify
such payments on the grounds that to attempt to determine
when compensation was constitutionally required, rather than
to pay compensation in all cases according to a standard formula, would make the program too costly and administratively
7
unmanageable on a case by case basis.1
This proposal, unlike the acquisition of negative easements,
postpones compensation for the loss in value of property for
future development until a time when the landowner would
normally have realized that development value, and determines
the amount of such compensation of the loss of the price actually
paid for the regulated property. The public sale requirement
is intended to protect the government against fraudulent sales
designed to draw upon the government's guarantee, a guarantee
which continues as long as the land is regulated as open space.
Losses are guaranteed in value as a result of the regulation, as
a result of depreciation in real estate values generally, and as a
result of inflation of the dollar.
These latter two guarantees against general real estate depreciation and inflation are not required by the constitutional
prohibitions against the taking of property without just compensation and should be excluded from this proposal as an unjustified gift of public funds to private property owners. States
with constitutional prohibitions against the payment of public
funds as gifts to private parties, or against the use of public
funds for private purposes, might require that compensation
paid under this proposal be only that required by the constitution. This proposal is otherwise an innovative program combining zoning and eminent domain concepts for more successful and
67 Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65, at 199.
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less costly open space preservation than could be accomplished
by the use of either zoning or eminent domain alone.
E.

Other Innovative Approaches

Municipalities might require private land owners to comply
with regulations similar to those of section 102(2) (C) of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 196968 before any alteration of the land would be permitted. The Town of Huntington,
Long Island, New York, has adopted an ordinance which requires
applicants for building permits to file environmental impact
statements similar to those required by section 102(2) (C) of
the 1969 Act, and to minimize the environmental impact of any
69
construction or devlopment of their land.
Local communities can also encourage local property owners
to preserve open space. In addition to the method of negative
easements and tax policies, municipalities could follow the Lake
George approach, 70 which combines zoning with private land
use controls such has equitable servitudes, real covenants, and
easements. Lake George, New York, has sought to aid private
property owners to preserve open space and keep areas residential by encouraging them to execute restrictive covenants
and easements restricting the use of their property for commercial uses. If all property owners in a given area sign such
covenants to make the area a residential zone, the Lake George
71
Park Commission can zone the area residential.
Municipalities have adopted so-called "official maps" reflecting their present official decisions to later condemn areas
and locate future streets, parks, and other facilities as marked
on the map. 72 The decisions reflected on the map are implemented by prohibiting development or improvement in those
areas marked for future acquisition and are enforced by court
injunctions and by denying compensation for unauthorized improvements when the land is later condemned. These statutes
have generally been held to be an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation unless they contain a clause
allowing the owner, upon a showing that his land as mapped
cannot yield a fair return, to improve the property to the extent
U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (1970).
69 Statement, Jerome A. Ambro, Supervisor, Town of Huntington, New
York (Feb. 23, 1971).
70 See Eveleth, New Techniques to Preserve Areas of Scenic Attraction in
Established Rural-Residential Communities- The Lake George Approach, 18 SYR. L. REV. 37 (1966).
6842

71

Id.

72

See Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65, at 184-86; Kucirek & Beuscher,
Wisconsin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176.
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necessary to give him a fair return.73 But this clause disrupts
open space preservation programs when landowners are permitted to improve their land pursuant to these "shock absorber"
clauses. Where the moratorium on land improvement and development imposed by official map laws has been extended to provide for future park acquisition, it has generally been limited
74
to a period of 1 year.
Finally, an orderly growth and population dispersion pattern in urban areas could be encouraged by appropriate urban
renewal and public housing programs. Many of the early efforts
built high-rise residential buildings that were close together
and had little adjacent open space and parkland. The public
housing program of Mayor Daley in Chicago and many of the
housing projects in New York City, including the mammoth and
still-uncompleted Co-op City, are examples of such urban renewal programs. Other cities, however, such as New Haven,
Connecticut, built low density housing units through federal
grants under the Model City Programs.
Local urban renewal programs should be designed to eliminate slums and blighted areas in our nation's cities, to revitalize business in urban areas, and to build moderate-cost public housing. Well-planned local urban renewal programs can
prevent the flight of the white middle class to the suburbs, a
situation which leaves poor blacks and other low-income minority groups as the majority of the population in several of our
cities and which means the loss of necessary taxes for essential
public services. If urban renewal programs do not seek to support the dispersal of people and stabilize a city's population,
but instead create high densities and uncontrolled population
growth, urban problems will increase.
The federal government should require local governing
bodies which seek federal urban renewal loans or capital
grants7 5 to develop urban renewal plans which preserve open
space and limit population density and growth in urban areas.
At present, contracts for urban renewal loans or capital grants
can be made by the Department of Housing and Urban Development only if the urban renewal plan has been found by
the local governing body to conform to a general plan for development of the locality as a whole and gives due consideration
to the provision of adequate park and recreational areas and
73 Id.
74 See
75

Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65, at 184-86.
See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq. (1970).
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facilities." Federal urban renewal loans and capital grants
should also be conditioned upon due consideration by the local
urban renewal authority, the local housing authority, and the
local governing body for a federal policy to limit population
growth and density in urban areas through devices such as
height restrictions on residential, commercial, and industrial
buildings, a limitation on the percentage of a lot which could
be occupied by a building, and cubic content requirements for
each individual dwelling unit. Federal loans to nonprofit, private corporations to build housing in urban areas under section
202 of the Federal Housing Act, and FHA guaranteed loans to
private developers to build housing, should be subject to similar
constraints. 77 Other federal programs which encourage construction of housing78 should seek to further a policy of open space
preservation, population dispersion, and control of population
and industrial growth.
F. The Municipal Taxpayer's Standing to Propose Alternatives
A municipal taxpayer has the right to assert his equitable
ownership of municipal property in suits to enjoin diversion or
misuse of municipal property. 79 This right arises from the doctrine that a city or municipality owns and administers municipal
property-such as streets and parks-as trustee for the resident
taxpayers.8 0
Land dedicated to the use of the public for park purposes is held
in trust for that use, and a resident of the city or town in which
the park is located may maintain a suit in equity to prevent
diversion of the use of such land, since "courts of equity always interfere at the suit of a cestui que trust or the cestui que
use to prohibit a violation of the trust or a destruction of the
right of the user. ... "81

In Douglass v. City Council of Montgomery,8 2 the court indicated, though in dictum, that any individual property owner in
a municipality (and thus a municipal taxpayer) should have
standing to sue against the municipality and private action to
protect the municipal parks. Where state law recognizes a
municipal taxpayer as being the equitable owner of, and as
7642 U.S.C. § 1455 (1970).
77
See generally A DECENT HOME, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMTTEE
ON URBAN HOUSING (1969).
78 Id. at 12.
79 Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1899); Archbold v.
McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1960); see Comment, 38 U. COLO.
L. REv. 391 (1966).
80 Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774, 785 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Smith v. Corporation of Wash., 61 U.S. 135, 147 (1857).
81 Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D.D.C. 1960) (footnote
omitted); see Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1899).
82 118 Ala. 599, 613, 24 So. 745. 748 (1898).
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having an equitable interest in, municipal property, the taxpayer may bring suit in federal district court under federal
question jurisdiction8 3 to assert this interest.8 4 This standing of
a municipal taxpayer traditionally has been based upon the
taxpayer's monetary interest in municipal property.85 Several
courts, on the other hand, have extended this doctrine to ins
Standing
clude the right to the use of municipal property.
in these cases is based as much upon the fact of dedication to
the public of the property involved as upon the monetary interest of a taxpayer or the possible increase in taxes that might
result to the taxpayer.87
II.

INTRASTATE REGIONAL LAND USE ALTERNATIVES

Above the local level but below the state level, a possible
solution exists for gaining the perspective and authority necessary to make rational growth decisions. Regional solutions are
not only possible, but presently their use is increasing. Where
binding regional governments are not in existence, there is
opportunity for local cooperation in forming regional bodies
that have recommendatory functions. These two forms are set
out below.
A. Regional Government
In some states, the possibility of regional government is
being seriously explored at present.88 Minnesota, in an attempt
to find an intermediate step between special purpose districts
and multi-jurisdictional general purpose governments, created
the Metropolitan Council of Minneapolis-St. Paul.8 9 Minnesota
had previously required, by statute, a regional review by a
metropolitan council for projects in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
area. Municipal units within that area had been required to
submit to the council their "proposed long term comprehensive
plans or any proposed matter which has a substantial effect
on metropolitan area development ... 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
1967).
Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ill.
85 The standing of the municipal taxpayer in such suits has been predicated
on the similarity to a private stockholder suing in a derivative suit. Scott
v. Frazier, 258 F. 669, 674 (D.N.D. 1919).
8,Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899); Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1960). The real interest that the
municipal taxpayer asserts in such a suit is the value of the right to use
municipal property. Davenport v. Buffington, supra, at 236.
87 Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899).
83
84

See GOVERNOR'S LOCAL AFFAIRS STUDY COMMISSION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN COLORADO (Sept. 1966).
81See ch. 24, S.F. No. 10, [1971] Minn. Sess. Laws 1827 (to be codified as)
88

§§ 473F.01 to -. 13 (1971).
§ 473B.06(7) (1969), as amended, ch. 541, S.F. No. 1024,
[1971] Minn. Sess. Laws 841.

MINN. STAT.

9°MINN.

STAT.
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The new council is organized as a body of members representing districts of substantially equal population. It is designed
to facilitate planning and coordinate the delivery of certain
services for the Twin Cities area. In 1971 the legislature gave
the council a limited taxing power to effect policy and financial
coordination over water, sewer, airports, and certain other
single-purpose authorities within the metropolitan areas. The
purpose of the new power was "to provide a way for local
governments to share in the resources generated by the growth
of the area, without removing any resources which local governments already have [and] [tlo increase the likelihood of
orderly urban development . . .91
Forty percent of all Twin Cities industrial-commercial tax
base added subsequent to 1971 will be shared on a regionwide
basis. The sharing of this tax base is determined by population
but adjusted if its property valuation is below the metropolitan
average per capita property valuation. 2 Thus, tax base is shared
on an equalizing basis which will help lessen the competition
among localities to increase the industrial and commercial property taxes within their borders.
B.

Local Cooperation

Most metropolitan areas have not gone as far
apolis-St. Paul in establishing regional institutions.
monly, they tend to operate in metropolitan councils
ments which create nonbinding coordination levels
state level. 93 There are, at the present time, some
94
jurisdictional planning bodies in existence.

as MinneMore comof governbelow the
650 multi-

This type of multi-jurisdictional cooperation was given a
boost by section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, which requires that specific types
of federal grant-in-aid applications from individual local governments located within standard metropolitan statistical areas
95
be subject to review and comment by an area-wide agency.
A large increase in area-wide agencies has resulted, which was
furthered by the issuance of Circular A-95 by the Office of
91 Ch. 24, S.F. No. 10 § 1(1), (2), [1971] Minn. Sess. Laws 1827 (to be codified as) MINN. STAT. § 473F.01(1), (2) (1971).
92 Id.
93 DOMESTIC COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON NATIONAL GROwTH 48 (1972).

,94Id. at 52.

9542 U.S.C. § 3334 (1970).
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Management and Budget on July 24, 1969.96 Under A-95 provisions, applications for grants for water and sewer, outdoor
recreation, highway planning and construction, hospitals, law
enforcement, and similar facilities must receive area-wide review and a review by state government. The overall effect
of this review process is not yet certain. It clearly would seem
to be a method for increasing cooperation in metropolitan areas
and for helping to formulate and execute urban growth policies.
Apart from A-95 applications, the courts are likely to approve such cooperation and coordination by local governments.
Local governments have been allowed to "provide cooperatively
for the needs of neighboring communities as well as [their]
own," 97 and have been required to give due consideration to
the needs and conditions of surrounding communities. 98 Through
such coordination and cooperation, local communities would not
have to allow every use within their boundaries,99 provided that
an excluded industry- which could not be prohibited in every
community as a nuisance- could be located in a nearby community.1 00
The possibilities of regional attempts at growth controleither on a cooperative or a more structured basis - are promising, although local tensions and jealousies have tended to retard
their full potential in the past. This level of government, however, affords too many advantages to not be utilized in the
future. Regional cooperation or government promises a level
of decisionmaking beyond the narrow perspective of single purpose districts and the chauvinism of small governmental units.
It offers a control structure close enough to be responsive to
the people, but sufficiently removed to gain needed perspectives.
The Minnesota experience may stimulate many decisionmakers
toward regional land use mechanisms.
06 Issued under authority of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
which provided that: "The President shall ...

establish rules and regu-

lations governing the formulation, evaluation, and review of Federal
programs and projects having significant impact on area and community development . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4231 (a) (1970).
97 Andrews v. Board of Adjustment, 30 N.J. 245, 251, 152 A.2d 580, 583

(1959).

98 Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441

(1954). See Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957); Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare:
Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism, 71 YALE L. J. 720 (1962).
See also River Vale Tp. v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir.
1968).
9 Cf. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 325, 139 A.2d
749, 752 (1958).
10 See Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347 (1949).
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III. STATEWIDE LAND USE ALTRNATnEs
Vigorous policies of state growth control are largely recent
in origin. The regulation of the land within its boundaries was
was a tenth amendment power impliedly reserved to each
state.Y°" The states, in turn, have delegated much of that authority to local governments. States are finding today that they
have, in fact, delegated too much responsibility to local governments which have neither the expertise nor the perspective to
make large scale land use decisions or to solve problems which
cut across local boundaries. This dilemma has been succinctly
described by the 1972 Yearbook of Agriculture:
Presently, land development is an aggregate of thousands of unrelated decisions made by single-purpose agencies, local governments, and private land owners without regard for each other
0
or for regional, statewide, and national concerns.1 2

Among the alternatives available to the states to assume
command of this situation and to control population distribution
within their boundaries are: setting aside of state parklands,
passage of state environmental policy acts and statewide land
use control programs, and the encouragement of a population
distribution policy through taxing, conservation easements, and
incentives to private land owners to grant public access to open
space. These choices are developed below with special emphasis
on some of the state-instituted land use programs that are proving successful.
A.

State Parklands

State governments, though to a lesser extent than the federal government, have set aside virgin land, wilderness, and
open space for the benefit of the public. The 2,136,857 acres
preserved as "forever wild" in 1894 by the New York Constitution in the Adirondack Forest Perserve is the outstanding example of state preservation of wilderness open space. 0 3 Timber
on this state-owned preserve cannot be cut, sold, removed, or
destroyed; and other commercial and industrial development is
prohibited within the preserve. The State of California, in conjunction with the Save-the-Redwoods League, has set aside
"some of the finest primeval groves in 28 redwood state
101 The powers nct delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
102 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 26, at 207.
103 N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1. See Comment, Permissible Uses of New York's

Forest Preserve Under "Forever Wild," 19 SY.

L. REv. 969 (1968).
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parks.' 10 4 These parks protect about one-tenth of the redwoods
still standing in California. 10 The Redwoods National Park was
designed to incorporate three of these state parks. The State of
Washington has established, as part of its coast, a seashore conservation area to be preserved in its natural state, or best possible condition, for public recreational use. 0
A number of states have instituted programs providing for
the continual acquisition of open space and parkland by the
state." 7 The New Jersey Green Acres Land Acquisition Act of
1961108 authorizes the state to provide funds to local governments to acquire lands for public recreation and the conservation of natural resources. Pennsylvania has enacted two constitutional amendments, 1° 9 implemented by statute, 11 authorizing massive bond-issue-supported state spending. The purpose is
the acquisition of state and local parks and reservoirs for conservation, recreation, open space, and historical preservation.
As well, the reclamation and development as parklands of
abandoned strip mine areas is sought. The success of such a
program, of course, depends upon the market for the bonds,
and may be less effective than a program financed by appropriations from taxes collected.
Unfortunately, only a limited number of states attempt to
protect public parklands from being taken for highways or
other uses."' The prior public use doctrine, 112 which in many
states requires a specific legislative authorization of condemnation of public parks, or other lands devoted to a public purpose,
has been inadequate to protect state and local parklands from
being taken to build highways.' 1 3 In addition, courts have not
applied the prior public use doctrine to protect privately owned
104

F. LEYDET,
(1969).

THE LAST REDWOODS AND THE PARKLAND OF REDWOOD CREEK 19

105 Atkinson, California Redwoods, a Country's Natural and Spirtual Re-

source, Are in Danger, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1964, at 30, col. 4.
§§ 43.51.650-.685 (1970).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, §§ 465a et seq., 501 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp.

i"(;WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
107

1972); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:8A-1 to -18 (1968); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW §§
1-0701 to -0715 (McKinney 1967), 2-0101 to -0117 (McKinney Supp.
1972); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1517.01-09 (Page Supp. 1970).
108 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:8 A-1 to -18 (1968).
'0")PA. CONST. art. 8, §§ 15, 16.
1"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5101-21 (Supp. 1971), tit. 72, §§ 3946.1-.22
(1968).
"' See Forer, supra note 33, at 1106-07.
112 The prior public use doctrine, where applicable, restricts one governmental body in the condemnation of land used for public purposes by
another governmental body, usually requiring, at minimum, specific
113

legislative authorization from the condemning body.
See Forer, supra note 33, at 1104-05. See generally Note, Reconciling
Competing Public Claims on Land, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 155 (1968).
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wildlife refuges or other privately owned open space. 114 Forer
has proposed a statute that would modify the prior public use
doctrine to afford greater protection to public parklands, and
to authorize citizen litigation to challenge takings of public
parklands for other public purposes."15
B. Environmental Policy Acts
If states enact environmental policy acts similar to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,116 agencies of the state
government- including municipal governments created by the
state-could be restrained from actions which adversely affect
the environmental value of open space and wilderness areas or
which encourage population growth and development in the
same manner that federal agencies are restrained by the 1969
Act. These statutes would make the power of eminent domain
7
subject to environmental considerations."
California has adopted such a statute, the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970.118 It is applicable to state
agencies, boards, and commissions. Local governmental agencies
are required to make environmental impact statements with
respect to land acquisition or construction projects for which
they receive an allocation of state or federal funds from a state
agency. Where city and county legislative bodies have officially
adopted a conservation element for a general plan, they are required to find that any project they undertake which may have
significant effects upon the environment be in accord with such
conservation element. All other local governmental agencies
must make environmental impact reports to the appropriate
local planning agency with respect to any project they intend
to carry out and which may have a significant effect upon the
environment. 119
C. State-Initiated Regional Land Use Plans
A number of states have enacted regional land use plans
and programs similar to those which would be required by bills
introduced in the first session of the 92d Congress. 120 Such
Texas E. Trans. Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d
130 (1966), aff'd (after remand), 49 N.J. 403, 230 A.2d 505 (1967). See
Tarlock, Eminent Domain -Review of Route Selection Made by Public
Utility through Private Wildlife Refuge, 8 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1968); Note,
52 IOWA L. REV. 1209 (1967); McCarter, The Case that Almost Was, 54
A.B.A.J. 1076 (1968).
115 Forer, supra note 33, at 1122-23.
11642 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
117 See generally Note, Eminent Domain and the Environment, 56 CORNELL
L. REv. (1971); Note, Eminent Domain - Ecological Considerations and
the Environment, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1079 (1971).
118 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-151 (West Supp. 1971).
119 Id. §§ 21150, 21151. See also text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
120 See text accompanying notes 194-99, 215-20 infra.
114
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statutes can be justified on the grounds that conflicting decisions by each local political subdivision of a state which resolve
conflicts between economic development and environmental
protection very often will not be in the best interests of the
state, the nation, or even in the best interests of the region in
which a particular community is geographically and economically located. A local community may decide to allow an industrial plant to be built on unique and valuable marshland or
open space within its jurisdiction, whereas that plant might be
built in a neighboring community on wasteland, while still
satisfying the former community's economic needs. Only coordinated regional, statewide, or interstate land use planning
can prevent such inefficiency in realization of benefits to the
21
public from land use management.'
1. Estuarine Controls
Land use management of a region defined to encompass a
seacoast or a bay or lake and its shoreline can be an effective
means to protect coastal and estuarine areas where many communities border the water. If these various communities depend
upon different means of economic support, they will likely afford varying degrees of protection to environmental values of
land resources within their borders. This result could occur
even if each community had to comply with a state statute
requiring it to protect the environmental values of the land
resources within its jurisdiction. Depending upon the economic
needs of each community, such a statute would probably be
interpreted differently by communities throughout a region,
and a uniform land use policy providing protection of environmental resources and consideration of population distribution in
the region would be unlikely. A community oriented toward industrial development might permit an industry to locate on its
shoreline, while a state-created regional land use commission
with regional enforcement powers might locate that industry
in a nearby community, with fewer overall adverse environmental and population effects, but with equal economic benefits
122
to the region.
See, e.g., the approach suggested by Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65,
at 208-13.
122 A general summary of state statutes regulating and protecting estuarine
areas is presented in J. LuDwIGSON, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE
COASTAL ZONE (1 ENVIR. REP. (Monographs) No. 3, May 1, 1970). See generally Delogu, Land Use Control Principles Applied to Offshore Coastal
Waters, 59 Ky. L.J. 606 (1971); Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislalation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 351 (1970); Teclaff, The
Coastal Zone - Control over Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J.
121
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A number of states have established regulatory programs
designed to protect the environmental values of coastal and
estuarine areas. The Georgia Coastal Marshlands Protection Act
of 1970123 requires a permit to be issued by the Georgia Coastal
Marshlands Protection Agency before any marsh within the
state's estuarine area can be dredged, drained, filled, or otherwise altered. The issuance of permits is based on consideration
of the publi( interest, including conservation of wildlife and
marine life, erosion, and effects upon navigable waterways.
12 7
125
New Jersey, 126 Connecticut,
North Carolina, 124 California,
and Maine 128 have enacted similar permit programs to protect
the environmental values of their wetlands. The Michigan
Shorelands Protection and Management Act of 1970129 is designed to protect the shores of the Great Lakes and connecting
waterways within the jurisdiction of Michigan from adverse environmental damage by requiring county, city, village, and township zoning regulations to prevent damage to the Great Lakes
shores. The state water resources commission has the power
to disapprove zoning regulations for failure to comply with this
requirement.
2. The San Francisco Bay Program
A regional land use program has been established in an
attempt to preserve San Francisco Bay. In the 120 years prior
to creation of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission,'1 30 the area of San Francisco Bay had been
reduced by 250 square miles. To prevent this rapid, and in
many cases unplanned, filling of the bay, the Commission was
empowered to control piecemeal filling of the bay by considering each particular fill application in terms of the effect of the
fill upon the entire bay. The Commission has been given the
power to issue or deny permits for any proposed project that
involves placing fill, extracting materials, or making a substantial change in the use of any water, land, or structure
within the Commissioner's jurisdiction (which extends 100 feet
landward of, and parallel with, the highwater mark of San
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-136 to -147 (Supp. 1971).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-229, 113-230 (Supp. 1971 (Pamph. No. 12 at
219)).
as amended, (West Supp.
125 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6301 et seq. (1956),
1971).
126 N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 13:9A-1 to -10 (Supp. 1971).
127 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7h to -7o (Supp. 1971).
8
12 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-58 (Supp. 1972).
129 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.631-.645 (Supp. 1972).
130 CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 66600-53 (West 1966), as amended, 66601-61 (West
Supp. 1971).
123

124
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Francisco Bay). In order to obtain a permit, the applicant must
show that there is no alternative upland location for his project,
that benefits to the public clearly outweigh detrimental effects
upon the public, and the project is water-oriented (which includes, however, airports and bridges). Fill or dredging projects
which are permitted must minimize adverse environmental
effects. 18 1
3. The Adirondack Park Protection
3 2
New York has established an Adirondack Park Agency'
because of the threat to the over 2 million acre Adirondack
Forest Preserve from potential development of the 3.5 million
acres of privately owned land intermixed and contiguous with
the state parkland. The Agency has been empowered to prepare, in consultation with local governments, a land use and
development plan applicable to all private land within the
Adirondack Park. This plan is to provide for private land development in the Adirondack area to insure optimum overall
conservation protection, preservation, development, and use of
the resources of the park. Though the plan is subject to the
approval of the state legislature and the governor and is advisory in nature, the Agency has the power to regulate private
land development in the Adirondack area while the report is
being prepared. The Agency will also prepare a master plan
for management of state lands in the Adirondack area (i.e., the
Adirondack Forest Preserve). States seeking to protect state
parklands from the pressures of haphazard contiguous development of private lands might follow the example of the Adiron33
dack Agency.'
4. The Lake Tahoe Interstate Plan
Because of the rapid growth of the Lake Tahoe region bordering California and Nevada and the accompanying environmental degradation, Nevada and California have formed an interstate compact13 4 to establish and enforce a general plan for
the interstate Tahoe region. The general plan of the Tahoe Regional Planning Commission will have the force of a general
ordinance applicable throughout the basin, with state agencies,
See generally Note, San Francisco Bay: Regional Regulation for its Protection and Development, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 728 (1967).
132N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 800-10 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
133 See Broesche, Land-Use Regulation for the Protection of Public Parks
-and Recreational Areas, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 96 (1966).
134 Act of Dec. 18, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360; CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 66800-01 (West Supp. 1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 277.190-.200 (1968).
See People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487
P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
131
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counties, cities, and other political subdivisions such as the California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, having the power to
adopt ordinances, rules, and regulations which conform with
the minimum standards of the general plan of the Commission.
Political subdivisions of the two states may adopt equal or
higher standards than those of the general plan. The Commission can force political subdivisions of the two states to comply
with the general plan by court action; violations of the general
135
plan are misdemeanors.
The Tahoe Regional Planning Compact is an imaginative
solution to an interstate land use management problem. By
establishing an interstate commission with the power to implement and enforce a general plan for the two-state region, California and Nevada have achieved a more effective solution than
if they had made the general plan advisory in nature (which is
the case with the Adirondack Park Plan). This regional approach to land use management may be a most effective method
to protect open space and provide for orderly development for
states bordering the Great Lakes and coastal states, where urban sprawl proceeds beyond state borders.
The Maine Coastal Island Trust Commission
Maine has established the Coastal Island Trust Commission
in order to protect its coastal islands.136 This Commission has the
duty to develop and maintain a comprehensive plan to preserve,
restore, utilize, and develop the commercial, natural, scenic, historic, and recreational values of the coastal islands of Maine.
The Commission's plan is to recommend action to be taken by
local, state, and federal governments to solve the land use
planning problems of the coastal islands. The Commission can
recommend master plans and zoning ordinances for the coastal
island trust areas to be established under the Act, and can issue
guidelines prescribing standards for such plans and ordinances.
Unlike the Tahoe Regional Planning Commission, which may
only set minimum standards applicable to the basin, and must
go to court to force noncomplying jurisdictions to adopt the
standards, the Maine Coastal Islands Trust Commission has the
power to directly adopt and enforce its own master plans and
regulations if the state or its political subdivisions fail to do
so. 1. 7 This provision has the virtue of allowing local communities to set stricter environmental control standards, while assur5.

67000-130 (West Supp. 1971).
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 641-46 (Supp. 1972).

135 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
136 ME.

137 Id.

REv. STAT.

§ 644 (2).
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ing implementation of statewide or regional policy that protects
environmental values in the absence of local action. The Commission, in addition, can recommend that the state or its political subdivisions acquire privately owned property or interests
therein for use as parks and for preservation in a natural state,
and can acquire such property or interests by donation or negotiated purchase - but not by eminent domain - if the state or
its political subdivisions fail to do so.
6.

The Delaware Coastal Strip

The State of Delaware is attempting an unusual approach
to regional land use management of its coastal area. Rather
than using the permit system, or minimum zoning and master
plan standards established and enforced by a regional commission, Delaware has sought to protect coastal and estuarine areas
for recreation and tourism by totally prohibiting industries considered to be heavy polluters from locating within a designated
coastal strip. This coastal strip runs the length of the border
from Pennsylvania to Maryland and has a width which varies
from about a mile on the Delaware River in the north to about
10 miles at the widest point on Delaware Bay. 138 Wetlands extending up to 5 miles inland are protected by this coastal strip,
while the seaward line extends to the middle of Delaware Bay
and to the 3-mile territorial limit in the Atlantic Ocean. Delaware has specifically barred from this coastal zone, as heavy
polluters, refineries, steel mills, paper mills, petrochemical complexes, and offshore bulk transfer terminals. Nonpolluting industries include "garment factories, automobile assembly plants,
and jewelry and leather goods manufacturing establishments.' 1 39
This Delaware statute may serve as a model for other states to
enact statewide zoning regulations segregating industrial polluters and ecologically destructive development from a state's
valuable land, water, and natural resources. 41 New York's
Adirondack Park Agency and the Tahoe Planning Commission
might attempt such a scheme, which could be used to control
tourist facilities which threaten many public parks.
State-created regional zoning is a good approach to protect
areas such as lakeshores, coastlines, and state parklands, with
similar and interrelated environmental values, from the pressures of unregulated development. Regional land use management of such areas recognizes that the entire region is a unified
land resource, and that commercial development that adversely
138 Janson, Delaware Bars Heavy Industry from Coast to Curb Pollution,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
139 Id. at 61, col. 1, 3.
140

Id.
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affects part of the resource in one community adversely affects
the whole. Management at this level also recognizes that the
pattern of economic development and thus, the distribution of
population within the region, is of significance to all residents
of the region, and should be regulated on a regional, rather
than local, basis. Regional land use planning and management
can be supervised by a state-level commission which considers
the overall needs of the region, so that the economic greed of a
local community cannot result in uncoordinated misuse of regionally-significant land resources.
State-Initiated Statewide Land Use Plans
Statewide land use management is an effective means of
regulating open space, green belts, transportation corridors, and
other growth related land use patterns. One state, Arizona, has
initiated a special new communities act. 1 4 1 Such statewide control can offer a truly viable response to the problem of coordinating regulation of various types of development in local
communities. It can also complement the protection afforded
to the environmental value of land resources by regional land
use management. Hawaii has adopted statewide zoning which
classifies, at a state level, all land in Hawaii into four classifications: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservational. 42 Hawaii
found that prior to 1961, development for urban land uses often
tended to be in areas where it was uneconomical for public
agencies to provide proper service facilities or that development
would occur on some of the state's limited prime agricultural
land. It was felt the answer to these problems and others was
the statewide land use classification. 143 The Hawaiian experience, while of great importance, is probably not transferable
to other states because of long standing local fears of statewide
zoning. The materials that follow will explore other possibilities more politically achievable in the vast majority of states.
Legislation is moving fast in this area and no attempt will be
made to catalogue all of the recent legislation. 4 4 Instead, some
important examples will be discussed.
1. Maine Land Use Management

D.

Maine has supplemented its regional coastal islands trust
statute and its coastal wetlands statute with a pair of statewide
land use management programs. One program through the
14' ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-771 et seq. (1971).
142 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-2 (Supp. 1961).
143

See generally

UNIVEsrrY OF HAWAII COOPERATIVE

EXTENSION

SERVICE,

FACTS ABOUT ACT 205 (Public Affairs Series No. 11) (1971).
144 See, e.g., Florida Land and Water Environmental Management Act of
1972, FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (Supp. 1972).
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Maine Water and Air Environmental Improvement Commission,
provides for statewide control of industrial development and
location, for the purpose of minimizing adverse effects on the
natural environment by industrial operations which would substantially affect the environment. 145 In order for industrial
development or location of an industry to be approved, the
developer must prove that there is adequate provision in his
plans for fitting his project harmoniously into the existing
natural environment and that his project will not adversely
affect existing uses, the land's scenic character, natural resources, or property values in the municipality or in adjoining
municipalities. This statute applies to industrial development
occupying in excess of 20 acres, projects which involve drilling
for, or excavating, natural resources, or structures which occupy
146
in excess of 60,000 square feet on a single parcel of land.
Maine has also given the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission authority to protect the environment and to regulate
the development of unorganized and deorganized townships and
mainland and island plantations, an area comprising about 10
million acres -42
percent of the state's land. 147 The Commission has the authority to classify the lands under its jurisdiction
into four types of districts-one type for protection of land in
its natural state, one type for development, one type to be held
for future development, and one type for commercial forestry
and agriculture. In all of these districts, the Commission is required to insure the protection of the environment. The environmental controls of this statute, however, are not applicable
to private power companies, single family houses occupied year
round, and current farming and commercial forest protection.
These exemptions may weaken the potential force of this statute.
The statute states that when it is in conflict with other
statutes, the statute which is more protective of existing natural,
recreational, and historic resources governs. Consequently, when
the conditions for approval of industrial development or location imposed under the Maine statute providing statewide control of industrial development and location 148 conflict with the
land use standards imposed under the deorganized and unorganized townships developments statute, the conditions which
are more protective of the environment apply. But there is no
145 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1972).

1461d. § 482(2).
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 683-85C (Supp. 1972); 2 ENVIR. REP.
(Current Dev.) 321 (1971-72).
See text accom148 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1972).
panying note 127 supra.
'47ME.
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such provision to govern conflicts between the statute providing
for statewide control of industrial development and location, and
the statutes governing development on the Maine coastal wetlands 149 and on the Maine coastal islands. 150 A developer will
have to comply with two or more sets of regulations where he
seeks to construct a project on coastal wetlands or coastal
islands, since he will be regulated also by the statewide development and location statute and may be additionally subject to
the unorganized township statute and either the coastal islands
or coastal wetlands statute. If the conditions required by each
regulation conflict, the developer will have to comply with the
standards requiring the strictest environmental protection unless there is an irreconcilable conflict. In cases of irreconcilable conflict, one would hope that the respective commissions
will reach an accord. If they cannot, the courts will have to
untangle this legislative complication.
2.

Vermont Land Use Management

Vermont has established a state environmental board and
district environmental commissions to regulate land use and to
establish comprehensive state capability, development, and land
use plans.15 1 This statute applies to the construction of any improvements, by private persons, industry, or state and municipal
government, of more than 10 acres; any commercial or industrial improvements on more than one acre of land within a
municipality that does not have permanent zoning and subdivision laws; housing projects of more than 10 units; and any
construction of improvements above 2500 feet elevation. This
statute, however, does not apply to construction of pipelines,
power or telephone lines, or other "corridor" development,
which is to extend more than 5 miles. Construction for farming,
logging, or forestry purposes below 2500 feet elevation are excluded, as are electric generation or transmission facilities certified by the state. Permits issued by a district environmental
commission are required for development regulated by the Act,
as well as for the sale of, or construction upon, land that is part
of a subdivision containing 10 or more units. But no permit is

149 ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
l5°ME.

tit.

12, §§ 4701-58 (Supp. 1972).
12, §§ 641-46 (Supp. 1972).

REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

See text accom-

panying note 136 supra.
Developers have been
tit. 10, §§ 6001-91 (Supp. 1971)
cooperating with state and local agencies under this statute to protect
the mountains of Vermont. See Fales, Can Our Mountains Be Saved?,
PARADE, OCT. 31, 1971, at 10, 12-13.

151 VT. STAT. ANN.
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required if a subdivision is sold as a single unit. Permits may
not be issued if the proposed subdivision or development will
cause "unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity of
the land to hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condition may result."' 5 2 Nor may permits be issued if the proposal
would have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural
beauty of the area, on the aesthetics of the area, on historic
sites, or on rare and irreplacable natural areas.
Permits also can be issued only after a finding that the
subdivision or development will not result in undue air or water
pollution, based upon a consideration of
the elevation of land above sea level; and in relation to the flood
plains, the nature of soils and subsoils and their ability to adequately support waste disposal; the slcpe of the land and its effect
on effluents; the availability of streams for disposal of effluents; and the applicable health and water resources department
1 53
regulations.

The Act also requires that there be no unreasonable burdens
on existing water supplies, on the ability of municipalities to
provide educational or governmental services, or to proposed
15 4
or existing highway systems.
Unfortunately, the statute does not define what is unreasonable or undue under the Act, and the environmental protection
afforded to land resources by the Act will consequently depend
upon the personal values and judgment of members of the commissions. In addition, the burden of showing adverse environmental effects to be "undue" is upon persons opposing issuance
of a permit, though the burden is on the person seeking the
permit to show that his proposal will not cause unreasonable
soil erosion or pollute the air or water. The Commission may
require the developer to dedicate lands for public use as a condition of the permit.'55
The permit system is enforced by provisions providing that
deeds cannot be recorded without an accompanying certificate
from a commission that the conveyance and development of the
property is in compliance with the permit requirements. This
Vermont statute provides, in addition, for a statewide land use
plan to be developed by the environmental board, subject to
approval by the governor and legislature. This plan is to be
15 2VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,

§ 6086(a) (4) (Supp. 1971).
153 Id. § 6086 (a) (1).
54Id.§6086(a) (3), (6), (5).
155 Id. § 6086(c). See also text accompanying note 33 supra.
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further implemented by local land use controls, such as subdivision regulations and zoning. 156
In order for statewide land use development to effectively
protect environmental values, regulation under such programs
must apply to all projects and development which may significantly affect the environment. State legislatures will have to
resist the pressure of lobbyists for power companies and lumber
companies, and other economic powers within the state, to
exempt certain industries or economic interests from the requirements of such statutes. Rather than enacting laws like the
Vermont statute, which leave approval of development to the
discretion of commission members, statewide land use development regulations should be similar to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,157 and require applicants for permits
to develop land to file environmental impact statements like
those required by that Act.'5 8 Regulation of development under
such a statute, of course, would be limited by the constitutional
prohibitions against the taking of property without just compensation.
E. A Model Land Development Code
The American Law Institute is drafting a Model Land Development Code' 1 9 which updates the standard land use and
zoning code proposed by the U.S. Development of Commerce in
the 1920's and adopted by most states. 10 The new model code
will recognize the increased need for state input in land use
decisions. It will require a state land planning agency to establish rules and standards governing development having state
or regional impact. The first decisional choice is retained at the
local level, usually reserved to the county commissioners, but
the state planning agency will have the right to review any of
these decisions which have statewide impact. This scheme is
156 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,

§§ 6081(a), 6041 et seq. (Supp. 1971). In a step
that may result in programs similar to those of Maine and Vermont,
North Carolina has established a state commission to prepare a study
of state land use goals and policies to lead to eventual statewide land
use planning. 2 ENVIR. REP. (Current Dev.) 412 (1971-72). California is
presently considering regional coastal land use management bills. N.Y.
Times, June 6, 1971, at 51, col. 1. Voters of Suffolk County, New York,
have recently defeated a proposed amendment to the county charter
which would have given the Suffolk Planning Commission the power
to review all zoning changes or variances within 500 feet of any shoreline or waterway of more than 1,000 miles of Suffolk County's shoreline,
subject to veto only by a majority-plus-one vote of the local township
boards. Andelman, Bond Issue Tied to Defeat of Suffolk Shoreline Plan,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, at 33, col. 7.
157 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970).
158 Id. § 4332.
159 ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3 (1971)).
160 See YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 26, at 208.
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designed to leave the decisionmaking power with local levels
while at the same time vesting the right of review in the appropriate state agency where local plans threaten to contradict
statewide growth policies. Similar legislation has been recommended by the Council of State Governments,1 6' and the newlyenacted Florida Land Management Act of 1972 was patterned
162
after this model code.
F.

Tax Policies
Critics have noted that most local property tax systems
force owners of open space land to sell the land for development. 163 Property tax assessment is usually based upon the
present fair market value of the land for its highest and best
use. Thus, assessment of open space and undeveloped land is
based upon consideration of the value of the land for potential
development. As a result, property taxes are high compared to
the low income which the owner receives from open space use
of his land, and the property owner may have to sell to a
16 4
developer because of an inability to pay the property taxes.
States can do much to encourage open space preservation by
private landowners by structuring their tax rates so as to make
it financially beneficial for a landowner to preserve his land as
165
open space.
A number of states do attempt to encourage preservation
of open space by private landowners by giving tax benefits to
property owners who maintain their land as open space or
recreational areas. 16 6 Several states provide for payments by
the state to political subdivisions which lose taxes as a result
of property within their jurisdiction being acquired for state
parkland. 67 This decreases the pressure upon local municipalities to raise taxes upon other undeveloped property, forcing
161 See generally COUNCIL OF STATE PLANNING AGENCIES, State and Local
Land Use Planning, in STATE PLANNING ISSUES (1971).
162 See Washington Post, Apr. 20, 1972, § E, at 3, col. 1, where the Act's chief
sponsor. Senator Robert Graham, said, "Florida is the first state to adopt
the American Law Institute's recommended approach. . . . This is an
attempt for the state to use its influence in giving positive direction to
development."
163 See, e.g., McCloskey, Jr., Preservation of America's Open Space: Proposal for a National Land Use Commission, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1167, 1170
(1970).
.164 Id.

165 See generally, Note, Toward Optimal Land Use: Property Tax Policy
and Land Use Planning, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 856 (1967).
166 Moore, The Acquisition and Preservation of Open Lands, 23 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 274, 291 n.86 (1966). See also Forer, supra note 33, at 109394 n.3.
167 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216-A: 3-a (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

72, § 3946.19 (1968).
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development of such land. In 1966, California adopted an amendment to its constitution which states that "assessment practices
must be so designed as to permit the continued availability of
open space lands for [the production of food and fiber production and to assure the use and enjoyment of natural resources
and scenic beauty for the economic and social well-being of the
state and its citizens]. " 16 The legislature is given the power to
implement this amendment.
Three methods of structuring a tax policy to encourage open
space preservation have been suggested."1 1 The first method is
a general direction to tax assessors to presume that a land use
control (such as zoning restrictions on the use of land) currently applied to a given parcel of land is permanent, in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary. Undeveloped land is
thus not assessed at a value based upon the value of the property for development; rather, the assessor is directed to ignore
surrounding land use classification and not presume imminent
development. The second method suggested is preferential
assessment - assessing land being used for a specified open
space purpose at its value for its present use or for a use
presently permitted by zoning regulations. This method allows
some uses, such as open space, to be statutory preferences. The
third method, tax deferral, involves postponing the payment of
taxes on that portion of the market value of the land preserved
as open space which exceeds the value of the property for its
present use as open space, until the owner subjects the land to
a more intensive use. The landowner pays a low tax as long
as he does not develop his property, but if he ever subjects his
land to commercial development, he must pay the accumulated
difference between the low taxes he paid while maintaining his
land as open space, and the higher taxes which reflect the full
170
market value of the land for development.
The tax deferral approach probably does not cause a significant tax loss to the municipality; though the muncipality
collects no taxes on the land, the taxable base of surrounding
land will probably increase because of its higher market value
171
But
due to its proximity to the open space, tax-deferred land.
inalso
lands
this increase in market value of surrounding
CONST. art. 28, § 1. See also Alden & Shockro, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Lands: Preservation or Discrimination?, 42
S. CAL. L. REv. 59, 65 (1969).
169 Moore, supra note 166, at 290-93.
168CAL.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 283.
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creases the value of tax-deferred land for development, and
probably makes it more likely that such property will be de1 72
veloped.
G.

Conservation Easements
Rather than condemn private property in order to preserve
open space, a state government might take a negative easement
in private property. 173 Some states have used this method to
establish aesthetic corridors alongside highways. 74 The method
generally involves the government purchasing a negative easement, comprising a landowner's right to develop his property,
with compensation paid for the resultant decrease in the value
of the land. The landowner keeps title and can use his land in
a manner that is not inconsistent with the rights conveyed to
the government. The deeds creating such negative easements
normally prohibit the erection of structures, the construction of
roads, the removal of trees or other vegetation, and trash dis175
posal on the land.
The acquisition of development rights by condemnation of
easements or other interests less than fee is unlikely to be
enforced by a court where the interest condemned is vaguely
defined or, depending for definition upon the exercise of an
official's discretion, "unless there is a definite community
scheme applicable to a described area which can supply a
standard against which the exercise of discretion involved can
be measured.' ' 76 In addition, acquisition of easements is a relatively expensive method of open space preservation; a state or
municipality must anticipate a landowner's value realization
many years in the future- value realizations which the landowner may have no intention of realizing- and must pay immediately for all the development value of the land from which
the easement was acquired. 7 7 Compensation for condemnation
of scenic easements, based on estimated future development
value, may inflate the actual development value of contiguous
land by focusing public attention on the development potential
78
of the land.1
172

Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65, at 190.
(1968); Moore, supra
note 166.
Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to Promote Aesthetics Along
Transportation Corridors,17 BuFF. L. REV. 701 (1968).
Moore, supra note 166, at 281-84.
Krasnowiecki & Paul, supra note 65, at 194 n.57 (citing dictum in a number of decisions).

173 See generally W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE
174
175
176

177

Id. at 195.

178 Id.
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H.

Encouragement of Public Access to Privately Owned Open
Space

In addition to encouraging private landowners to preserve
open space through tax policies and other devices, a state should
encourage a landowner to allow the public to use the open space
which he owns. The federal government has several programs
which provide financial encouragement to private land owners
to permit public access for recreational purposes, 1' which the
states could emulate. States could also increase payments for
negative easements if a landowner opened his land to the use
of the public. States could also enact, as Delaware has, 80 a
statute limiting the liability of landowners who make land and
water areas available to the public by abolishing the licenseeinvitee obigations where the landowner does not charge the
public to use his land. This makes the landowner liable only
for malicious or willful injury to members of the public from
the use of his land.
IV.

FEDERAL LAND USE ALTERNATIVES

The Rockfeller Report on Population and the American
Future has recommended that "[t]he federal government develop a set of national population distribution guidelines to
serve as a framework for regional, state, and local plans and
development.'' s The difficulty in effectuating that recommendation through land use decisions is that the role of the federal
government is still unsettled in land use policy generally and in
the control of growth specifically. Patrick Moynihan has stated
with great insight, "We have long had a national urban growth
policy familiar under the more modest guise of the Federal
Highway Program.' u8 2 In addition to the long standing grantsin-aid for planning and open space development, there is a
growing dialogue that the federal government's role should
actually be more extensive. The National Goals Research Staff
has recommended a national growth policy described as follows:
A national growth policy will not be a single policy. Rather, it
will be composed of an entire constellation of policies that collectively will shape both the directions of our society in terms

179 See 16 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq. (1970); 7 U.S.C. 1838 (1970).

180 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-07 (Supp. 1971).
181 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AmERICAN

FUTURE, supra note 1, at 213.
182 Quoted in an address by Dr. Richard H. Slavin entitled "Components

of National and State Land Use Policy," delivered at the Meeting of
the Council of State Planning Agencies, Washington, D.C., January 10-13,
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of its growth and the balance among many segments of the
83
society in terms of priorities and interrelationships.1

The federal government has in the past made significant
efforts to influence the forces affecting urbanization and economic growth, which, while not described as land use policy,
often have had the same effect. 8 4 Like past efforts, many of
the current land use regulation proposals pending at the federal
level do not set up federal land use regulations, but attempt to
induce states into increased responsibility and expertise in the
land use area. We must thus look first to these federal programs which have an indirect effect on land use, and then to
other proposals which attempt to seek actual land use regulation.
A. Programs of Indirect Effect
1. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 clearly requires that the federal government comply with the Act prior
to undertaking construction, action, or granting funds to a state
or political subdivision thereof for a project that may significantly affect the environment of open space or wilderness
areas. 1 5 More specifically, the Act requires that federal agen183

NATIONAL GOALS RESEARCH STAFF, TOWARD BALANCED GROWTH:

WITH QUALITY,

supra note 22, at 160.

QUANTITY

The Employment Act of 1946 [15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (1970)] was aimed at
creating conditions under which there will exist jobs for all those able,
willing, and seeking work, and at promoting maximum employment, production, and purchasing power. The goal of the National Housing Act
of 1949 [Pub. L. No. 81-171, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in part at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1703, 1709, 1738 (1970))] is to provide a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family. The Public Works
and Economic Development Act of 1965 [Pub. L. No. 89-136, 79 Stat.
552 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1970))] is directed at
helping areas and regions of substantial and persistent unemployment
and underemployment to plan and finance public works and economic
development essentially for the purpose of creating new employment
opportunities. The goal of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 [Pub.
L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(1970))] is "to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty
in this nation by opening to everyone the opportunity for education
and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in
decency and dignity." The purpose of the Appalachian Regional
Development Act of 1965 [Pub. L. No. 89-4, 79 Stat. 5 (codified in scattered sections of 40 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C. App. (1970))] is to assist this particular region "in meeting its special problems, to promote its economic
development, and to establish a framework for joint Federal and State
efforts toward providing the basic facilities essential to its growth and
attacking its common needs on a coordinated and concerted regional
basis." Finally, Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966 [Pub. L. No. 89-754, 80 Stat. 1255 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C. (1970))] is aimed at enabling cities to improve living conditions for their residents, including rebuilding slum
areas, expanding jobs, housing, and income opportunities, establishing
better access between homes and jobs, and reducing dependence on
welfare payments.
18542 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et. seq. See Guidelines, Council on Environmental
Quality, 36 Fed. Reg. 1398-402 (1971), as modified, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29
(1971); see e.g., Named Ind. Members of the San Antonio Conserv.
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dept. Dept., 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), (cert.
denied (prior to judgment), 400 U.S. 968 (1970) (Black, Brennen, and
Douglas, J.J. dissenting in writen opinions)).
184
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cies consider the effects upon population growth and concentration before any grants or actions they take.186 The Department
of Housing and Urban Development has been enjoined from
making a federal grant to a private developer to construct a
16-story high-rise apartment in an urban area until preparing
an environmental impact statement in compliance with NEPA,
where the high-rise would change the character of a neighborhood with no high-rise apartments, would concentrate population in the area, would draw a greater concentration of population in the future, would incidentally increase automobile
traffic, and would result in a loss of view to some neighborhood
lots.' 8 7 Such potentialities were held to be significant cumulative effects on the human environment: an environment
which section 102 of NEPA8 8 mandates must be studied and
considered first.
2. Congressional Encouragement of Open Space
While the National Environmental Policy Act insures that
federal grants to state and local governments be conditioned
upon the requirement of consideration for protecting open space
and controlling growth, Congress has also sought to encourage
states to preserve open space and wilderness areas. Congress
passed the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965,189
establishing a fund to provide federal financial assistance to the
states for planning, acquisition, and development of needed land
and water areas and facilities for outdoor recreation. Congress
has authorized the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to make grants to states and political subdivisions to
acquire and develop parks and open space. 19 0 Five hundred and
sixty million dollars has been authorized for this program. Recipients of grants under this program need approval of the
Secretary prior to changing the use of parks and open space
acquired. Approval is conditioned upon the substitution of
equivalent parkland or open space to replace the areas diverted
for other uses.
3. Congressional Encouragement to Protect Estuarine Areas
Congress has sought to encourage the states to protect estuarine areas. The Secretary of the Interior has been authorized to make an inventory of the nation's estuaries, coastal
§ 101(b) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(5) (1970); S. Rep. No. 296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 19 (1969).
187 Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971).
18 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
18916 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to -11 (1970).
190 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500a-d (1970).
186NEPA
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marshlands, bays, sounds, seaward areas, lagoons, and land and
waters of the Great Lakes, and to determine whether such areas
should be acquired by the Secretary of the Interior for the
federal government, by a state or by political subdivisions
thereof, or whether such areas can be protected adequately by
local, state, and federal laws.19 ' The Secretary of the Interior
has also been authorized to study the feasibility of establishing
a nationwide system of estuarine areas, and has been given the
authority to enter into agreements with states, or political subdivisions or agencies of a state, to provide for permanent management, development, and administration of any estuarine
19 2
area owned or acquired after the agreement is entered into.
In approving funds to states under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 or under several fish and wildlife
conservation statutes, the Secretary of the Interior is required
to establish such terms and conditions as he deems necessary
to insure the permanent protection of estuarine areas, including
a provision that the lands or interests therein shall not be disposed of by sale, lease, donation, or exchange without prior
approval. 19 3
Several bills before the 92d Congress would provide further federal aid and encouragement to the states to protect
estuarine areas.19 4 A proposed Coastal and Estuarine Area
Management Act' 95 would authorize the Administrator of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency to make grants to
any state coastal authority to defray the authority's operation
expenses incurred in long range planning with respect to coastal
and estuarine area management and the implementation of
those plans. The Administrator would have to approve grants
for such long range planning or for the implementation of these
plans if the coastal authority complied with statutory requirements. In order for the Administrator to approve a grant, the
proposal of a coastal authority would have to fulfill the objectives of the Act, taking into consideration a number of factors, including the degree to which the proposal:
191 16 US.C. §§ 1221-26 (1970).
192 Id. §§ 1222(c), 1223.
193 Id. § 1225.
194 H.R. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 9229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1972); H.R. 2493, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 2492, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 582, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); The Senate passed S. 3507 in an amended form on Apr.
25, 1972, to assist states to establish coastal zone estuarine management
programs. See 3 ENviR. REP. 1563 (Apr. 28, 1972). On Aug. 2, 1972,
by a 376-6 vote the House passed and sent to conference H.R. Res.
14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), the Federal Coastal Zone Management Bill. 3 ENWR. REP. (Current Developments) 403 (Aug. 4, 1972).
195 H.R. 2492, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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(1) identifies the coastal areas requiring concentrated attention,
and develops a plan for their most effective utilization,
(2) provides machinery for the resolution of conflicts arising
from multiple use,

(3) fosters the widest possible variety of beneficial uses to maximize social return, achieving a balance between the need for conservation and for economic development,
(4) provides for necessary enforcement powers through zoning,
permits, licenses, easements, acquisition, or other means to assure compliance with plans and resolve conflicts in uses,
(5) fosters coordination with local, State and Federal agencies,
research instituticns, private organizations, and other groups as appropriate to provide a focus for effective management .... 196
The size of grants to individual states would depend upon the
population of the state, the size of their coastal or estuarine
area, and the financial need of the state.
Another proposed coastal and estuarine act' 97 would similarly provide for federal grants to states to encourage them to
protect estuarine and coastal areas. This bill would authorize
the Secretary of Commerce to make grants to coastal states to
assist them in developing and administering a management plan
and program to achieve a wise use of the land and water resources of the state's coastal and estuarine areas. The Secretary
of Commerce would be authorized to underwrite, by guarantee,
bond issues or loans to the states for the purposes of land
acquisition, land and water development, and restoration
projects in coastal and estuarine areas, as well as to make grants
to states to establish estuarine sanctuaries to be used for research with respect to natural and human processes occurring
within coastal and estuarine areas. A Senate version of the bill
would also authorize coastal states to review all public and
private development plans, projects, or regulations for conformance to the state plan and program. 198 The Senate version requires federal agencies which engage in or support projects in
any state's coastal or estuarine area to attempt to follow the
state management program in conducting their activities. This
bill also has a provision similar to section 21 of the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970,199 requiring applicants for
federal licenses or permits- as a prerequisite to issuance of
the license or permit- to obtain a certification from the state
that the proposed activity complies with the state coastal plan.
State and local governments submitting applications for federal
196 Id. at 3, 4.

197 H.R. 2493, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
198 S. 582, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
199 33 U.S.C. § 1171 (1970).
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grants would have to include a statement by the appropriate
state agency that the applicant's proposed project is consistent
with the state's coastal plan.
These proposals have been praised for providing methods
of reconciling differences among local, state, and federal value
systems with respect to coastal and estuarine areas, for encouraging the multiple use philosophy with respect to coastal
and estuarine areas-a management philosophy that has become accepted for the management of federal lands - and for
providing federal financial assistance to the states. They also
provide federal coordination of state programs, and engage the
federal government in establishing management standards for
coastal and estuarine areas which protect the national interest
in the natural resources in such areas. One criticism that can
be leveled at these proposals is that they fail to coordinate
coastal and estuarine management with management of the
other land and natural resources of the state. Maximum public
benefits through environmental protection of open space, wilderness, coastal and estuarine areas may best be achieved through
regional, multi-state land use management, or statewide land
use management, which coordinates all land use and development with the needs of the highly mobile population of the
area. Regional or statewide land use management programs
which regulate both coastal and inland areas would allow
coastal and estuarine management and protection to be considered in conjunction with regional or statewide recreational
and economic needs.
4. Urban Growth and the New Communities Act
The federal government has recently dramatically increased
its role in formulating growth policies. In the Urban Growth
and New Communities Act of 1971,200 Congress made the following finding:
The rapid growth of urban population and uneven expansion of
urban development in the United States, together with a decline
in farm population, slower growth in rural areas, and migration
to the cities has created an imbalance between the nation's needs
and resources and seriously threatens our physical environ20
ment. o

This Act establishes a scheme for development of new communities 202 which allows the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to guarantee bonds, debentures, and other obli42 U.S.C. § 4501 et. seq. (1970).
Id. § 4502.
202 Id. § 4511.

200
201
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gations of public and private developers of new communities,
sets up advantageous loan terms for new communities, and
authorizes outright grants to developers of new public communities. 20 3 At the end of 1971 private developers had approval
20 4
and federal help in initiating seven new communities.
B.

The Federal Role in Transportation Systems

Another indirect effect with profound impact upon population stabilization and dispersion is the role the federal government plays in our nation's transportation systems. Regardless
of which level of government exercises control in this field, the
entire area of transportation policy is a direct factor in population maldistribution. Industrial location is influenced by the
cost of transporting natural resources and raw goods used in
industrial and manufacturing processes to the processing or
manufacturing plant, and by the cost of transporting manufactured or processed goods to consumer markets. Industrial location and population density are influenced by the transportation
systems which are available for workers to travel to their place
of employment.
The highways have become a significant transportation system for delivery of raw goods to industry and finished goods
to consumer markets, and for workers to travel to their places
of employment. Railroads are increasingly relying upon the
transport of goods, while discouraging commuter and passenger
travel. Air travel is increasingly used for the transport of raw
goods and finished products, but is too expensive for most workers to travel significant distances between their home and place
of work. Inexpensive air travel would do much to encourage
distribution of population, by making it possible for workers to
live great distances from their places of employment, but because of high prices, it is not a realistic mass transportation
system at present. Urban mass transportation systems by subway, train, or monorail are possible alternatives to bus or car
travel as commuter transportation systems, but have not been
adequately financed because, heretofore, the federal automotive
dollar has been expended in new highway construction, as set
out below. It is apparent that transportation systems can play
a large role in growth regulation and population dispersal.
That role would require more flexibility than exists in the
present system. The construction of federal aid secondary, pri203

204

Id. § 4516. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1492(c) (1970), which gives a priority to
smaller municipalities in the purchasing of municipal securities and
obligations.
REPORT ON NATIONAL GRowTH, supra note 93, at 60.
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mary, and interstate highways - which constitute the major
highways in this country- are financed by the Highway Trust
Fund, established in 1956.205 This fund, from which Congress
votes package appropriation for all federal aid highways every
year or two, 206 is collected from gasoline and auto excise taxes.
Though Congress has had to provide funds in addition to the
funds in the Highway Trust Fund in order to fully finance the
federal aid highway program, the trust fund remains the major
source of financing the federal aid highway system. The Highway Trust Fund can be used to finance only the construction
of highways;2 0 7 consequently, as more people buy automobiles
and pay increasing amounts of federal excise and gasoline taxes,
more and more highways are built, while other types of urban
mass transportation- commuter railroads, monorails, and subways- are neglected because of lack of financing.
The result is that major highways have penetrated many
urban areas, furthered urban sprawl, threatened parks and historic areas, and forced residents to relocate. Some members of
Congress have attempted to allow the use of the Highway Trust
Fund for financing types of transportation other than highways,
but so far have been unsuccessful.2 0 8 Apparently, it is not
widely understood that major highways have a significant
effect on growth and population density. Industry often locates
adjacent to major highways, because such highways are important trucking routes and routes for employees to travel. In
turn, commuter suburbs grow up along these highways, because
commuters can use them as routes to jobs in urban areas.
These factors require that less reliance be placed upon the
highway and automobile as a commuter and freight transportation system and more understanding be given to their role in
population distribution problems and to the possible alternative
methods of commuter and freight transportation. The Highway
Trust Fund should be used to finance alternative types of commuter transportation systems, though this will require overcoming the strong opposition of gasoline companies, automobile
manufacturers, the construction industry, the trucking industry,
205 Act of June 29, 1956, § 209, ch. 462, tit. II, 70 Stat. 397, as amended, 23
U.S.C. § 120 note (1970).
206 23 U.S.C. § 104(b) (1970).
207 Id. § 101 (d).
208 See Note, The Highway Trust Fund: Road to Anti-Pollution, 20 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 171 (1971). See also HOLCRAFT, THE ROAD TO RUIN (1968);
LEAVITT, SUPERHIGHWAY - SUPERHOAX (1970); Symposium, The Impact
of the Highway on the .Urban Environment, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 1
(1971).
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motel owners, and other business interests dependent upon
heavy automobile use.
Congress has begun to attempt to coordinate highway construction with construction of other types of transportation systems. The Secretary of Transportation has been directed not to
approve federal funds for highway projects in urban areas of
over 50,000 population unless plans for such projects have been
based upon a continuing comprehensive transportation planning
process carried on cooperatively by states and local communitis.2 0 9 Long range highway plans must be coordinated with plans
for transportation and be formulated with due consideration of
their probable effect on future development of urban areas of
more than 50,000 population. Federal grants to planning bodies
may be conditioned upon federal assistance in developing coordinated transportation planning, including highway planning.
The statutory scheme is keyed to the needs of contiguous interstate critical transportation regions or transportation corridors
where the "movement of persons and goods between principal
metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers has reached, or
is expected to reach, a critical volume in relation to the capacity of existing and planned transportation systems to efficiently accommodate present transportation demands and future
growth. ' 210 Only $500,000, however, has been authorized for such
grants-a wholly inadequate amount to finance sophisticated
coordinated transportation planning.
In addition, our highway transportation policy can be used
to limit growth, prevent concentrated industrial location and
industrial development, and to decentralize our population by
dispersing our people geographically. Even the American Trucking Association has urged that our highway transportation policy
should promote a population dispersal program. 211 The Association urges highway transportation which "can facilitate the
flow of both goods and people that would support a program
' '21 2
to achieve better balance of our population and our resources.
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970 authorizes expenditure
of $100 million over the next 2 fiscal years.
[This is] to demonstrate the role that highways can play to promote the desirable development of the Nation's natural resources,
to revitalize and diversify the economy of rural areas and smaller
communities, to enhance and disperse industrial growth, to en209
210
21,
212

23 U.S.C. § 134 (1970).
Id.
The Geography of Survival (advertisement of the American Trucking
Ass'n), HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 1971, at 40-41.
Id. at 41.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.. 49

courage more balanced population patterns, to check and, where
possible, to reverse current migratory trends from rural areas
and smaller communities, and to improve living conditions and
the quality of the environment .... ,,213

The Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make
grants to states for demonstration projects for the construction,
reconstruction, and improvement of development highways,
federal aid primary system highways which provide appropriate
access to economic growth centers (urban areas which are
geographically and economically capable of contributing significantly to the development of the area and have a population
of under 100,000). The purpose of such demonstration projects
is spelled out.
[It is] to serve and promote the development of economic growth
centers and surrounding areas, encourage the location of business
and industry in rural areas, facilitate the mobility of labor in
sparsely populated areas, and provide rural citizens with improved highways to such public and private services as health
care, recreation, employment, education, and cultural activities,
or otherwise encourage the social and economic development of
rural communities, and 214
for planning, surveys and investigations
in connection therewith.

Implementation of this philosophy to future construction of all
federal aid highways would assure that highways are constructed with due regard for population dispersal and control
of growth.
C.

Direct Land Use Regulation

A number of bills designed to provide federal aid and encouragement to the states to undertake comprehensive and coordinated statewide land use programs have been introduced
into the 92d Congress, 215 following introduction by Senator
Jackson of a proposed National Land Use Policy Act to the second session of the 91st Congress. 216 These bills generally provide
for federal grants to the states and to interstate agencies for
23 U.S.C. § 143(a) (1970).
Id.
215 H.R. 8119, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 7804, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); H.R. 6579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 5504, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); H.R. 4703, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) ; H.R. 4569, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 4332, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 2449, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 2173, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 2554,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 992, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 632,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The House Interior Committee has approved
H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), providing for land use planning
213

214

grants to states, see 3

216

ENVIR. REP.

188 (June 16, 1972); 3 ENVIR.

REP. 39

(May 12, 1972), which incorporates H.R. 4332. The Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee has passed a compromise between Senator
Jackson's S. 632 and the administration's S. 992. See 3 ENvia. REP. 150
(June 9, 1972).
S. 3354, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 1757 (1970).
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planning, management, and administration of the states' land
resources through the development and implementation of comprehensive statewide land use plans. These plans would be
based upon national goals and values established by the federal
government in conjunction with state and local governments.
The plans are designed to achieve an ecologically and environmentally sound use of the nation's land resources and to protect
wilderness and open space. Such statutes would avoid the conflicts and degradation of open space and wilderness that often
occur when federal, state, and local governmental agencies collide in the pursuit of separate goals and objectives. 21 7 These
bills would resolve the conflicts between various federal administrative agencies involved in public land management and the
conflicts between various statutes regulating the public landsgoals of the Public Land Law Review Commission Act.2 1 8 Some
of these bills provide that federal grants to states under other
statutory programs-such as federal aid for highways-be lowered if the states fail to prepare a statewide land use program
which is approved by the federal government as in compliance
with the goals and purposes of the bill. These bills are based
on the power of the federal government to regulate the
use of private land in order to protect public lands 219 and the
power of Congress to condition federal grants to states upon
compliance with other federal statutes. 220 Most of these bills
also provide that federal administrative agencies must conduct
their activities so as to comply with approved state land use
plans.
On February 8, 1971, President Nixon suggested to Congress
in a special message on the state of the environment that federal subsidies be granted to encourage the states to recapture
from local zoning authorities some of their tenth amendment
rights on land use regulation. 2 1 Unlike Senator Jackson's previous efforts-which would have exempted cities of 250,000 or
more and cities which accounted for 20 percent or more of their
state's population-the President's proposal contained no exemptions. It would require states to guarantee at the state level
certain important state c6ntrols such as:
* A method for state control over location of all focal points of
Id. at 1758-59.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970).
219 United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927).
220 See Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Ccmm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
221 First Annual Report on the State of the Nation's Environment, 117 CONG.
REC. H. 505, S. 948 (daily ed., Feb. 8, 1971), (H.R. Doc. No. 92-46, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)).

217
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DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

growth, such as highway interchanges, major airports, and major
recreational centers such as Disneyland.
* A method for state control over the location of all new communities.
* A method for state control over all large-scale developments
of property.
* A method for state control over local attempts to block property
developments of regional benefit. Such properties might be
schools, hospitals, community centers, or multi-dwelling residential settlements capable of providing good housing for the
poor.
* A method to ensure state protection of existing property
identified as being of "critical environmental concern." Such
property includes coastal zones and estuaries; lakes, rivers, and
smaller streams and their flood plains; homes of important ecosystems; and areas embodying historical, cultural, or esthetic
values beyond the ordinary. "Critical" in this context can also
222
mean hazardous and hence closed to unrestricted development.

The President proposed that all federal aid expenditures
affecting land use must be designed or redesigned to conform
with the state's land development plans. His proposal did not
cover directly the situating of electric power generating stations,
which can be another major force in population distribution, but
he has advocated a separate siting law which would require a
single state agency to make certification and environmental de22
cisions relating to electrical production. 3
Another method of protection of unique and valuable land
resources that has been suggested is a national land use commission which would regulate the commercial and industrial
development of open space land and the preservation of open
space by determining the use to which private lands could be
put, with payment of just compensation to private landowners
where land use restrictions imposed by the commission create a
taking of property without just compensation. 224 The constitutionality of this program might be suspect, however, since it
could be found to exceed the power of the federal government
to regulate private lands in protecting public lands, and as invading the province of the state's police power.
D.

The Distribution of the Federal Dollar
The control and redirection of growth can be greatly affected by the federal government's ability to influence the location of economic activity. Some of the opportunities available
in this area have been explored by the prestigious Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The Commission
222 Lear, Land: Making Room for Tomorrow, SATURDAY REVIEW, March 6,
223
224

1971, at 46.

Id.

McCloskey, supra note 163.
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recommended consideration of the following programs as "useful
approaches to the implementation of a national policy regarding
urban growth:"
* Federal financial incentives, such as tax, loan, or direct payment arrangements for business and industrial location in certain
areas;
e placement of Federal procurement contracts and construction
projects to foster urban growth in certain areas;
* Federal policies and programs to influence the mobility of people, to neutralize factors producing continued excessive population concentrations, and to encourage alternative location choices;
such policies and programs might include, anmong others, resettlement allowances, augmented on-the-job training allowances,
interarea job placement and information on a computerized basis,
and the elimination or reduction in the "migrational pull" of interstate variations in public assistance eligibility and benefit
standards;
9 strengthening the existing voluntary Federal-State programs
of family planning information for low-income persons;
* Federal involvement and assistance under certain conditions
for large(such as assurances of an adequate range of housing)
225
scale urban and new community development.

Much of the current federal spending pattern is an unequal
distribution of federal dollars which adds to the forces causing
deterioration of rural America, which, in turn, causes further
concentrations in urban America. 228 Rural communities do not

receive their share of federal spending. Nonmetropolitan citizens
get 17 percent less per capita in federal outlays than do metropolitan area citizens. 227 Fifty-seven percent of the federal outlays in fiscal 1970 went to the most urban counties while 3.3
percent went to sparsely settled rural areas with no urban
population. 228 Clearly, rural America is both separate and unequal.
The Second Session of the 92d Congress has reported out
of Conference Committee Title I of the Rural Development Act
of 1972229 which is directed at this problem and which seeks to
225 ADVISORY COMMISSION
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POLICIES FOR

FUTURE GROWTH (excerpt from Report A-32) 25 (1968).
"Following the riots in Detroit a few years ago, the business community
of that city formed an organization that created 50,000 new jobs for the
poor. It was an enormous community effort. And when it was done,
Detroit learned that its unemployment rate was slightly higher than it
had been before the jobs had been created. The word had gone out on
the migration grapevine that there were jobs in Detroit for rural people
who wanted to work." S. Rep. No. 92-734, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972).
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 9.
Id.
3 ENVIR. REP. (Current Developments) 481 (Aug. 25, 1972). The Senate
pproved and sent to the White House on Aug. 17, 1972 H.R. Conf.
Comm. Rep. No. 92-12931, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) on the Rural
Development Act.
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set up an entirely new rural development banking system. It
allows interest subsidies to private businesses which obtain
loans from the system and are unable to repay at the market
rate of interest, such interest subsidy being available only to
firms locating in areas which have a net loss of population.
The choice of alternatives such as those that are available
on the federal level is vast. Federal purchasing policy provides
a significant stimulus to the growth and development of certain
areas. Yet recent studies have shown an extremely uneven geographic distribution of federal contracts to the wealthier and
more highly urbanized states. 230 Various bills have been introduced to give credit on bids received from cities under 250,000
population, proportionately greater credits for smaller cities, and
a separate credit of 2 percent for any area where unemployment
or underemployment exceeds the national average or for areas
of serious emigration. 23' The goal of one such bill was clear:
[It was to] develop business and employment in smaller cities
and areas of underemployment and unemployment, to assist in
bringing excess farm labor and other unemployed and underemployed labor into a new productive relaticn to society and yet
areas,
to enable such people to remain in less densely populated
232
and not be forced to migrate to our overcrowded cities.

Decisions regarding location of federal (and state) facilities
such as government office centers, research complexes, military
installations, and public works projects can further be used to
direct growth to areas which need the growth, and away from
areas where growth is excessive.
CONCLUSION

The search today is for an effective and politically realistic
balance between local, state, and federal land use decisionmaking. The task is complicated by both its intrinsic problems and
the burden of overcoming years of "local control" which, in
fact, did serve the needs of the time. But current needs are
already different and changing rapidily. Massive population
shifts, increased population pressures on finite land resources,
large scale transportation systems which have large scale effects
on land use patterns, the increased size, scope, and impact of
many private actions, and the proven inability of fragmented
local decisionmaking to adequately weigh and balance all neces230 ADVISORY COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

supra note

225, at 33.
231 See, e.g., H.R. 12802, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
232 113 CONG. REC. 28186, 28187 (1967) (remarks of Representative Morris).
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sary considerations all mandate a total overhaul of our land use
decisionmaking process.
Part of the solution may lie in requiring certain categories
of decisions to be made at a regional or state level. To accept
this choice means that we must recognize the failures and inadequacies of the existing system. Growth policies are all but
nonexistent on both the national and state levels. Decisions
concerning land use, water use, and growth are made by innumerable, scattered, and uncoordinated local officials seeking
"additional tax base." Land speculators purchase land on the
outskirts of every large city and in prime recreational areas and
then apply economic pressure to reinforce the already compelling forces that bring about urbanization and environmental
destruction. More importantly, the sprawl, maldistribution, and
environmental deterioration are caused by impotent regulation.
We have assumed that the laissez-faire attitude toward land
development served the highest public good. Adam Smith's
theories were applied to land management and it has always
been felt that each community seeking its own self-interest (or
what it thought to be its self-interest) served the public good.
We are finding today that that assumption is as untenable on
the community level as it was on the individual level. One community seeking short term economic growth can seriously harm
scarce natural resources, perpetuate urban sprawl, or completely
negate statewide plans and goals.
The situation can be remedied by the development of new
decisionmaking levels and the use of new or existing legal tools.
The states must reclaim some of their previously delegated
tenth amendment rights to manage the land within their boundaries. Each state must recognize that many of the decisions of
the 1970's will have impact far beyond any one city's limits.
Local zoning alone is insufficient to solve multi-jurisdictional
problems. Local zoning must be guided by-or at the least, not
be inconsistent with-state and regional land use policies. The
state land use policies themselves should be responsive to, and
coordinated with, state growth policies. In turn, each state's
growth policy should seek a fit within the federal scheme. Pending federal legislation offers states the opportunity to synchronize their land use decisionmaking process, examine the underlying policies, and adapt their intergovernmental structures toward effective land use planning. It is likely to be the most
important opportunity of the 1970's.
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CRITIQUE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

INACTION IN THE BANGLADESH CRISIS
By VED P.

NANDA*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation state is
an event of major significance for the people of the entire
Indian subcontinent. Its long-range effects are at present uncertain, but a likely result is a shift in the balance of power in
Asia.' Already India has begun to assert its role as a dominant
power in South Asia and a major middle power in the world
arena; and it is anticipated that the future triangular contest
among India, China, and Japan for the friendship and loyalty
of the Asian states will precipitate a readjustment of power in
Asia, particularly in the context of the global clash of U.S.Soviet interests.
For the international lawyer, the birth of Bangladesh and
the events which preceded it are of particular significance; this
for a variety of reasons: (1) India's intervention by the use of
force raises serious questions as to the viability of articles
2(4)2 and 2(7) 3 of the U.N. Charter; (2) the prolonged silence
on the part of the U.N. in the wake of gross, persistent, and
massive violations of human rights by the Pakistani armed
forces and their collaborators calls into question the adequacy
of the available international mechanisms to prevent such occurrences; and (3) the crisis underscores the need to reevaluate
the concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and "self-determination" in international law.
It is the purpose of this article to raise some preliminary
*Professor

of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,

University of Denver College of Law.
'See, e.g., D. MANKEKAR, PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE (1972); Gupta, The Impact
of Bangla Desh, Economic & Political Weekly (Bombay), Jan. 1, 1972,
at 15. See also Wanavwala, The Indo-Soviet Treaty - The Sub-continent Reconstructed, 246 ROUND TABLE: THE COMMONWEALTH J. INT'L
AFFAIRS (London) 199 (1972); BANGLA DESH:

CRISIS & CONSEQUENCES

(A Deen Dayal Research Institute, New Delhi, publication 1972);
Narayanan, Towards a New Equilibrium in Asia, 7 ECONOMIC & POLrTICAL WEEKLY (Bombay) 219 (1972).
2 "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
3 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to interfere in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; and this principle
shall not prejudice the application of information measures under Chap-

ter VII." U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 7.
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questions on the U.N. inaction, and on articles 2(4) and 2(7)
of the U.N. Charter. Self-determination in noncolonial situations, which I have discussed elsewhere, 4 and the nature and
scope of humanitarian intervention in the light of the Bangladesh crisis, which I propose to study separately, will not be
discussed.
I. EvENTs PRECEDING THE CRISIS
The genesis of the Bangladesh crisis can be traced to the
partition of India in 1947 which created the state of Pakistan
out of two disparate parts, physically separated by a distance
of over 1,000 miles and otherwise divided by ethnic, linguistic,
and cultural differences.5 The only elements tending to bind
these parts were a common religion, Islam, and the hatred of
India. Neither of these proved to be sufficiently strong to ensure
lasting unity and by the late 1960's the economic and political
domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan Panjabis had
6
resulted in serious political unrest in East Pakistan.
The events that led to the final break between East and
West Pakistan began with the Pakistani general elections of
December 1970, the first ever based on the adult franchise. The
Awami League party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won an
overwhelming victory, capturing 167 of 313 seats in the National
Assembly on a program of political and economic autonomy for
East Pakistan. 7 The election results were apparently unacceptable to the military-landlord-business-industrial clique in West
Pakistan, which undoubtedly faced with some alarm the prospects of being ruled by the Awami League party. The East
Pakistani demand for autonomy was perceived by the West
4 Nanda, Self-Determination in

International Law: The Tragic Tale of
Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan),
66 AM. J. INT'L 321 (1972).
5 See, e.g., Chowdhury, Bangladesh: Why it Happened, 48 INT'L AFF. 242
(1972); Michener, A Lament for Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 11, 43-46; Morris-Jones, Pakistan Post-Mortem and
the Roots of Bangladesh, 43 POL. Q. (London) 187 (1972). See also
Jackson, Birth of a Nation, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 18,1971, at
15, col. 1; Nanda, Bangla Desh: From Genocide Toward Statehood, NATION, Dec. 27, 1971, at 690; Tanner, Bangalis Pressing Their Cause in
Corridors of United Nations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1971, at 13, col. 1
(statement of Justice Chowdhury, who is now President of Bangladesh); Tanner, Swaran Singh Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1971, at 16, col. 3 (statement of India's Foreign
Minister, Singh); N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1971, § 4, at 10, col. 1 (editorial);
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at 47, col. 2 (excerpts from a lead editorial
in the London New Statesman).
6 Michener, supra note 5, at 44-46.
7 On the election results, see Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of
India, Bangla Desh Documents, cited in 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 550
(1971); Far Eastern Economic Rev., Jan. 9, 1971, at 19-21. The text of
the Awami League Manifesto is reprinted at 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
524 (1971).
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Pakistani ruling elite as a major threat. Its likely outcome was
seen to be the loss of a captive market for West Pakistani manufactured goods and the curtailment of the primary source of
such valuable raw materials as jute and tea as well as the bulk
8
of Pakistan's foreign exchange.
In early 1971, a breakdown in negotiations for the convening
of the National Assembly to draft a constitution intensified the
crisis and caused the simmering unrest in East Pakistan to surface in mass demonstrations against the Pakistani government.
This situation was exacerbated by Sheikh Mujib's call for noncooperation with the government. There ensued serious acts of
civil disobedience, including refusal to pay taxes and a total
strike in government offices and businesses. This was accompanied by a change in the East Bengali mood which began to
reflect a desire for complete independence as opposed to mere
autonomy.
Ultimately, on March 25, 1971, the Pakistani military struck
Dacca without warning and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan which continued with increasing intensity
until December 1971.10 Villages were burned; civilians were
indiscriminately killed; Hindus were sorted out and massacred
as were university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors,
Awami League leaders, and Bengali military and police officials. 1 The horror of these events prompted observers to accuse
the Pakistani armed forces and razakars, the local volunteer
militiamen who were collaborators of the Pakistani armed
forces in East Bengal, of committing selective genocide, pur12
portedly to deprive East Pakistan of Bengali leadership.
8 Hayward, Pakistan Feels Economic Impact From Loss of Bangladesh,

Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1972, at 14, col. 1.
9 Nanda, supra note 4, at 323 nn.12-13, 331 nn.74-77.
10 See notes 11-15 infra; Nanda, supra note 4, at 331-33. For accounts of

the alleged atrocities by the Pakistani army, see Hearings Before the
Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with the Refugees and
Escapees of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. I, at 95-226, pt. II, at 311-53, pt. III, at 431-81 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and
Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 35-50 (1971).
11 Michener, supra note 5, at 46-48; Schwarz, Bloody Baptism for Bangladesh, M.G. Weekly, Dec. 25, 1971, at 4, cols. 1, 3.
12 See Cousins, Genocide in East Pakistan, SATURDAY REVIEW, May 22, 1971,
at 20; sources cited in Nanda, supra note 4, at 332 nn.81-86; Shaplen,
A Reporter at Large: The Birth of Bangladesh -I, NEW YORKER, Feb.
12, 1972, at 40, 65, wherein the author quotes the resident editor of the
Indian Express (New Delhi) as describing in May 1971, the Pakistani
action as "a demographic war" designed to "destroy or drive out those
whom it considers immediately or prospectively undesirable." The first
thorough expcs6 was done by Mascarenhas, Pakistani correspondent of
the Sunday Times (London) issue of June 13, 1971, which is reprinted in
the Senate Hearings pt. I, at 120 with the accompanying editorial at 118.
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The 9-month wave of terror forced approximately 10 million people to flee from East Pakistan and take refuge in India. 13 This in turn put a severe strain on India-Pakistan relations and as a result, on December 3, 1971, full-scale war erupted
between the two nations.
The destruction and havoc wreaked by the 2-week conflict
which ensued were frightful: "Thirty million people dislocated
by the war. More than 1.5 million homes destroyed. Nine million refugees returning from India to rebuild their lives and
aomes. War damage drastically reducing rail traffic. Key rail
and road bridges destroyed. '14 According to the Swiss U.N.
Chief in Dacca, Toni Hagen, the destruction suffered by Bangladesh was greater than that suffered by Europe in World
War 11.15
II. THE U.N. AND THE BANGLADESH CRISIS
The role of the United Nations in the crisis was, at best,
that of a concerned but helpless observer. While it assumed part
of the burden of maintaining the millions of refugees pouring
into India,1" it lacked the willingness to take positive steps to
13

This the the reported number of refugees. Mehta, Letter From West Bengal, NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 1971, at 166; Schanberg, Bengalis' Land a Vast
Cemetery, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 5, 7; Tanner, Swaran Singh
Says India Seeks No Pakistani Land, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1971, at 16,
col. 3, 6 (statement of India's Defense Minister Singh); Christian
Science Monitor, Dec. 18, 1971, at 14, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1971, at
46, col. 1, 2 (editorial); id. at 47, col. 1 (statement by John Lewis, former
U.S. AID director of India, 1964-69). For a Reuter report on the return
of all the refugees to Bangladesh, see Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 28,
1972, at 19, col. 2. For a succinct account, see CRSIS IN SOUTH ASIA- A
REPORT BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TO THE SUBCOlvIMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES (Nov. 1,

1971).
Winder, Bangladesh: a Race for Solutions, Christian Science Monitor,
Apr. 4, 1972, at 1, col. 2; see also Nanda, Bangladesh Economy in Ruin,
Rocky Mtn. News (Global Section), Oct. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
15 TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at 30. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman estimated that the
Pakistanis may have killed three million Bengalis. Schanberg, supra
note 13, col. 7; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1972, at 3, col. 1; TIME, Feb. 28,
1972, at 30. The police chief in Dacca is reported to have described the
"slaughter of East Pakistan" in these words: "The whole country is a
mass grave. Who knows how many millions have been killed?" N.Y.
Times, Dec. 22, 1971 at 14, col. 1. A New York Times correspondent reported a month after the surrender that he found "on a recent tour of
the countryside, that almost every town in East Pakistan had one or
more of these graveyards, where the Pakistanis killed hundreds of
thousands of Bengalis, apparently often on a daily basis, throughout
their 9 months of military occupation." Schanberg, supra note 13, col.
5. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1971, at 1, col. 2; Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 28, 1972 at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1971, at 2, col. 5; TrmE, Oct. 25, 1971, at 37. In Khulna
alone, the number of people killed at one execution site is estimated at
between 10,000 and 15,000. Motherland (New Delhi), Jan. 30, 1972, at 8,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
various initiatives, see 8
16For an account of the Secretary-General's
U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 6) at 49-50 (June 1971); id. (No. 8) at
56-59, 67-68 (Aug.-Sept. 1971). For discussion and action by various
U.N. organs, see id. (No. 6) at 106 (June 1971); id. (No. 8) at 72 (Aug.Sept. 1971); id. (No. 9) at 87 (Oct. 1971); id. (No. 10) at 206 (Nov.
1971); id. (No. 11) at 124-26 (Dec. 1971). [The U.N. MONTHLY CHRONI14
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prevent the tragic happenings that were gradually but surely
pushing India and Pakistan to a head-on collision.
Not until full-scale war between India and Pakistan had
erupted did the Security Council and the General Assembly see
fit to discuss the matter. The Council began its deliberations on
December 4, 1971,17 but since the Soviet veto blocked any action,' 8 the Council referred the question to the General Assemly. 19 The General Assembly then proceeded to discuss the
situation 20 and ultimately adopted a resolution calling for an
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all troops. 2 1 Howver, India considered these recommendations to be unrelated
22
to the cause of the crisis, unrealistic, and hence, unacceptable.
It may be an exaggeration to charge the U.N. members
with blindness, callous indifference, or even cowardice in ignoring the crisis or dismissing it as not worthy of attention,
for perhaps the inaction could be attributed to the realization
on the part of a majority of nation states that a discussion at
the United Nations would not resolve the conflict but might
even exacerbate it. Or perhaps the inaction was caused by the
concern that a U.N. intervention in the allegedly domestic
affairs of Pakistan might create an unhealthy precedent, or
perhaps that even if the United Nations intervened, it might
not be effective. 23 In any event, mishandling by the U.N. of
the entire situation is a matter of such serious concern that it
deserves careful examination in order to pfevent similar occurrences in the future.
A. Discussion in the Human Rights Organs of the United
Nations
One U.N. organ which did consider the political and human
rights aspects of the crisis was the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. The Subcommission was
will be cited frequently throughout the paper due to the delay in
publicaticn of official U.N. documents and because of its relative ease
of availability]. For reports by the Secretary-General on the U.N.
"effort for the relief of the people of Bangladesh" as of the end of May
1972, see U.N. Doc. A/8662 and add. 1 & 2; U.N. Doc. S/10539 and add.
1 & 2 (1972).
For a summary account of the Council deliberations, see 9 U.N. MONTHLY
CLE

17

CHRONICLE

(No. 1) at 3-25 (Jan. 1972).

For the Soviet veto, see id. at 13, 20.
19 S.C. Res. 303 (1971). The text is contained in id. at 25.
20 For a summary account of the Assembly discussion, see id. at 89-91.
For the text of the resolution,
21 G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (Dec. 7, 1971).
see id. at 91.
22 See the Indian delegate's statement in id. at 28-29.
23 1 am grateful to my colleague, William Beaney, for his suggestion that I
explicitly identify the possible reasons for the U.N. inaction.
18
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prompted to discuss the situation at the initiative of 22 international non-governmental organizations in consultative status
with the Economic and Social Council.24 Addressing the Subcommission on behalf of these organizations, 25 John Salzberg,
a representative of the International Commission of Jurists,
made a strong plea that the Subcommission exercise its full
authority granted it under resolution 8(XXIII) of the Commission on Human Rights and under Economic and Social Council resolution 1235(XLII) 2, He asked the Subcommission either
to set up a committee of inquiry to investigate the various reports of alleged violations of human rights in East Pakistan
or to recommend to the Commission on Human Rights that it
27
establish such an investigatory body.
The authority granted under resolution 8(XXIII) is that
of referring to the Commission any situation which the Subcommission "has reasonable cause to believe reveals a consistent pattern of violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms," and of preparing a report "containing information
on violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms from
all available sources. ' 2 The Economic and Social Council in
resolution 1235(XLII) has not only put its stamp of approval
on the Commission's action in so authorizing the Subcommission, but has asked the Commission "to make a thorough study
of situations revealing a consistent pattern of violations of human rights" and to report to the ECOSOC with its recommenda29
tions on such situations.
The summary records of the Subcommission show that
except for the Indian observer3 1' and the Pakistani representative on the Subcommission,"1 only three other members of the
Subcommission participated in the discussion, 3 one of whom
opposed the discussion on the ground that the matter fell within
the purview of article 2(7)32 of the U.N. Charter. Although the

25

U.N. ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 24th Sess.,
Agenda Item No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/NGO.46 (July 23, 1971).
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/SR.625-35, at 75 (1971).

26

Id. at 76.

27

Id. at 78.

24

2s Report on the 23d Sess., Comm'n on Human Rights, 42 U.N. ECOSOC,

Supp. 6, at 131 (1967).
2942 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17 (1967). The text of the resolution is
conveniently contained in 1967 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at 512.
30
For his remarks, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/SR. 625-35, at 145 (1971).
31 For his remarks, see id. at 139.
'2 For their remarks, see id. at 74-75, 146-47.
33 Id. at 74.
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other two participants expressed concern at the situation,3 4
only one member addressed himself to the role of the Subcommission.35 The Subcommission "had very properly spent many
days discussing the question of the protection of the rights of
individuals," 36 he said, but to him it seemed that "when faced
with a situation affecting tens of thousands of persons, members
were inclined to suppress their feelings and consciences. ' '37 The
Subcommission "should not remain silent, ''38 he added. But the
Subcommission did remain silent.
B.

Discussion in Other U.N. Organs

In July 1971, the Economic and Social Council dealt with
the humanitarian aspects of the problem, focusing on the U.N.
relief operations. 39 Four months later, in November, the Third
Committee of the General Assembly discussed the accomplishments of the U.N. East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO)
and the problems it faced. 40 The representative of New Zealand,
however, called the Committee's attention to the political aspects of the problem. "If the flow of refugees was to be stopped
and war avoided," it was essential, he said, that there should
be negotiations between the government of Pakistan and the
elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan.4 1 A draft
resolution submitted in the Third Committee by New Zealand
and the Netherlands also touched upon the political aspects of
the question, insofar as it referred to the need for restoring
the "climate of confidence" on the part of Pakistan so as to
promote voluntary repatriation of refugees. 42 However, the resolution finally adopted by the General Assembly on December
6, 1971, contained only an innocuous reference to the need for
"a favorable climate which all persons of goodwill should work
to bring about . . . 43 It should be noted that at the time the
General Assembly was adopting this resolution, a full-scale war
was already in its fourth day.
Id. at 139.
35 Id. at 74-75.
36 Id. at 74.
37 Id. at 74-75.
38 Id. at 75.
39 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 72 (Aug.-Sept. 1971).
34

40

For a summary report, see 8 U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

(No. 11) at 124-

26 (Dec. 1971).
41 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1877 (Nov. 19, 1971).
42 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 1885 (Nov. 18, 1971). The advisability of this reference was questioned by the representative of Somalia because of its

controversial nature.
43U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1879 (Nov. 22, 1971).
(Dec. 6, 1971).
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The Security Council and the General Assembly Debates
The discussions in the Security Council 44 and the General
Assembly 45 show that most member states were primarily concerned with the restoration of the status quo- an immediate
cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of forces.
Intervention, particularly military intervention across international boundaries, was unacceptable to a vast majority
of the U.N. members for fear that it might set an unhealthy
precedent. The members invoked concepts of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national independence in the hope that
it might somehow stop the fighting. The Soviet Union 46 and
Poland 47 were the only two Council members which, along
with India, 48 repeatedly stressed the need for looking at the
"root cause" of the problem and seeking a political solution to
the crisis. To call for a cease-fire without correlating it with
the attainment of a political settlement in East Pakistan was
considered inadequate and unrealistic.
To recount briefly, the Council discussed the situation on
December 4, 5, and 6. On the first day of discussion, Pakistan
accused India of unprovoked "aggression, '49 described the East
Pakistan crisis prior to December 3 as internal and therefore
"outside the Security Council's concern" 50 and asserted that it
was "for the Security Council to find the means to make India
desist from its war of aggression. Only means devised by the
Security Council, consistent with Pakistan's independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and with the principle of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Member States,
would command Pakistan's support and co-operation." 51
India replied that in spite of the humanitarian efforts by
the U.N., killings had continued in East Pakistan and warned
the Council that it "would not be a party to any solution that
would mean continuation of the oppression of the East Pakistan
people. '52 The representatives of the U.S., 53 Italy, 54 Somalia, 55
44 9

U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

45 Id. at 89-91.
46 Id. at 11-12, 38.
47 Id. at 12.
48 Id. at 25, 28-29.
49 Id. at 5-6.
50
Id. at 7.

51 Id. at 8.
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 9-10.
54 Id. at 10.

55Id.

(No. 1) at 3-25 (Jan. 1972).
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France,56 Japan,5 7 China,58 Syrian Arab Republic,5 Belgium, 60
Burundi,61 Argentina, 62 the United Kingdom,6 3 and Sierra
Leone6 4 called for an immediate cease-fire, while the representatives of the Soviet Union65 and Poland 6 urged the Council
to seek a political settlement, taking into account the wishes
of the East Pakistanis. A draft resolution introduced by the
67
United States was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
Charges and countercharges were repeated on December 5,
with Pakistan 8 and China 9 forcefully invoking article 2(7) to
claim that the Council should demand an end to India's armed
intervention, while the Soviet Union accused China of trying
"to divert attention from the main cause of the conflict in the
Hindustan Peninsula, which was the monstrous and bloody
repression of East Pakistan. '' 70 Another resolution calling for a
cease-fire was vetoed by the Soviet Union. 71 Similar arguments
were again repeated on December 6 when the Indian representative urged the Council to "consider some realities. '' 72 He
said: "Refugees were a reality. Genocide and oppression were
a reality. The extinction of all civil rights was a reality. Provocation and aggression of various kinds by Pakistan from March
25 onwards were a reality. Bangladesh itself was a reality, as
was its recognition by India. The Council was nowhere near
' 7'
reality. 8
Since the Council was paralyzed and there were apparently
no prospects for a consensus among the major powers, the
Council eventually adopted a resolution, 74 pursuant to which
it decided to refer the question to the General Assembly, as
provided for in General Assembly resolution 377 A(V) of November 3, 1950.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 10-11.
58 Id. at 11.
59 Id.

6o Id.at 12.
61 Id.
62

Id.

63 Id.
64

Id. at 13.

65 Id. at 11-12.

66 Id. at 12.
67 Id. at 13.
68 Id. at 17.
69 Id. at 19.
70

Id. at 15.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 25.
73 Id.
74 S.C. Res. 303 (1971).

71
72

The text is contained in id.
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The Assembly met twice on December 775 and adopted
a resolution by a vote of 104 in favor, to 11 against, with 10
abstentions, which called for an immediate cease-fire and a
mutual troop withdrawal by India and Pakistan. 76 The overwhelming majority in favor of the resolution demonstrated
the concern of the members for territorial integrity and article
2(7). Pakistan explained its interpretation of the resolution to
mean that "no attempt would be made to disrupt the national
unity of Pakistan, and that any attempts by the General Assembly to intervene in the situation would be within the prin77
ciple of the territorial integrity of Pakistan."
Since India did not comply with the Assembly recommendations, the Council was again called into session at the
request of the United States. The Council met seven times between December 12 and 21;78 the Soviet Union vetoed one more
resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and troop withdrawal; 79 and finally the Council adopted a resolution on December 21, by which it demanded that a durable cease-fire and
cessation of all hostilities on the India-Pakistan sub-continent
be strictly observed until troop withdrawals had taken place. 80
Ironically, India had already declared a cease-fire unilaterally
on December 17 after the surrender of the Pakistani armed
forces. 8'
But for the dramatic walkout of the Pakistani delegate from
the Council meeting on December 15,82 and the heated exchanges between the delegates of India and Pakistan,8 3 this
round of Council meetings is of significance only in its rehash
of the earlier arguments. However, as the eventual surrender
of the Pakistani army became imminent, the tone of the Council debates shifted from an unrelenting emphasis on an immediate cease-fire to a fresh concern for a political settlement.
For instance, on the evening of December 15, the Soviet delegate said that "many delegations had told him personally that
the Soviet approach to the solution of the problem regarding
the interrelationship between cessation of hostilities and a poliFor a summary report, see id. at 89-91.
76 G.A. Res. 2793 (XXVI) (1971). The text is contained id. at 91.
75

77 Id.
78 For a summary report, see id. at 26-45.
79 For the text of the draft resolution, see id. at 28. For voting on the
resolution, see id. at 34.
80 S.C. Res. 307 (1971). For the text, see id. at 45-46.
81 N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1971, at 16, col. 5 (Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in the Parliament of India on the truce and surrender).
82 9 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 1) at 37 (Jan. 1972).
83 Id. at 28-31.
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tical settlement, was perfectly correct. 8 4 The delegate from
Ceylon considered "a political settlement in East Pakistan to be
central to any solution, and negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and the acknowledged leaders of the people
of East Pakistan to be the only effective and legitimate means
of achieving it."' 5
D.

The Role of the Secretary-General in the Crisis
To his credit, the Secretary-General did take the initiative
to bring the gravity of the situation to the attention of the
Security Council. 6 However, he did not pursue the matter any
further. When the Council deemed fit not to meet formally to
discuss the issue, he seems to have chosen the course of least
resistance. Henceforth, his efforts were focused on the humanitarian aspects,8 7 followed in October 1971 by the offer of his
good offices to the governments of India and Pakistan. s8 He
never insisted that a Security Council meeting be called to
discuss a situation which, in his words, had by July 1971 become a potential threat to international peace and security and
had the potential of adversely affecting the United Nations effectiveness "for international co-operation and action."'
He
had clearly perceived the danger, for in his introduction to the
Annual Report of the Secretary-General, issued on September
19, he said: "In a disaster of such vast proportions, the international community has a clear obligation to help the Governments and peoples concerned in every possible way. But, as I
have indicated, the basic problem can be solved only if a political solution based on reconciliation and the respect of humanitarian principles is achieved." 9 However, he did not use the
authority granted him under article 99 to bring the matter
before the Security Council for discussion, 91 nor did he ask the
Id. at 38.
Id.
86 In a memorandum to the President of the Security Council. U.N. Doc.
S/10410 (July 20, 1971). The text is also contained in 8 U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 51-59 (Aug.-Sept. 1971).
87 See, e.g., the Secretary-General's statement of August 2, 1971, contained
in 8 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 8) at 56-57 (Aug.-Sept. 1971); For
a summary report of his activities in this regard, see id. (No. 9) at 13032 (Oct. 1971); id. (No. 10) at 95-96 (Nov. 1971); id. (No. 11) at 116-18
(Dec. 1971).
88 The text of his letters is contained in id. (No. 10) at 97-98 (Nov. 1971).
89The reference is contained in the Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work of the Organization, id. (No. 9) at 92, 132
(Oct. 1971).
90 Id. at 132.
91 "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Coun84
85

cil any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of in-

ternational peace and security." U.N.

CHARTER

art. 99.
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General Assembly to meet in an emergency session since the
Council was unwilling to meet.
Perhaps the Secretary-General, in refusing to act, was concerned with futility of his efforts. Perhaps he was discouraged
because his prior attempts to bring about a settlement in Vietnam had come to naught. Perhaps he did not want to strain
the U.N. machinery, which clearly has only limited competence.
But he failed to balance all these inadequacies against the possible outcome of the U.N. silence, for at least there was the
possibility that formal discussions at the U.N. and the world
public opinion generated by such discussions might have put
pressure on the Pakistani regime so as to compel the latter to
seek a political settlement of the crisis, or at least force it to
put a stop to the ruthless suppression by its army and collaborators in East Pakistan.
In any event, article 2(7) was certainly on the SecretaryGeneral's mind, for in the Introduction to the Annual Report,
he said that in his exchanges with the governments of India
and Pakistan, he had been "acutely aware of the dual responsibility of the United Nations, including the Secretary-General,
under the Charter both to observe the provision of Article 2,
paragraph 7, and to work, within the framework of international economic and social co-operation, to help promote and
ensure human well-being and humanitarian principles. '92 It is
submitted that this construction of article 2(7), in the light
of the circumstances, is at best exceedingly narrow, and seems
unwarranted by the past practices of the United Nations in
9 3
dealing with cases of massive violations of human rights.

III.

APPRAISAL AND

RECOMMENDATION

In the Council debate of December 12, the Indian delegate
succinctly summed up the U.N. dilemma, when he said:
It was not India which declared or started war; it was not India
which was responsible for creating the conditions that led to the
present unfortunate conflict; it was not India which deliberately
and systematically refused to meet the aspirations of the 75 million people inhabiting the country, once part of Pakistan; it was
not India which perpetuated the repression, genocide and brutality which provided the springboard for the freedom movement
of Bangla Desh, which led to the decision of the people of that
region to create a free and independent nation; it was not India
which forsook the long period of nine months during which a
reasonable political settlement could have been evolved with the
leaders and people of Bangla Desh.
92

8 U.N.

MONTHLY CHRONICLE

(No. 9) at 130 (Oct. 1971).

93 The number of resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and
the Security Council on South Africa and Rhodesia is an indicator of the
interpretation of article 2(7) by the U.N. bodies in situations involving
massive and persistent violation of human rights.
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The United Nations had been unable to deal with the root cause
of the problem in East Bengal. Informal consultations in the
Security Council in July and August indicated that the international community could not, due to limitations born of its commitments to the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, act in the matter. In the face of a direct violation of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the provisions of Articles 55 and 56 of the
Charter by Pakistan, the Security Council and the United Nations
should have found themselves in a position to intervene and persuade Pakistan to return to reason. That did not happen. While
developments proceeded on their inexorable course towards the
present tragedy, the United Nations continued to be inhibited by
94
considerations of domestic jurisdiction.
The United Nations failed to prevent the crisis. It failed
to deter the Pakistani regime from using excssive force in East
Pakistan. It failed to stop the war. Above all, it failed even
to attempt to persuade or coerce the parties to arrive at a political settlement. The war is over. A new state was born with
the use of force and in technical violation of article 2 (4), for
notwithstanding India's claim that it went to war only in selfdefense and only after the Pakistani planes had strafed several
Indian cities, 95 and Pakistan had launched "full-scale war,"9 )
the fact remains that in late November 1971, the India-Pakistan
confrontation seemed almost inevitable.9 ' And it is not too farfetched to suggest that in all likelihood India would have invoked the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to send its
armed forces into East Pakistan to help the rebel forces even
if it could not justify its action on grounds of self-defense.
There are three major questions: (1) Is the emphasis put
on article 2(7) by the Secretary-General and the U.N. members during the duration of the crisis realistic and functional
in a situation such as Bangladesh? (2) Are the expectations as
to the viability of article 2 (4) changed to the point that it is
really dead, as Professor Thomas Franck suggested in 1970?98
(3) Looking toward the future, what should the United Nations
have done to avert the eventual crisis and what action should
be taken to prevent such tragic occurrences in the future?
Without attempting a thorough discussion of articles 2(7)
and 2(4) in the context of the Bangladesh crisis, which I pro-

U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE (No. 1) at 29 (Jan. 1972).
95 Prime Minister Gandhi's statement reported in the Motherland (New
Delhi), Dec. 5, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
96 Prime Minister Gandhi's statement reported in N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1971,
at 10, col. 5.
97 See, e.g., Mohr, India and Pakistan Step up Preparationsfor Full War New Units Are Formed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
98
Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am.J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
94 9
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pose to study in collaboration with two of my colleagues, 99
some tentative conclusions are offered here. Article 2(7) was
erroneously construed to prohibit intervention in the domestic
affairs of Pakistan, for at least three reasons: (1) the situation
as a potential threat to international peace and security had
ceased to be a domestic affair, (2) the presence of 10 million
refugees on India's soilOO with thousands fleeing from the Pakistani army's wrath each day, with its impact on India's economic and political structure, had internationalized the situation
vis-A-vis India, and (3) in view of the massive and persistent
violations of human rights, 10 1 the situation could no longer be
deemed to be a domestic one.
Article 2(4) may not be dead as Professor Louis Henkin
has asserted in his response to Professor Franck, 102 but the fact
remains that, for the following reasons, the Bangladesh crisis
has seriously shaken it: (1) notwithstanding the technical violation of article 2(4) by India in hastening the birth of Bangladesh, the latter was recognized within 4 months of its establishment by over 50 countries, 01 3 (2) India was not condemned,
nor even censored by any U.N. organ, for its use of force, and
(3) despite the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly
for an immediate cease-fire, member nations seemed reconciled
to India's use of force.
With respect to recommendations, it has been previously
mentioned that the Security Council should have discussed the
situation because of its gravity and potential threat. In the face
of inaction by the Security Council, the Secretary-General should
have invoked his authority under article 99 to ventilate the
situation in a U.N. forum.
The U.N. human rights machinery should have been active.
Specifically, the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities should have studied
the situation. It has been authorized to do so in those situations
which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights
99 Forthcoming law review article: Nanda, Cox & Neeleman, Humanitarian

Intervention, articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter and the Bangladesh Crisis.
100 See sources cited note 11 supra.
101 See sources cited notes 8-10, 12-13 supra.
102 Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
103 The United States recognized Bangladesh on April 4, 1972 (Welles,
Bangladesh Gets U.S. Recognition, Promise of Help, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1972, at 1, col. 5); it was the 55th country to recognize the new nation.
ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 1972, at 47, col. 3.
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based upon the available information to the Subcommission;-0 1
05
the Subcommission did have such information available to it.'
Now that the Subcommission is authorized initially to review communications sent by individuals and groups alleging
the violations of human rights, pursuant to procedures established by the ECOSOC resolution 1503(XLVIII) May 27, 1970,106
the Subcommission has a special responsibility in this regard.
Perhaps the Commission on Human Rights should be authorized to meet in emergency sessions to discuss situations
which demand urgent and immediate attention because of "the
imminent threat or willful destruction of human life on a massive scale," a suggestion recently made by the International
Commission of Jurists." ' Perhaps the office of the proposed
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights should be authorized to undertake some initial investigation and recommend
measures for the Commission on Human Rights, once the office
is established. 0 8
The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, '0 9 which is in force and under
which the Committee on Racial Discrimination has been established, should have been invoked. Pakistan is a party to the
Convention and a special session of the Committee should have
been called.
The interdependence between the massive violation of human rights and international peace and security needs no further proof or evidence for these measures to be urgently undertaken and implemented in any future crisis involving such
violations.

of the
Commission on Human Rights. For the text of the resolution, see supra
note 28.
105 See p. 58 & note 24 supra.
10648 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1A, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
107 International Commission of Jurists Calls Upon Human Rights Commismission to Consider Implications of Human Rights Violations in East
Pakistan/Bangladesh, International Commission of Jurists Press Release
at 3(Apr. 5, 1972).
108 On the latest developments pertaining to the establishment of the Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, see G.A. Res. 2841
(XXVI) of Dec. 18, 1971.
109Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) (1966) in
December 1965. The text is conveniently contained in 60 Am. J. INT'L L.
650 (1966).
104 Pursuant to the authority granted under resolution 8 (XXIII)

GUEST COMMENT
SECURITIES LAW - "SPLIT-SALE" § 16(b) Liability of Beneficial Owners for Short-Swing Profits- Reliance Electric Company v. Emerson Electric Company, 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).

P

URSUANT to an attempted takeover of Dodge Manufacturing Company ("Dodge"), Emerson Electric Company ("Emerson") acquired 13.2 percent of the outstanding common stock
of Dodge.' In a defensive move, Dodge negotiated a merger
with Reliance Electric Company ("Reliance"). A proxy fight
ensued and the shareholders of Dodge subsequently approved
the Dodge-Reliance merger. Realizing its bid for control would
now be fruitless, Emerson sold enough of its recently acquired
Dodge stock to bring its holdings down to 9.96 percent of the
total outstanding shares. Two weeks later, Emerson sold the
remaining Dodge stock in its possession to Reliance. Both sales
were consumated within 6 months of Emerson's initial purchase and each yielded a considerable profit.2 Reliance, as
corporate successor to Dodge, demanded from Emerson the total
profit on both sales relying on the provisions of section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 3 Emerson filed suit in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri requesting a declaratory judgment determining its liability to Reliance.
The district court held that Emerson must account to Reliance
1On May 22, 1967, Emerson made a tender offer for shares of Dodge common stock. Emerson, on June 16th, upon the expiration of the tender
offer, purchased all 152,282 shares tendered.
2 Emerson's tender offer price was $63.00 per share. The first block of
stock, 37,000 shares, was sold to investment brokers at a price of $68.00
per share; the remaining shares, 115,282, were sold to Reliance at a price
of $69.00 per share.
3 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78
p(b) (1970), provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner
["Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner
of more than 10 percentum of any class of equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered .... " 15 U.S.C. §
78 p(a) (1970)], director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and
sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of
less than six months ...

shall inure to and be recoverable by the

issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial
owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months ....

This sub-

section shall not be construed to cover any transaction where
such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved,
or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

for the profits realized on both sales. 4 Emerson appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The court of appeals
reversed that part of the district court's finding that would
have forced Emerson to pay over the profits on the second sale
of the 9.96 block of stock. 5 On appeal by Reliance, the Supreme
Court affirmed, 6 holding that the second sale was specifically
exempted from the operation of section 16(b) since Emerson
was not the beneficial owner of a 10 percent interest in Dodge
at the time the second sale was made.
I. SECTION

16 (b)

OF THE SECURrrIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF

1934

Section 16(b) provides, in part, that a corporation has a
right to recover the profits realized by a beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of its stock resulting from a purchase
and sale of such stock within any 6 month period. 7 The section is limited, however, to exclude from coverage "any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
_t the time of purchase and sale."
Most cases dealing with a question under section 16(b)
have reviewed the history and congressional motives behind
the section's enactment.9 Stated briefly, the section was designed to curb the abuses of insider trading by forcing those
persons who might have access to inside information to return
all profits realized from short-swing transactions. 10 Factors
such as motive, intent, and actual access to or use of inside
information were not to be considered when applying the
statute." Congress had enacted "a relatively arbitrary rule
capable of easy administration" imposing strict liability on
those transaction which fall within its terms. 1'2 The use of a
4 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F.

Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
5 Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
1970).
6 Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1970).
8 Id.
I)See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840
(2d Cir. 1959); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
lOThe section covers only those persons and transactions that meet
the statutory definitions. The section is not designed to be a catchall for all situations where abuse might be present. Adler v. Klawans,
267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
1 Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943); Volk v. Zlotloff, 285 F. Supp. 650
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
1.2Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970).
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"crude rule of thumb ' 13 to determine liability prompted at least
one court to suggest that the section was Draconian in its application. 14 Despite this apparent quest for objectivity, some factual, if not subjective, analysis was necessary to determine
whether liability attached. Thus, courts have had to decide
whether an individual came within the definition of an "officer," 15 "director, ' 16 or "beneficial owner;"'1 7 or if an "equity
security' '1 8 was traded; or if a particular transaction was a
"sale"' 9 or "purchase;"'
or if a purchase and sale took place
"within a six-month period."' 2 1
In a more fundamental departure from the strict objective approach, courts have begun to inquire into particular
transactions to see if the possibility of abuse of inside information was present..2 2 This analysis is not utilized to replace the
traditional objective approach but rather to supplement it.23
For example, in Petteys v. Butler,24 objective measures would
have dictated that a conversion of preferred shares to common
be characterized as a "purchase" - and thus, a subsequent
sale of the common within 6 months would be subject to
section 16(b) provisions - but because of the absence of the possibility of abuse in this particular case the court found no liaHearings on H.R. 9323 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
See also Bershad v.
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
992 (1971); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156, 166 (3d Cir.
1965).
14 Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967); see Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
15 Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949); Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
16 Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970); Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
17 Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See also Newmark v. RKO General,
Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
18 Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Ellerin
v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
19 Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971); Newmark, v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); Western Auto Supply Co. v. GambleSkogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987
(1966).
20 Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 892 (1965); see Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
21 Varian Associates v. Booth, 224 F. Supp. 225 (D.C. Mass. 1963), aff'd 334
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965). See B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964).
22 See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518-20 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
23 Id. at 519.
24 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
13
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bility. The court's rationale was that "if an examination of the
facts indicates that there is no possibility of abuse, there is
no need to apply a section 16 (b) label to the transaction. '25 This
method of reasoning does not mean that the insider's "intent"
will be scrutinized, nor will an examination be made for proof
of actual use of inside information. Rather, the transaction
will be looked at to see if the circumstances afforded an opportunity for speculative abuse.

II.

EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY V. RELIANCE

ELEcTIc COMPANY

The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in
deciding that the profit from both sales was recoverable, placed
great weight on the fact that the two separate sales were "effected pursuant to a single predetermined plan of disposition
with the overall intent and purpose of avoiding Section 16(b)
liability ...."26 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals saw little
merit in predicating liability on intent in general and intent
to avoid liability in particular: "[I]ntent . . .to avoid loss of
realized profits by engaging in two independent sales not
legally tied to each other and made at different times to different buyers . . .does not result in treating the two sales as
one sale of the entire stock held, nor as one continuous transaction .... ,,27
Purposeful conduct to minimize liability under section 16(b) "is to some extent analogous to tax avoidance con2' 8
duct which is permissible.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Stewart speaking for the
4-3 majority, 9 affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 3 The
Court found simply that Emerson was in fact not a 10 percent
beneficial owner of Dodge's stock at the time of the second
sale and therefore could not be required to disgorge its profits
from that sale. The majority allowed that "where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves the
congressional purposes of curbing short swing speculation
25

Id. at 535. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967). See also Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82

27

(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954); Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172
F.2d 140 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Comment, 59 YALE
L.J. 510 (1950); Comment, 45 VA. L. REV. 124 (1959).
306 F. Supp. at 592.
434 F.2d at 926.

28

Id. at 925.

26

The court of appeals referred in footnote 19 to the case

of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1934),

which dealt with tax

avoidance.
29 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
30 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
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by corporate insiders." 31 However, "a construction of the term
'at the time of ... sale' that treats two sales as one upon proof
of a pre-existing intent by the seller is scarcely in harmony
with the congressional design of predicating liability upon an
objective measure of proof. '3 2 The court could not adopt a
construction that "flatly contradicts the words of the statute. '38

III.

EXEMPTION PROVISION OF §

16(b)

It is not entirely clear whether the framers of section 16(b)
forsaw such a "split-sale" and decided to exempt it under the
phrase "both at the time of purchase and sale" or whether they
simply did not anticipate such a transaction. It is clear, however, that neither the majority nor the dissenters could cull any
specific dialogue from the congressional hearings to conclusively
support their respective postions.
Justice Stewart suggested that the reasoning behind the
exemption was "that Congress regarded one with a long-term
investment of more than 10% as more likely to have access
to inside information than one who moves in and out of the
10% category. '34 Considering the arbitrariness of the statute 35
and its use as a "crude rule of thumb, '36 this may well have
been the congressional motive behind the inclusion of the specific exemption in question. It is indeed unfortunate, however,
that the majority opinion could not cite a more definite rationale for the exemption. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in an amicus brief, argued:
The exemption was intended to operate in situations where a
person purchases stock of a corporation, subsequently becomes

a more than 10 percent beneficial owner through circumstances
other than a voluntary stock purchase, and then sells his stock
within six months of the purchase. 37
Id. at 600.
32 Id.
33
Id. at 601.
34 Id. at 600. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959), suggested
another reason why 10 percent beneficial owners were treated differently than officers and directors:
[Olfficers and directors have more ready access to the intimate
business secrets of corporations and factors which can affect the
real and ultimately the market value of stock than does even
so large a stockholder as a "10% beneficial owner."
35 See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). See also cases cited note 13 supra.
86 Note 12 supra.
37 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13, Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972). The Commission suggested two ways
this might happen: first, by legal succession; second, by a reduction in
the total number of outstanding shares of a corporation, thereby increasing the percentage holdings of a shareowner. Id. at 30.
31
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In other words, if the transaction that brought about the 10
percent status was voluntarily consumated, all sales within six
months would be subject to section 16(b) liability. 38 The SEC
based this conclusion on the fact that of the three classes of
persons upon whom liability is imposed (officers, directors, and
10 percent beneficial owners) only 10 percent beneficial owners
can become such involuntarily. 39 That is why, in the SEC's view,
the exemption provision mentions only 10 percent holders and
not officers and directors. 40 Given the paucity of legislative
history on this point, the Court was probably reluctant to adopt
such a position without more convincing proof. It must be conceded that if Congress meant to make some sort of distinction
between ownership voluntarily and involuntarily achieved, they
certainly could have done so in a provision much clearer than
the one finally included in the section.
IV. THE DIssENT:

"SPLIT-SALE"

AND

"SALE"

In trying to characterize Emerson's two separate sales as
one "sale," Justice Douglas in his dissent argued that the
Court "should contrue the statute as allowing a rebuttable
presumption that any such series of dispositive transactions will
be deemed to be part of a single plan of disposition, and will
be treated as a single 'sale' for the purposes of § 16(b)." '41 Although Justice Douglas maintained that this method would not
require the courts to delve into the forbidden "intent" inquiry,
his construction begs the question. If intent is irrelevant under
section 16(b) what difference can it make that intent is presumed rather than proved? In effect Justice Douglas is saying
that the split-sale situation ought to be covered, and if necessary a strong judicial hand should be wielded in interpreting
the statute so as to achieve that result. This is judicial legisla-

Id. at 14.
39 Id. at 29-30.
40 Id. at 29.
41 92 S. Ct. at 607 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas
found fault with the district court's reasoning when he said: "Insofar as
the district court's approach appears to place the burden on the plaintiff
to demonstrate the existence of a 'plan of distribution,' it is justifiably
open to criticism." Id. at 606. It seems Douglas' answer to this dilemma
is to conveniently assume such a plan given the "split-sale" circumstances.
The textual footnote to Douglas' language regarding the construcstruction of a "rebuttable presumption" makes an analogy to a similar
proposed rebuttable presumption concerning the so-called "private
placement" and the "view to distribution" concept. 92 S. Ct. at 596 n.12.
Unfortunately, this analogy fails because the search for proof of whether
the purchasers had a "view to distribution" centers on the "intent"
of the individual - something neither required nor at issue in a § 16(b)
case. See cases cited note 11 supra.
38

1972

"SPLIT SALE" SECTION 16(b) LIABILITY

tion at its clearest and is properly rebuked by the majority
opinion.
The Securities and Exchange Commission also suggested a
42
construction of the word "sale" as including a series of sales.
Rather than fabricating a rebuttable presumption that a "plan
of distribution" exists given a series of sales (as Mr. Justice
Douglas would), the Commission relied on the broad interpretive power of the Court to "effectuate the policy of section
16(b). '43 The problem with this approach is that the majority
of the Court neither accepts nor plans to utilize this power a power, in fact, unrecognized by the present Court.
V. LIABILiTY OF "Ex-BENEFICIAL OWNERS"

Both the Securities and Exchange Commission 44 and Mr.
Justice Douglas 45 maintained that section 16(b) liability should
be extended to ex-beneficial owners on the same rationale that
led the Court to hold ex-directors liable in Feder v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,46 viz., information obtained while occupying a
favorable position with a corporation does not lose its utility
simply because that relationship is terminated. Although this
argument has considerable facial appeal, it will not withstand
close scrutiny.
As Mr. Justice Stewart points out, the "SEC's own rules
undercut such an interpretion. '' 47 The Commission, pursuant to
the powers granted in the statute, 48 promulgated rule 16a-10
that exempts from 16(b) liability any transaction that does not
fall within the reporting requirements of section 16(a) .4" Rule
16(a) requires that officers, directors, and beneficial owners
report at the end of each month any changes in their stock
holdings during the month. The Commission's original interpretation of that rule, Form 4, determined that such a report was
necessary only if the status of officer, director, or 10 percent
beneficial owner was maintained during the month.--- This ad42
43

Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13.
Id. at 34.

44 Id.
45

at 26.

92 S. Ct. at 609 (dissenting opinion).

The
46406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970).
specific holding of the Feder case stated that § 16 (b) applies to a sale of
stock by a former director if the stock was purchased by him during
the time he was a director and the sale was made within 6 months
after purchase - seemingly regardless of when resignation took place.
Id. at 269.
47 92 S. Ct. at 601.
48 15 U.S.C. § 78 p(b) (1970) (last sentence).
49 SEC Rule 16 a-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.
50 Form 4, SEC Release No. 6487 (March 9, 1961).
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Mr. Justice Douglas was quick to respond that the Feder
case found that "Rule 16a-10 was invalid, insofar as it operated
through Form 4 to exempt transactions by ex-directors
from liability under § 16(b)."'51 He reasoned that the Feder
analysis would be equally applicable to deny this exemption to
ex-10 percent owners. 52 What Justice Douglas fails to acknowledge is that Feder clearly excluded the analogy to 10 percent
holders: "[T]he act expressly sets forth that the liability of a
10% shareholder to surrender his short-swing profits is conditional upon his being such both at the time of purchase and at
the time of sale, but there is no such limitation in the case of
officers and directors. '53 It is difficult to put much faith in an
argument based on a source that expressly denies the reasoning
of the argument.
VI. FUTURE OF SECTION

16 (b)

Doubtless many critics of Reliance will rise to side with
Justice Douglas in saying that this decision "is a mutilation of the Act." 54 But it must be remembered that this case,
as it now stands, does not entirely guarantee that similar treatment will be afforded all future "split-sales" cases. This lack
of certainty is a product of the extent to which the legal
theories involved in section 16(b) cases tend to center on the
particular facts before the court. For example, the district
court's Reliance opinion, in language quoted by the Supreme
Court, characterized Emerson's two sales as "not legally tied
to each other."55 Although neither court advanced any guidelines on what sales "legally tied to each other" might mean or
how such a transaction might be proven, 6 the way is clearly
open for the Court to find in future cases that the particular
sales under consideration had the legal connection not present
in Reliance and should be treated as a single sale.
The Court might also employ the theory announced in
Petteys v. Butler5 7 to exempt the profits of all sales in a
51 92 S. Ct. at 608 (dissenting opinion).
52 Id.
at 609.
53 406 F.2d at 267 (citations omitted).
54 92 S. Ct. at 602 (dissenting opinion).
55 306 F. Supp. at 591-92. The district court borrowed this phrase from an
intra-company memo prepared by Emerson's corporate counsel which
explicitly set out the liability avoidance motive for the split-sale.
56 This vagueness has been roundly attacked. See Note, 5 GA. L. REV. 584
(1970).
57 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967).
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Reliance-type series from corporate recovery under section
16(b). In Petteys, a 16 (b) insider had converted preferred stock
into common following a call for redemption of the preferred.
Had the preferred stock not been converted, the insider would
have suffered a considerable loss on the redemption. The question before the court was whether such a conversion constituted
a "purchase" of the common stock for the purposes of section
16(b). While freely admitting that under traditional standards
the transaction would be classified as a "purchase," the court
refused to impose liability because in the particular circumstances presented, the opportunity for abuse was not present.
In Reliance, Emerson was left holding a substantial block
of Dodge stock after its attempted takeover failed. It was obviously in a most unfavorable position. It had to sell and risk
16(b) liability or hold the stock and be forced to exchange it
for shares in the new Dodge-Reliance corporation. This latter
course of action might have also incurred 16(b) liability. 58
The Petteys principle might easily have been applied to exempt
all sales necessary for Emerson to extricate itself from this
predicament. The transaction at issue in Petteys was of a type
capable of abuse-a conversion from preferred to common
shares.5 9 Similarly, the Securities and Exchange Commission
and Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that the instant transaction
was also of the type that could, under some circumstances, be
utilized for insider speculation. The Court in this case never
had to reach the next step in the Petteys approach, i.e., an
examination to determine whether no abuse was possible under
There is an intimation in the opinion to that effect. The majority cited
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 400
U.S. 854 (1970), as standing for the proposition that an exchange of stock
pursuant to a merger agreement was a "sale" under § 16 (b). 92 S. Ct.
596, 598. They did not, however, say that Newmark would control the
instant case had the need arisen to decide the issue. Newmark has been
interpreted as allowing an inquiry into whether opportunity for abuse
is present. Katz, Short-Swing Liability, 2 REV. OF SECURITIEs REGULATION
916 (1969); See note 60 infra. It would appear that Katz's interpretation
of Newmark is correct in light of Abrams v. Occidental Pet. Corp.,
450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom Kern County Land Co.
v. Occidental Pet. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1498 (1972). There the court found
that Newmark did not establish an inflexible rule that forced exchanges
of shares would always be looked upon as "sales" for the purposes of
establishing § 16(b) liability. Rather the Abrams court distinguished
Newmark on the basis that knowledge of impending defensive mergers
and ability to control the same would be highly determinative - factors
that were present in Newmark and not present in Abrams. Had the
Court in the present case made a similar search, perhaps these factors
would also have been found absent.
Interestingly, based on the Securities and Exchange Commission's
own "voluntary-involuntary" dichotomy it seems that if Emerson had
held onto their Dodge shares, and been forced (i.e. involuntarily) to
exchange them for new shares in the Dodge-Reliance Corporation, the
transaction would be exempt from § 16(b) liability. Brief for SEC as
Amicus Curiae n.14.
59 See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
58
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the circumstances of this particular case. One wonders if the
Court might not have done just that were it not for the presence
of a convenient exception which served to minimize the severity
of section 16(b) as it applies to 10 percent beneficial owners.
Certainly, the possibility of abuse in Reliance was not appreciably greater than in Petteys.
Whether the aspect of "possibility of abuse" will be flexed
to deal with different fact situations, has yet to be seen. There
can be no doubt, however, that the Court will have to face
corporate merger situations where it would be unfair to blindly
apply 16(b) sanctions to innocent transactions. 0
CONCLUSION

The Wall Street Journal hailed this decision as an indication
that the Court was taking a turn to the "Right."6 But this case
is beholden to no pat rules of construction. The transaction
at issue seems to comfortably attach itself to the specific exemptive language of the statute. The unanswerable question that
remains is whether Congress actually intended to exempt splitsale situations or simply left a loophole in the statute. 62 Precisely because it is not clear from the legislative history which
of the above is correct, it appears that this decision reached
the preferable result. If Congress meant to exempt this transaction, the instant case did just that. If not, Congress has
ample opportunity to plug the loophole recognized in Reliance.

60 For example:

Where the management of the target company indicates a defensive merger with a third company to thwart a tender offer,
the tender offerer typically is neither privy to the defensive
merger nor apprised of plans for its consumation. Having failed
in a bid to gain control through the tender offer, but having
obtained enough stock to become a statutory insider, the offeror
is locked into securities if a hostile issuer. It may be obliged to
dispose of such securities pursuant to a corporate reorganization
over which it has no control and with respect to which it
obviously has no inside information. It is fair to say that the
imposition of section 16 (b) liability in this contest would involve
an unjustifiable and probably unintended hardship. Katz,
Short-Swing Liability, 2 REV. OF SECURITIES REGULATION 916

(1969).

The headline was:
"Supreme Court Opens Loophole in Trading by Insiders; Economic Turn
to Right Seen."
(32
Interestingly enough, as early as 1934 it was pointed out that this type
of "split-sale" transaction would appear to avoid liability under § 16(b):
"[T]he intention of the language was to exclude the second sale in a
case where 10% is purchased, 5% sold within three months, and the
remaining 5% a month later." Seligman, Problems Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1934). See also, 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs
REGULATION 1060 (2d. ed. 1961) where a similar course of action was
recommended.
61 Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1972, at 3, col. 1.
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As Justice Stewart correctly pointed out,6

3

the Supreme Court

is not the proper forum for remedial work on the statute.
Charles C. Turner*

63 92 S. Ct. at 600.
*

A Denver attorney, Mr. Turner is Coordinator for Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc.; B.A., St. Lawrence University, 1966; J.D., University of Denver, 1971.

NOTE
THE PROPRIETY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER COLORADO'S
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
Now, the laws keep up their credit not for being
just, but because they are laws; 'tis the mystic foundation of their authority; they have no other, and it well
answers their purpose.
Montaigne, Essays of Experience
INTRODUCTION

T has been said that the history of the phases of man's reflections is in great part a history of the confusion of ideas,1
to which, it may be added, the law is hardly an exception. Not
infrequently, the underlying basis of a legal precedent has been
rooted in an an irrational convenient explanation that bore little
relation to an issue when originally faced by a court, but with
each successive celebration, the precedent has grown in stature
more for being a precedent than for being correct. In Colorado,
the issue of whether punitive damages may be recovered in a
wrongful death action is an apposite example of what the English legal historian, Holdsworth, warned is "an object lesson
both in the dangers of hastily acquiring [historical] knowledge
for a special occasion, and in the consequences of the neglect of
[the historical] branch of legal learning. '2 Although it is widely
believed by members of the Colorado bar that the question is
foreclosed and that punitive damages are never recoverable in
an action for wrongful death,3 the purpose of this article is to
examine the verity of this position and to suggest some arguments that have yet to be posited with the Colorado Supreme
Court.
I.

WRONGFUL DEATH: ITS ENGLISH HERITAGE

Recovery for wrongful death boasts a long and somewhat
obscure development. Social mores, historical intrigue, and judicial misconception, as well as changes in rationale without corresponding changes in application, produced a pastiche of confusing traditions and unreasonable rules that became crystalized
in common law precedent. 4 This precedent ultimately found its
1 A. LovEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING (1936).
2 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 336 (3d ed. 1923) [here-

inafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
3See Hall, Damages for Death- Limited or Unlimited? 34 DICTA 32, 35
(1957).
4 See generally Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law
Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960); Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
81
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way into statutory language and judicial constructions. Therefore, in order to understand the Colorado wrongful death statute,
the historical foundations of the common law must be examined.
Early English History
No single factor is responsible for the common law rule
that death is not an injury compensable in a civil court. However, three protean ingredients have been suggested by various
authors as contributing to this early common law conclusion.
Prior to the genesis of the common law tradition under Henry
II, English society was influenced by tribal status, 5 and although
the first form of redress was personal vengeance,6 it was early
established that certain minor wrongs were "emendable" by
payment of a sum of money referred to as bot, or betterment.
Recovery for wrongs depended essentially on a victim's position
within his own tribe and upon that tribe's relative position with
other tribes. Once an offense was "emended," the wrongdoer
avoided the pains of being named an outlaw, and blood feuds
were avoided. Although at first only minor wrongs were emendable, in time the scope of wrongs grew to include homicide.7
A.

"The custom of the people had from the earliest days consecrated inequality. Every free man had his rights, but the rights differed for
different men. The damages that could be claimed for wrongdoing,
like the sort of evidence needed to prove wrongdoing, were graded
according to social status, varying from Kent to Mercia, from Wessex
to the Danelaw. As a writer of Edward's days said: 'People and law
went by ranks;' and the difference between the mal whose death
must be atoned for by twelve hundred shillings, and the 'twy hynd'
men whom it only cost two hundred shillings to slay, was a difference
that ran through the whole structure of Anglo-Saxon society." H. CAM,
ENGLAND BEFORE ELIZABETH 57-8 (1950). See also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArl-

LAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 26 (1895) [hereinafter cited as
POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
"E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 7 (2d ed. 1922).
In 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 84 the authors illustrate some of the factors

that were considered in evaluating the damages in an early wrongful
death case.
Let us suppose that a man learned in the law is asked to advise
upon a case of homicide. Godwin and Roger met and quarrelled, and Godwin slew Roger. What must be paid; by whom;
to whom? Our jurist is not very careful about those psychical
elements of the case which might interest us, but on the other
hand he requires information about a vast number of particulars which would seem to us trivial. He cannot begin to cast up
his sum until he has before him some such statements as this: Godwin was a free ceorl of the Abbot of Ely; Roger, the son of
a Norman father, was born in England of an English mother
and was a vavassor of Count Alan: the deed was done on the
Monday after Septuagesima, in the county of Cambridge on a
road which ran between the land which Gerard a Norman
knight held of County Eustace and the land of the Bishop of
Lincoln; this road was not one of the king's highways; Godwin
was pursued by the neighbours into the county of Huntingdon
and arrested on the land of the Abbot of Ramsey; Roger, when
the encounter took place, was on his way to the hundred moot;
he has left a widow, a paternal uncle and a maternal aunt. As
a matter of fact the result will probably be that Godwin, unable
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The price of atonement for slaying someone (bot) was referred
to as wergild, a sum based on a man's rank in society.8 Hence,
it can be seen that even in earliest times the loss of life was
looked upon as compensable,9 though the basis for setting the
amount of compensation may seem irrational by modern standards.
As the influence of the English monarchy waxed, so did
that of its courts, which through aggrandizement gradually took
jurisdiction of the aggravated wrongs. At the expense of the
tort law, the criminal sanctions levied by the crown were swift
and complete. Most crimes were punishable by death, and a
felon's property generally escheated to the crown. As a practical
matter, if not in law, the tort often merged into the crime."
This factor of merger eclipsed the concept of emendation and
contributed to the common law conclusion that death was not
a wrong that could be compensated in a civil action. Once the
wrongdoer was executed and his property confiscated, there
was nothing left for a claimant suing for wrongful death. Although the doctrine of merger was later supplanted by a practice of suspension, that is, the tort recovery was merely suspended until the criminal tribunal decided a case, the concept of
merger lingered in the minds of common law judges long after
its statutory demise."
The third factor affecting recovery in wrongful death actions was the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona;
i.e., a personal right of action dies with the person. The origins
of the maxim are unknown, and although it has been said that
the rule had its roots in Roman law, such a conclusion has been
to satisfy the various claims to which his deed has given rise,
will be hanged or mutilated. This however is but a slovenly,
practical solution of the nice problem, and even if he be hanged,
there may be a severe struggle over such poor chattels as he
had.
" Id. at 238-41. Early English law did not clearly distinguish civil
injuries from criminal offenses. Besides the bot paid to a man's wer,
the class of persons permitted to share the damages resulting from a
wrongful death, the King, or in some instances the deceased's lord,
required a payment of wite, a revenue raising penalty. See generally
Admirality Comm'rs v. Owners of S.S. Amerika [1917] A.C. 38, 56-7.
9 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 448-49.
10 See Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607), wherein the court
said:
[I]f a man beats the servant of J.S. so that he dies of that battery, the master shall not have an action against the other for
the battery and loss of the service, because the servant dying
of the extremity of the battery, it is now become an offense to
the Crown, being converted into felony, and that drowns the
particular offense, and private wrong offer'd to the master
before, and his action is thereby lost ....
11 3 HOLDSWORTH 334-35.
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disparaged by the leading commentators. 12 Nevertheless, the
maxim became a shibboleth on which innumerable decisions
have been based.
B. The Rule in Baker v. Bolton
Although not explicitly recognized, these three factors
obviously contributed to the holding in Baker v. Bolton,13 the
source of the common law rule that death is not compensable.
In that early nisi prius case, plaintiff and his wife were passengers on the defendant's stagecoach. As a result of alleged
negligence on the part of the defendant's driver, the stagecoach
was upset and the plaintiff's wife sustained injuries from which
she died shortly thereafter. The husband brought an action
in which he sought to recover the loss of his wife's services
and the costs of caring for her following the accident but prior
to death. The English court rejected the husband's claim for
losses sustained as a result of his wife's death, stating that "in
a civil court the death of a human being cannot be complained
14
of as an injury.'
Obviously, this rule, which resembles the maxim actio
personalis moritur cum persona, was broader than was needed,
and the dictum has stirred a great deal of comment. Generally
it has been contended that the court confused the maxim
actio prsonalis moritur cum persona with the doctrine of merger. 15 Since the plaintiff's wife died she could not maintain an
action, and since wrongdoing merged into felony, no one else
could sue. On closer inspection it is noted that the plaintiff
in Baker v. Bolton was suing on his own behalf for damages
suffered by him as a result of his wife's injuries and death.
Hence the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona was
inapplicable. Both plaintiff and defendant were still alive. Moreover, from the point of view of merger, the result under the
facts of the case is illogical because it is unlikely that the
1Id. at 333-35; see Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton,
32 L.Q. REV. 431, 435 (1916); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the
Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960); 33 L.Q. REV. 107
(1917); Admiralty Comm'rs v. Owner of S.S. Amerika [1917] A.C. 38,
60; but see W.

BUCKLAND & A MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMIVION LAW

418 (2d ed. 1952) wherein the authors state that:
[T]he Roman law allowed no action for the killing of a freeman,
and it is a probable conjecture that this is due to the impossibility of valuing a freeman. The evidence is essentially negative: it consists in the existence of many texts giving action for
wounding while there is none which gives one for killing.
It seems clear that a man's representatives had no action if he
was killed and that a paterfamiliashad no action if his son was
killed.
13 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
14 Id.
15 3 Holdsworth 334-35,
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driver's master, the defendant, could have been charged as a
felon. An American court added the third dimension to the
conjecture surrounding the rule, speculating that:
[T)he reason of the rule is to be found in that natural and almost
universal repugnance among enlightened nations, to setting a
price upon human life .... Among barbarous and half civilized
nations, it has been common to find a fixed and prescribed standard of value or compensation for human life, which is often
found to be carefully graduated by the relative importance of
the position in the social scale which the deceased may have

occupied.

16

Thus, all three factors previously mentioned probably contributed to the conclusion reached in Baker v. Bolton, however
irrelevant they may have been to the facts at bar. Despite
the weakness of the rationale, however, the rule became firmly entrenched, and no amount of research or argument has
succeeded in budging its effects, other than by the enactment
of statutes.
C. Lord Campbell's Act and the American Response
Whatever the rationale of the rule in Baker v. Bolton, the
enactment of Lord Campbell's Act 17 in 1846 attenuated the
effects of the common law rule and removed to a different
level some of the illogical vagaries that judicial reasoning had
created. The Act, in effect, created a new cause of action permitting recovery for wrongful death. The right of action of
the deceased still died with him,' 8 but his survivors were no
longer barred from maintaining an action in their own behalf
for compensatory damages. The significance of the Act was
widespread, and as a result the common law rule became
crystallized.19 Without a statute, there could be no recovery
for wrongful death. If there remained any question that a
plaintiff could recover damages for wrongful death at common
law, the Act settled that argument. More important, however,
was the Act's recognition that life has value. Although the
ambit of recoverable damages was limited severely by the
judicially-invented pecuniary loss rule and the denial of puni20
tive damages, the initial step had been taken.
16Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 191 (1867).
17 Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846).
18 Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852). See generally Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH.
L. REv. 114 (1925).
19 The Recital to the Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846)
stated that "[n]o action at law is now maintainable against a person who
by his wrongful act, neglect, or default may have caused the death of
another person." Coampare Admiralty Comm'rs v. Owners of S.S.
Amerika [1917] A.C. 38 with Osborn v. Gillett [1873] L.R. 8 Ex. 88, 93
(Bramwell, B.) and Clark v. General Omnibus Co. [1906] 2 K.B. 648,

658-59 (Lord Alverston).

20 Blake

v. Midlands Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35 (Q.B. 1852).
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Although there are some early decisions to the contrary,
for the most part American jurisdictions adopted the principle
of the common law and enacted statutes similar to Lord Campbell's Act. 21 In some instances even the issues regarding wer24
gild,22 merger, 23 and actio personalis moritur cum persona
received de novo consideration; yet the courts reached conclusions consistent with the English precedent. But in doing
so, it is quite evident that wrongful death actions became
colored by the unknowable, and surmised trappings of the
English prejudices. For the most part, the English judicial
constructions were followed without examination to limit statutory recovery to compensatory damages. Thus, while clearly
recognizing that the death of a human being may be the basis
of pecuniary recovery, 25 the modern decisions retain shadows
of golems of the past even when modern statutes clearly and
unambiguously provide for forms of recovery not contemplated
by the English and early American wrongful death acts.
II.

WRONGFUL DEATH iN COLORADo

Just as the early common law influenced the remedial
legislation enacted in England, the early history in Colorado
affected the construction of Colorado's wrongful death statute.
Accordingly, in order to understand the present state of the
law in Colorado, it is not only necessary to appreciate the early
developments in England and the United States, but it is also

See, e.g., Panama R.R. v. Rock,' 266 U.S. 209 (1924) (wrongful death
action depends wholly upon statutory authority). But see 266 U.S. at
216 (dissenting opinion), wherein Justice Holmes states:
[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes sometimes
have been too slow to recognize that statutes even when in terms
covering only particular cases may imply a policy different
from that of the common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose of limiting their
scope. [citation] Without going into the reasons for the notion
that an action (other than an appeal) does not lie for causing
the death of a human being, it is enough to say that they have
disappeared. The policy that forbade such an action, if it was
more profound than the absence of a remedy when a man's
body was hanged and his goods confiscated for the felony, has
been shown not to be the policy of present law by statutes of
the United States and of most if not all of the States....
Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 (1860); Grosso v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R.,
50 N.J.L. 317, 13 A. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1888); Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28
Barb. 9 (N.Y. 1858).
(dictum).
22 Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867)
21

See White v. Fort, 10 N.C. 251, 265 (1824) (wherein the court states that
the only requirement is that wrongdoing first be heard and disposed of
before a criminal tribunal).
24 See Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1913)
(wherein the court rejects the maxim).
25 Panama R.R. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924) (dissenting opinion).
23
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important to understand the origin, history, purposes, and
26
language of Colorado's act.
A. Origin and History
1. Early Territorial Legislation
In 1872, the territorial legislature of Colorado enacted a
wrongful death act which provided for an action brought by a
representative of the deceased where such could have been
brought by the deceased himself.2 7 Unlike the English paradigm, the Colorado act did not limit damages by any "just and
fair" and "necessary injury" formula.2 8 In construing this early
legislation, the Colorado court, in Kansas Pacific Railway v. Miller, stated that:
All else is left to the operations of rules already in existence, for
the admeasurement of damages. When a rule is prescribed in a
statute, all other methods of computation must be ignored. When
none is prescribed, then the statute must be taken to embrace
those ordinarily applied to like cases....
... whatever is susceptible of pecuniary computation enters
into the rule, and what cannot be included must be left out. So,
too, I apprehend, that when the injury is the result of wantonness, violence or gross negligence, it is competent for the jury to
award punitive damages. [citing authority] 29

In light of the differences between Lord Campbell's Act and
the 1872 Colorado act, the language of the court is not startling;
for punitive damages had been recognized at common law.
But remembering the common law development of wrongful
death actions, the decision is remarkable. Based solely on common law principles concerning damages and not upon precedent concerning death, the court concluded that punitive recoveries were permissible when the circumstances surrounding
a death were attended by wantonness, violence, or gross negligence.
See Ellet v. Campbell, 18 Colo. 510, 518-19, 33 P. 521 (1893), aff'd on
other grounds, 167 U.S. 116 (1897) (wherein the Colorado court said
that in interpreting a statute, the meaning and application are to be ascertained "by considering its origin, its history, its purposes and objects,
as well as its subject matter and the language employed").
27
Act of Feb. 8, 1872, [1872] Colo. Terr. Sess. Laws 117-18 (repealed 1877).
The Act provided:
When the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act,
misconduct, negligence, or omission of another, the personal
representatives of the former may maintain an act therefor
against the latter, if the former might have maintained an
action, had he or she lived, against the latter for the same act,
misconduct, negligence, or omission. ...
See generally Comment, Wrongful Death in Colorado, RocKY MT. L.
REV. 393 (1961).
28 Compare Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict. 217, c. 93 (1846) with Act of
Feb. 8, 1872, [1872] Colo. Terr. Sess. Laws 117.
29 2 Colo. 442, 464, 467 (1874) (emphasis added).
26
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Two years after the Miller decision, the court declared
that "[a]s a matter of sentiment, life has no pecuniary value." 30
But in the course of the opinion the court said it did not
intend, in setting out the often quoted basic pecuniary loss rule,
to disturb the rulings in the Miller decision. With these decisions then, Colorado law recognized two different bases of
damages. Not only would a claimant be entitled to the pecuniary
losses he had suffered as a result of a death, but he was also
entitled to seek punitive damages when the circumstances warranted.
2. Wrongful Death in the State of Colorado
In 1876 Colorado became a state and the 1872 act, having
enjoyed a relatively short life, was repealed in 1877 by a statute undoubtedly adopted from Missouri. 31 The 1877 statute,
32
which has remained substantially unchanged to this day,
provided inter alia that:
[In every [wrongful death] action the jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and just (not exceeding five thousand
($5,000) dollars) with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties, who may be entitled to sue; and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any such wrongful act, neglect
or default.

33

The first part of the statute is substantially the same as Lord
Campbell's Act, but the latter portion, i.e., "and having regard
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances," is not found
in the English model.
Although the question was not raised until 1894, there are
dicta in cases prior to that time that are indicative of the
changes intended by the 1877 act. Immediately following its
enactment, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that the
prior case law was still viable, stating that "the later act
recognizes the justice of the former one by re-affirming the
right of recovery in all like cases in the future, limiting, howKansas Pac. Ry. v. Lundin, 3 Colo. 94, 102 (1876). The pecuniary loss
rule in Lundin subsequently was followed in Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo.
178, 37 P. 721 (1894) (leading case); accord, Kogul v. Sonheim, 150
Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962); Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 371
P.2d 422 (1962); St. Lukes Hospital Ass'n. v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240
P.2d 917 (1952). Compare Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 P. 200
(1918) with McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953)
(overruling Tadlock in part).
31 Act of March 7, 1877, ch. 25, §§ 877-81, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 342.
See Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892) (dictum); F. TnFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT 46 (2d ed. 1913); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384
(1935). Compare ch. 25, §§ 877-81, Colo. Gen. Laws [1877] with ch. 51,
[1855] Mo. REv. STAT.
32 Compare ch. 25, §§ 877-81, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 342 with COLO. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
33 Act of March 7, 1877, ch. 25, § 879, [1877], Colo. Gen. Laws 343.
30
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ever, the amount of damages to $5,000. ' '3 4 Thus it would be a
pejorative reading of this statute's language to say that the 1877
act overruled the prior decisions.3 5 The language of the later
act expressly continued to provide for compensatory damages
as well as punitive damages arising from the aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act. The only limitation
was that the two categories of recovery, considered together,
were limited to the maximum amount of $5,000.36
When the source of the 1877 legislation is considered, further credence is lent to the conclusion that the 1877 act was to
be construed as consistent with prior Colorado law. As pointed
out, Colorado adopted its statute from Missouri. At that time
Missouri had already construed its statute' to provide for punitive damages.3 7 Moreover, Colorado had recognized the prevailing rule of statutory construction that, where a statute adopted
by the Colorado legislature from another jurisdiction has been
construed by that jurisdiction's highest appellate court, there
is a presumption that the Colorado legislature intended to
adopt that jurisdiction's construction. 8 Applying this rule of
construction to the 1877 act, coupled with the fact that punitive
damages had been recognized under prior Colorado law, the
future course of the statute would seem to have been inalterably set. If the legislature had wanted to change the course of
Colorado law, it seems reasonable that it would have enacted
a statute more readily resembling Lord Campbell's Act. Instead,
the legislature followed a state that had a wrongful death act
providing for both pecuniary losses and punitive damages.
B.

Purposes of Colorado's 1877 Wrongful Death Statute
Since at common law it was held that there was no re-

34 Denver, S.P. & Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 168 (1878).
35
See, e.g., Mitchell v. The Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 12 Colo. App.
277, 55 P. 736 (1898) (the court recognized that the 1877 Act was a substitute, differing only slightly from the former Act, except that the
recovery under the new Act was limited to $5,000).
36 Although this conclusion is consistent with the Missouri decisions [See,
e.g. Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888)], it could
be argued that the $5,000 limit (now $45,000) applies only to the first
part of the formula for awarding damages, i.e., those damages with reference to the necessary injury. See, e.g., Law of May 27, 1911, ch. 113,
§ 2, [1911] Colo. Sess. Laws 294, 295 now CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-2
(1963).
3T Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873); accord Parsons v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888) (complete statement of Missouri
rule); Morgan v. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879) (before instruction proper,
there must be evidence showing aggravating circumstances). See Note,
The Missouri Wrongful Death Statute, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 141 n. 107.
38 Bradbury v. Davis, 5 Colo. 265 (1880); Stebbins v. Anthony, 5 Colo.
348 (1880). See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5209 (3d ed. 1943). [hereinafter cited as SUTHFRLAND]. But see
Atchison T. & S.F.R.R. v. Farrow, 6 Colo. 498 (1883).
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covery for wrongful death, statutes following the pattern of
Lord Campbell's Act often were characterized as remedial,
and, consequently, were construed liberally. 39 It was generally
concluded that where a statute was remedial in nature, providing a right of action to a class of persons for wrongful
conduct, and imposing upon the wrongdoer a duty to pay damages sustained by a plaintiff, only compensatory damages could
be recovered. Under penal statutes, on the other hand, both the
right of action and extent of damages, deemed to be a form of
40
punishment, were construed strictly.
Admittedly the courts have tended to classify wrongful
death statutes either as penal or remedial, which in turn has
determined the types of damages recoverable. 41 Yet, there is
no basis to conclude that the 1877 Colorado act was not intended
to provide for both kinds of awards. Although the Colorado
court apparently concluded that the Missouri statute was penal,
and therefore was not consistent with the intent of the Colorado legislature to adopt a remedial statute, the evidence is
otherwise. Missouri had recognized two bases of recovery, compensatory as well as punitive. 42 Secondly, the Colorado court
arrived at its determination that the Missouri statute was penal
in nature, not in cases involving damages, but in cases concerning procedural matters. 43 Finally, because the language
suggests two grounds of damages, under accepted rules of construction, the statute should be regarded as a whole, and, being
both penal and remedial, should be given a reasonable inter44
pretation.
31 3 SUTHERLAND § 7205.
40 Id.
Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the
Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950).
41 See, e.g., Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892); Denver, S.P.
& Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162 (1878) (dictum); Mitchell v.
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 12 Colo. App. 277, 55 P. 736 (1898)
(dictum). See Note, Punitive Damages in Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 301 (1971) for a classification of rationales used by the courts to
permit or deny punitive recoveries. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks
on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (note,
however, that the author overlooks canon that penal statutes are to be
construed strictly).
42 Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Morgan v.
Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879); Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873).
See Note, The Missouri Wrongful Death Statute, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125.
43 E.g., Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 352 (1892) (statute of limitations); Denver S.P. & Pac. Ry. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162 (1878), (retrospective operation of 1877 Act). Query: Has the Colorado court confused the issues of (1) the right to bring an action and (2) the extent
of recovery permissible under the 1877 Wrongful Death Statute? See
Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Com-

mon Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950).
44 3 SUTHERLAND § 7205, citing Betz v. Kansas City S. Ry., 314 Mo. 390, 284
S.W. 455 (1926).
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C.

The Language and Syntax of Colorado's 1877 Statute
Turning to the language of the 1877 statute, the punctuation and actual terms employed shed considerable light on its
meaning. Looking at the statute as a whole, it appears to divide
into two parts, thusly:
[In every [wrongful death] action the jury may give such
damages ... with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death; . . . and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any such wrongful act. . . .45

The presence of the semicolon and the use of the words, "and
also," strongly suggest two elements. The first element of the
statute provides for damages in accordance with the pecuniary
loss rule. But the second element allows the jury to consider
the aggravating circumstances of a killing, if such aggravating
46
circumstances appear.
The term, "aggravating," suggests a form of damages not
concerned with compensation. A recent Arizona decision provides direct support for the proposition that the word "aggravating" must be construed to provide for punitive damages.
Prior to 1956, Arizona had a statute resembling Lord Campbell's
Act. Following a decision in that year which limited recovery
under that act to compensatory damages, 47 the Arizona legislature enacted a statute substantially the same as the 1877 Colorado act. 48 Under the new statute the Arizona court followed
the general rule that punitive damages are awarded on the
basis of aggravated, wanton or reckless conduct, and held that
the words, "having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act . . . " refer to awards
of punitive damages.49
III.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER CoLORADo's WRONGFUL DEATH ACT

A.

Moffatt v. Tenney: A Lesson in Judicial Sophistry
Notwithstanding the origins and tenor of the 1877 Wrongful Death Act, in interpreting it the Colorado court avoided
45 Ch. 25, § 879 [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 343 (emphasis added).

See Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Boies v.
Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965).
47 Downs v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 80 Ariz. 286, 297 P.2d 339
(1956).
48 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (1956).
49 Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407 P.2d 917 (1965). The Boies court went on
to state that:
[T]he phrase "mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act..." would have to be an element of
damages created by the legislature in addition to those considered to be "fair and just". The word "aggravating" modifies
the words "wrongful act..." and is a clear implication that the
element of damages added by the [19561 amendment are punitive damages. Id. at 202, 407 P.2d at 921.
46
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the accepted rule of construction concerning a statute adopted
from another jurisdiction without comment and imposed a
startling construction that has been followed, apparently without question, to the present. In Moffatt v. Tenney5" the plaintiff sought recovery for the negligent death of her husband.
Although there was no claim for punitive damages, the court
instructed the jury by reading substantially the entire damages
portion of the wrongful death statute, including language which
permitted the jury to consider the mitigating, or aggravating
circumstances attending the alleged death. The jury returned
a verdict of $5,000, the maximum permitted under the statute,
and judgment was entered thereon.
On appeal the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the verdict
was excessive, because the jury had been permitted to award
exemplary damages, having regard to aggravating circumstances attending plaintiff's husband's death, even though there
was no evidence of gross negligence. In affirming th trial court's
decision that the jury's award did not include exemplary damages, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 1877 Wrongful
Death Statute was compensatory in nature, and the language
concerning aggravating circumstances referred not to the ambient circumstances of the death but only to the necessary in-

50 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892).

Although Moffat v. Tenney is the leading

case, it has only been followed in one opinion, decided three weeks after

the Moffatt case. Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 P. 353 (1892). The
following cases, although citing Moffatt, have relied thereon principally
as authority for the pecuniary loss rule: Orman v. Mannix, 17 Colo.
564, 30 P. 1037 (1892) (dictum); Mollie Gibson Consol. Mining & Milling
Co. v. Sharpe, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 P. 850 (1894); Alcorn v. Erasmus, 484
P.2d 813 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (not selected for official publication).
It is apparent that if the law is
the propriety of punitive damages in
'to the decision in Moffatt v. Tenney.
nbte will be devoted to an examination
its. ramifications in the current state
death.

confusing or incorrect regarding
wrongful death actions, it is due
Therefore the latter part of this
of that decision, its reasoning and
of the law concerning wrongful

For a confusing reference to the Moffatt decision, see Fish v. Liley,
120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949). There the court was presented with
an action wherein both the plaintiff's husband and the defendant were
killed in an automobile collision. Plaintiff brought her action under the
survival statute and the wrongful death statute. Although the decision
concerns the limitations surrounding the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona, the court, citing a note in 48 HARV. L. REv. 1008, 1012
(1935), stated that the "'medieval notion that tort actions are punitive
has long been abandoned,' " and therefore concluded that a survival
statute should be liberally construed. But, as the commentator in 48
HARv. L. REv. 1008, points out, the reminiscent of the English law concerning the merger of torts into criminal actions, "since the reasons
for punishment do not exist after a wrongdoer's death, [such claims]
should not survive against his estate." (emphasis added) Id. at 1013.
It would seem that the Moffatt decision was an inapposite authority.
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jury resulting from the death. 51 Following the rule of construction in Kansas Pacific Railway v. Miller,5 2 the court stated that,
unlike its predecessor, the 1877 statute provided a formula by
which damages were to be computed. Furthermore, because "necessary losses" are tied inextricably to pecuniary losses, the
Moffatt court reasoned that punitive
cluded, even though the latter part
compel a conclusion that punitive
when the circumstances warranted.
strue the latter part of the statute:

damages were thereby preof the statute appeared to
damages were awardable
The court went on to con-

Since mitigating circumstances relating to the act itself do not
justify an assessment of damages less than compensatory, it is not
reasonable to suppose that the aggregating [sic] circumstances
contemplated by the statute are such as would justify an assessment of damages more than compensatory. Hence, a different
idea must have been intended by the antithesis. Taken in connection the with preceding language of the section ... the words
"mitigating and [sic] aggravating circumstances attending such
wrongful act," etc., contemplate circumstances,not relating to the
wrongful act itself, but such as affect the actual damage suffered
by the surviving party entitled to sue, either by way of diminishing or enhancing the same."3

The court concluded that the damages awarded the plaintiff
were not punitive - and therefore not excessive.
B. Moffatt v. Tenney: An Analysis
1. The Effect of the Pecuniary Loss Rule
In 1892, it was beyond argument that the first part of the
Colorado statute permitted damages in accordance with the
"necessary injury" inuring to a plaintiff.54 Consequently it was
a truism to conclude that punitive damages were prohibited
under that portion of the statute. Punitive awards, as the court
correctly observed, had nothing whatever to do with the character of the plaintiff's deceased husband, and, as such, a jury
51 A plaintiff's injury, so far as the statute undertakes to provide redress,
rests upon a pecuniary basis. Plaintiff may suffer as much pecuniary
injury where the negligence causing her husband's death is slight as
to where it is gross. Her necessary injury depends, not upon the character of the act causing death, but upon the character, ability, and
industry of her husband in providing for his family .... Id. at 197, 30 P.
at 351.
See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
52 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
53 17 Colo. at 197-98, 30 P. at 351. See also Clune v. Ristine, 94 F. 745 (8th
Cir. 1899) (Colo. dec.) (effect of collateral source rule in wrongful
death action). But cf. Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 474, 30 P. 352, 355
(1892) wherein the court states:
The jury were expressly told to confine the damages to such a
sum, not exceeding $5000, as would compensate plaintiff "in a
pecuniary sense for the loss, if any, suffered;" and that "in
arriving at this sum" they might take into consideration mitigating circumstances connected with the neglect or injury complained of. (emphasis added).
54 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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would not have been obliged to weigh the attending aggravation in arriving at the amount of pecuniary losses. Hence, if
there was no evidence on which to find "aggravating circumstances," the trial court should not have instructed the jury
concerning the latter part of the statute. 55
As even the court admitted, the latter part of the statute
seemed to provide for assessments of a different nature; the jury
was permitted to award damages "having regard to aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending any such wrongful
act, neglect or default." 56 The court, on the other hand, stated
that aggravating or mitigating circumstances may only be
considered by a jury in arriving at the necessary injury, that
is, the terms "contemplate circumstances, not relating to the
wrongful act itself." 57 In support of what appears to be an
egregious misreading, the court suggested that the presence of
the antithetical term, "mitigating," compelled a conclusion different from the obvious. Since a defendant may not mitigate
compensatory damages arising out of a wrongful death, he may
not be held responsible for damages based on the aggravated
nature of the wrongdoing. Therefore, concluded the court, the
statute provides merely for compensatory recoveries.
2. Pecuniary and Punitive Damages Distinguished
Granting the premise that compensatory damages are limited to pecuniary losses, it is difficult to understand why the
court thought punitive damages were inconsistent with compensatory recoveries. Compensatory damages are not dependent
on the degree of the defendant's negligence. Once negligence
is established, a legal conclusion, the extent of compensatory
liability is set by looking to the plaintiff's losses, not the defendant's wrongful conduct, be that slight or great. The point
is this: mitigating or aggravating circumstances have nothing
to do with compensatory recoveries; they concern a second element a jury may consider in awarding damages.
The pecuniary loss rule cannot be said to limit both forms
of damages, because each traces from a different source. Pecuniary losses concern the necessary injury resulting from and
following a death; punitive damages concern the circumstances
surrounding and preceding the death. Pecuniary damages com•5 Parsons v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 94 Mo. 286, 6 S.W. 464 (1888); Morgan v.
Durfee, 69 Mo. 469 (1879); Owen v. Brockschmidt, 54 Mo. 285 (1873).
See Montgomery v. Colorado Springs & I. Ry., 50 Colo. 210, 114 P. 659
(1911) (evidence must be introduced before a question is in issue);
Whalen v. Centenary Church, 62 Mo. 326 (1876).
56 Ch. 25, § 879, [1877] Colo. Gen. Laws 343.
57 Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. at 198, 30 P. at 351 (emphasis added).
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pensate the family of the deceased while punitive damages
provide a condign punishment to the defendant, and an example
to others designed to deter similar conduct. 58 Neither recompenses the deceased's representative for grief or solace, because
the pecuniary loss rule limits the scope of injuries that are
compensable, and the defendant's conduct limits the punitive
recovery, if any. Although the deceased's representative may
receive a windfall if a death is found to have resulted, for instance, from gross negligence, on the part of the defendant,
these damages are not in the nature of payments for grief. They
are a form of punishment. As between the two parties, there is
no reason why the defendant should have the benefit of a reverse windfall because of the fortuitous death of his victim.
3. The Nonvictim Plaintiff in a Wrongful Death Action:
A Distinction Without a Difference
Suppose for instance an action in which it is alleged that
the defendant, an owner of a gasoline station, conceals a "spring
gun" in one of his automatic fuel pumps during the night-time
hours because of recurring larceny. The plaintiff at 2:30 a.m.
drives into defendant's station, and when he attempts to remove a hose from a fuel pump he is wounded in his arm by a
bullet fired from the "spring gun." In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges both compensatory and punitive damages. During
the trial, defendant introduces evidence that he had suffered
substantial losses over several months, and the reason he placed
the gun in the fuel pump was to deter thefts. Furthermore, he
states that plaintiff was wounded not while he was lawfully
trying to make a purchase, but, rather, while he was attempting
to steal gasoline. He maintains that in light of these circumstances his action was justifiable. 59 Assuming that liability is
established, it is clear that, under these facts, the plaintiff can
claim two kinds of awards: one dependent on his actual losses,
and one based on the degree of negligence of the defendant.
Significantly, even though conceptually the amount of compensatory damages becomes fixed following a finding of negligence,
the defendant may be able to reduce the sting of punitive
damages by justifying his action with respect to the plaintiff's
58

See C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935)
("exemplary damages are assessed for the avowed purpose of visiting
a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of any loss or
detriment of the plaintiff"); Wegner v. Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, 290 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Colo, 1967).
59See Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 1112 (1933) and concurring opinion by J. Butler, reported at 92 Colo. at 424, 22 P.2d at 640.
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alleged conduct. It is with this aspect of damages that the
enormity of the defendant's act is put in perspective, the mitigating facts tracking the aggravating circumstances as retaliation follows provocation.
Now suppose that instead of the victim receiving a wound
in his arm, he is fatally shot through the chest. In regard to
punitive damages should a defendant benefit from wrongfully
killing a person rather than simply wounding him? Under Lord
Campbell's Act, the answer would be in the affirmative, since
that act provided merely for recovery of pecuniary losses. The
Colorado act, however, provides for more: it permits a jury
to award exemplary damages having regard to the aggravating
circumstances attending a wrongful act. The statute explicitly
bridges the gap between the nonvictim plaintiff and the defendant. Since punitive damages only concern the conduct of
the defendant, the fact that a nonvictim plaintiff will receive
a windfall of punitive damages is of no import. Therefore, it
is an irrelevant distinction whether the victim was wounded
or fatally injured. 60
C.

Moffatt v. Tenney: Its Effects

Once the veil of words around the court's logic is removed,
the weaknesses inherent in the rationale appear stark and unsupportable. Nothwithstanding that the Colorado Wrongful
Death Act appears to be divided into two elements, the Moffatt
court concluded that "aggravating or mitigating" circumstances,
if any, only concern the necessary or pecuniary injury suffered
by the plaintiff. As pointed out, there is no compelling rationale
for such a conclusion, since compensatory and punitive damages
generate for different reasons and from different sources; and
both sources are, in fact, explicitly articulated in Colorado's
statute.
Although the reasoning in Moffat v. Tenney is suspect,
the decision has not been seriously questioned. In common parlance it is generally accepted that punitive damages cannot be
recovered in wrongful death actions. However, it must be admitted that the law remains confusing. In Moffatt there was
GO
In a claim for punitive damages by a victim of assault and battery, the
common law recognized that a defendant may be assessed punitive dam-

ages. Moreover, it is generally conceded that the plaintiff should be the
recipient of such damages. See, e.g., Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420,
21 P.2d 1112 (1933). The Colorado Wrongful Death Act not only creates
a new cause of action in certain persons, it also explicitly states that
punitive damages may be claimed by the plaintiff. The fact that the
victim is dead, reminiscent of the misreading of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona. and of the doctrine of merger is not dispositive because the act, not the common law, defines the scope of damages inuring to a plaintiff.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

no claim for punitive damages; the plaintiff was merely trying
to save a compensatory recovery. As a result, the decision is
limited to the holding that the statute, even though it uses the
term, "aggravating," does not admit of punitive awards. The
case did not hold that punitive damages are never rcoverable
in wrongful death actions. In fact it was said, immediately after
the Moffatt decision, that:
[W]e do not say that punitive damages can never be recovered
in [wrongful death actions]. Section 1512, MILLS' ANN. STATUTES,
a recent enactment [now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-2 (1963)],
may be broad enough to warrant such recovery. But these damages can only be obtained upon proper averment and proof
under this statute.0 1

Even if the Colorado court were to adhere to the construction
adopted in Moffatt v. Tenney, where a proper claim is made
under the exemplary damages statute, and evidence is introduced supporting that claim, a plaintiff should be entitled to an
instruction on this element of damages.
CONCLUSION

As was illustrated in the common law rule laid down in
Baker v. Bolton, recognizing historical misconception and logical
fallacy are not enough. Courts are wisely reluctant to trammel
on precedent, no matter how trenchant the criticism. Rationales
flower and die, but the law remains. When a rationale bears no
relation either to the rule or to the custom of society, inspection
of the precedent should follow. It is submitted that the construction adopted in 1892 in Moffatt v. Tenney, and occasionally
reiterated by the Colorado court, was unsound at its inception
and to this day is incapable of any convincing explanation.
Even the court has expressed doubt about the extent of its
holding. For although the statute was construed not to permit
punitive damages, the court has suggested that such recovery
might have been possible under the exemplary damages statute.
It has been suggested that wrongful death acts should be
remedial in nature, and therefore not permit punitive recoveries. In construing statutes, the "ought" of the commentator
should not be confused with the intent of the legislator. To
suggest that all wrongful death acts have the same restrictions,
notwithstanding clear changes in the language employed, is to
put man above laws, prejudice above reason.
C. Garold Sims

61 Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 468, 30 P. 352, 355 (1892).

NOTE
BLIND IMITATION OF THE PAST:
AN ANALYSIS OF PECUNIARY DAMAGES
IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes*

C OLORADO

INTRODUCTION

presently adheres to the "pecuniary loss" doctrine in wrongful death cases. Under this doctrine, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the economic loss he has suffered as a result of the death. Neither mental anguish nor loss
of companionship, guidance, or consortium is, under this rule,
a compensable injury. The history of the pecuniary loss rule is
a peculiar one. Since Anglo-Saxon times it has taken curious
twists, sometimes for good reasons, but all too frequently for
bad ones. As a result of this anomaly, policies which became
antiquated a hundred years ago still control the Colorado courts.
This note will (1) examine the historical development of the
pecuniary loss rule; (2) analyze the policies on which it is based,
comparing them with current social policies; (3) examine the
ways in which modern courts have dealt with the question;
and (4) suggest an avenue of reform.
I. THE HISIoicAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PECUNIARY Loss RULE
A. The English Background
1. The Common Law Heritage
In the landmark case of Baker v. Bolton1 Lord Ellenborough
laid down the basic common law rule that absent a statute no
action will lie for wrongful death.2 The origin of the rule in
Baker dates back to the middle ages where a civil action for
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
1 1 Campbell 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (C.P. 1808).

2 This rule has been criticized for 150 years. See, e.g., Hay, Death as a
Civil Cause of Action in Massachusetts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 170 (1893);
Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431
(1916); Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043
(1965); Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules,
13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
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wrongful death was, under the doctrine of merger,8 superseded
by the criminal action of homicide, which belonged to the
crown. 4 Notwithstanding the doctrine of merger, however, the
clan of a person wrongfully killed was entitled to a payment
("wer"), the amount of which depended on the social status
of the deceased.5
Thus, at common law, the wer served as compensation to
the deceased's family. By 1808, however, this doctrine was virtually extinct. Instead, English law had devised another form
of compensation known as appeal. By this means a convicted
felon could secure a release from criminal liability from the
plaintiff, who in certain cases was very generously rewarded.,
However, in 1819 this remedy was also abolished,7 and England
was left with only half a policy; the rule in Baker still applied
to thwart any wrongful death actions, but the compensation
which the criminal law provided and which was implicit in the
Baker rationale no longer existed.
At this point in history, the very nature of wrongful death
changed. Prior to the 19th century the typical defendant in a
wrongful death action would have been a felon- most likely
a highwayman or burglar. Such a person, if apprehended,
usually went to prison and, consequently, it was appropriate
that the matter should be within the purview of the criminal
law." With the advent of the industrial revolution, the typical
defendant was no longer a felon, but a railroad or factory. The
wrong was not malicious, but merely negligent.
Then suddenly at mid-century society faced up in a panic to a
virtually new phenomenon- accidental death through corporate
enterprise. Tragedy as a result of indifference and neglect was
suddenly upon us in the factory, or the city streets, and on the
rails. Nor was the principal villain of the piece any longer the
impecunious felon. In his place stood the prospering corporation
with abundant assets to meet the needs of widows and orphans. 9

Perhaps in response to this change 0 Parliament in 1846
passed the "Fatal Accidents Act," more commonly known as
Holdsworth, supra note 2.
Higgins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
5 Malone, supra note 2, at 1055. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-62 (2d ed. 1968).
"Hay, supra note 2, at 172-73.
7 An Act to Abolish Appeals of Murder, Treason, Felony cr Other Offences, and Wager of Battel, or joining Issue and Trial by Battel, in
Writs of Right, 59 GEO. 3, c. 46 (1819).
8 Hay, supra note 2, at 176.
Malone, supra note 2.
10 15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF' ENGLISH LAW 220 (1965).
3
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Lord Campbell's Act. 1' The Act provided that in all cases in
which the deceased, had he lived, would have had a cause of
action against the tort-feasor, certain named beneficiaries could
sue in their own name and be awarded such damages as the
jury felt were "proportioned to Injury resulting from such
Death."12
2. Blake v. Midland Railway Co.
At first glance, the provision for damages in Lord Campbell's Act would seem to give the jury almost unlimited discretion in assessing the measure of damages in a wrongful death
action. Judicial construction, however, quickly restricted the
jury's latitude. The key decision in this regard is Blake v. Midland Railway Co.13 in which it was held that damages should
be limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff. The
importance of this rule cannot be underestimated. It serves as
the basis for the entire law of damages in wrongful death actions, not only in England, but in most American jurisdictions
as well. Nevertheless, close inspection reveals that Blake was
based on highly suspect reasoning.
The facts in Blake were simple. The deceased was killed in
a train crash and his wife sued, basing her claim upon Lord
Campbell's Act. Liability was confessed, and the only issue became one of damages. At the trial, the judge instructed the
jury that:
[H]e thought there was great difficulty in fixing any measure but
that of pecuniary injury: but that, if they considered the plaintiff entitled to any compensation for bereavement she had sustained, beyond the pecuniary loss, they were to make their esti14
mates accordingly.

This broad instruction was the basis of the reversal; yet
there were excellent reasons for upholding it. First, the concept of solatium was not new. It was well recognized as a
legitimate item of damages for wrongful death in Scotland.
Indeed, as plaintiff's attorney pointed out, Lord Campbell himself, while still a practicing attorney, had observed that:
Although, by the English law, if a man's wife or son were killed
by negligence, he could have no action, because "the English law
allows no solatium in this respect," "the Scotch law" "says more
11 Act for Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents, 9 &
10 Vict., c. 93 (1846).
12Id. The act also stated that the beneficiaries could sue regardless of
whether the tort-feasor's act was also felonious. Thus, the merger doctrine, which had been so important in the Baker case would not be a
factor in any construction of the Act.
13 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Rep. 5 (1852).
14 Id. at 96-97, 118 Eng. Rep. at 36.
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sensibly that in such a case a solatium shall be granted to the
person injured in his happiness and circumstance by the death of
his wife or child."' 1 5

Moreover, solatium was also recognized as a proper item of
damages in normal trespass actions.
In refusing to grant this item of damages to a decedant's
survivors, Lord Coleridge drew a distinction between wrongful
death and personal injury and pointed out that "[w]hen an
action is brought by an individual for a personal wrong, the
jury, in assessing the damages, can with little difficulty award
him a solatium for his mental suffering alone, with an indemnity for his pecuniary loss. ' '16 To argue that juries have an easier time computing solatium for people who survive than for the
relatives of the people who die, seems unjustifiable. Solatium,
pain, and anguish are all elements of damages which different
juries have responded to in very different ways. It is precisely
because juries on occasion have brought in rather huge awards
based on these hard-to-prove categories that good defense attorneys are at such a premium. In fact, juries will bring back
huge awards because it seems just, not because they had an
easy time computing the dollar value of an injured plaintiff's
emotional injuries.
The main thrust of Coleridge's opinion, however, is aimed
at the unfair burden a broad rule of damages would place on
businesses. He stated: "We must recollect that the Act we
are construing applies not only to great Railway Companies but
to little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse in the care
of an apprentice." 17 This facet of the rationale, however, seems
to have been based more on empathy than sound logic. The
courts had found no need to protect the small businessman
whose negligence merely maimed a victim. In such cases, as we
have seen, solatium was a legitimate item of damages. Why then
protect him when his actions wrongfully caused a death? If
anything, the rules should be reversed. Not only is killing
someone a more serious injury than maiming him, but it happens less frequently. Thus if the courts were serious about
protecting businesses from solatium damages, they would protect them in the nondeath cases first.

15

Id. at 100, 118 Eng. Rep. at 38. This quote is taken from the clerk's
record of the argument and represents the plaintiff's attorney's statement of Lord Campbell's argument in Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & Fin.

894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).

16 18 Q.B. 93, 111, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41-42 (1852).

17 Id. at 111, 118 Eng. Rep. at 42.
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In part, the oral argument in Blake was addressed to the
intent of Parliament when it passed the statute. I8 As Lord
Campbell, the Act's author, was himself one of the judges hearing the case, the court was in an unusually good position to
determine the intent of the legislature. Lord Campbell's actions
in the case remain, however, a mystery. He took an active part
in the oral argument, constantly interrupting the attorney for
the railroad, in one instance resolving a point in favor of the
plaintiff.19 His own bias, one would assume based on his comment about the Scottish law and his authorship of the Act
itself, may well have favored extended liability. Nevertheless,
he not only failed to write an opinion in the case, he was not
present when the opinion was issued. 20 Consequently, one can
only speculate as to his influence in the decision. However,
there is some evidence that it was minimal. Lord Campbell
himself does not appear to have attached much importance to
his wrongful death act. In fact, in his autobiography he not
only fails to mention the "Fatal Accidents Act" but said: "I
did not take any very prominent part in the business of the
session of 1846. ' ' 21 Additionally, the week that the decision in
Blake was handed down, a new government was being formed.
From Lord Campbell's Journal, it seems that politics, not law,
was paramount in his mind. 22 The point of this digression is that
Lord Campbell's presence on the court which rendered the
decision does not necessarily mean that Justice Coleridge's
opinion accurately reflects the intent of Parliament when it
passed the Act.
B. From England to Colorado
In the beginning it appeared that American courts would
not fall into the same historical tangle as the English courts.
In fact, for the first half of the 19th century, American courts
rejected the rule that at common law wrongful death could not
be considered a legal injury. 23 However, in 1848, the decision
in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co. 24 began a trend in the United
States of adopting the rule in Baker v. Bolton.25 In response,
18

Id. at 104, 118 Eng. Rep. at 39.

19
Id. at 106, 118. Eng. Rep. at 40.
2
0 Id.at

108, 118 Eng. Rep. at 40.

2111 HARDCASTLE, LIFE OF LORD CAMPBELL 199 (1881).
22
23

Id.

Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, (Conn. 1794), Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11234)
(C. Mo. 1825) (dictum). See also, F. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL
ACT

25

(2d ed. 1913); Malone, supra note 2, at 1066.

Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
F. TIFFANY, supra note 23; Malone, supra note 2.
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American jurisdictions began to pass wrongful death statutes,
26
most of them modeled after Lord Campbell's Act.
Colorado originally passed such a statute in 187227 and 5
years later modified and re-enacted the statute.28 Except for
modifications as to the maximum amount of damages permissible, this statute is the same as Colorado's present wrongful
death statute, 29 which, in defining the measure of damages,
provides:
[T]he jury may give such damages as they may deem fair and
just, not to exceed forty-five thousand dollars, with reference
to the necessary injury resulting from such death, to the surviv30
ing partner, who may be entitled to sue.

In 1874, the Colorado Supreme Court, obviously basing its
opinion on Blake3l adopted the pecuniary loss rule of compensatory damages.32 Speaking for the majority, Justice Belford
stated:
It seems to me, therefore, that the survivors are not entitled to
compensation for such anguish as they may have endured by reason of the taking of the parent ....

Whatever is susceptible of

pecuniary compensation enters into the rule, and what can not be
33
included must be left out.

In 1894 the Court affirmed this rule and stated the rule
of damages in wrongful death actions which has gone basically
unchanged since then:
The true measure of compensatory relief in an action of this kind,
under the act of 1877, supra, is a sum equal to the net pecuniary
benefit which plaintiff might reascnably have expected to receive
from the deceased in case his life had not been terminated by
the wrongful act, neglect or default of the defendant. Such sum
will depend on a variety of circumstances and future contingencies, and will, therefore, be difficult of exact ascertainment;
but the damages to be awarded in each case may be approximated by considering the age, health, condition in life, habits of
industry or otherwise, ability to earn money, on the part of the
deceased, including his or her disposition to aid or assist the
plaintiff; not only the kinship or legal relation between the deceased and the plaintiff, but the actual relations between them as
manifested by acts of pecuniary assistance rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff, and also contrary acts may be taken into
268 . SPEISER, RECOVERY
cited as SPEISER].
27
2,
29

FOR WRONGFUL

DEATH

§

1.8 (1966)

[hereinafter

Section 1, [1872] Colo. Sess. Laws 117 (repealed 1877).
Ch. 25, §§ 878-81, [1915] Colo. Sess. Laws 342-44.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963).

REV.

30 Id.

: While the court does not cite Blake, the language is so similiar as to
leave little doubt that Blake was the basis of the court's oninion.
32 Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874).
33 Id. at 466-67.
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consideration. But it must be borne in mind that the recovery
allowable is in no sense a solatium for the grief of the living occasioned by the death of the relative or friend, however dear.
It is only for the pecuniary loss resulting to the living party entitled to sue resulting from the death of the deceased that the
statute affords compensation. This may34 seem cold and mercenary, but it is unquestionably the law.

A.

II. THE PECUNIARY Loss RULE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The 19th Century and Limited Liability

The pecuniary loss rule is a product of 19th-century conditions and values. As society changed, the law, in its characteristically tardy manner, failed to keep pace. In the history of
tort law, the period from 1800-1850 is one in which courts consistently restricted liability. During this period, for example,
the courts created the fellow-servant rule, 35 the doctrines of contributory negligence 36 and assumption of the risk, 37 as well as
adopting the duty,38 privity,3 9 and foreseeability 0 limitations to
liability.
Prosser explains the 19th-century trend toward limited
liability when he states: "The explanation

. . .

probably lay in

the highly individualistic viewpoint of the common law courts,
and their desire to encourage industrial undertakings by making
the burden upon them as light as possible. ' 41 Afraid of a great
increase in litigation, 42 which would make members of society
each other's insurers and severely cripple growing industry,
the courts' response was to limit liability. Thus when Justice
Coleridge said: "We must recollect that the Act we are con3

4 Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 182, 37 P. 721, 722 (1874).

This doctrine
has been consistently upheld in Colorado. Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Spencer,
27 Colo. 313, 61 P. 606 (1900); City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo.
246, 254 P. 1000 (1927); Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233, P.2d 382
(1951); St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Cclo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1953);
McEntyre v. Jones, 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953); Rigot v. Conda,
134 Colo. 375, 304 P.2d 629 (1956); Herbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110,
371 P.2d 422 (1952); Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731
(1962) ; Lewis v. Great W. Distrib. Co., 168 Colo. 424, 451 P.2d 754 (1969).
35 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
36 Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809); W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65 n.1 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
37 Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W.

1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837); PROSSER,
supra note 37, § 69 n.9.
38 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837);
Landridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837);
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842);
PROSSER, supra note 36, § 53.
3
9 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
40 Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Ex. 243, 155 Eng. Rep. 104, (1850); Rigby v.
Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240, 155 Eng. Rep. 103 (1850); PROSSER, supra note 36,
§ 43.
41 PROSSER, supra note 36, § 80.
42 Id. § 4.
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struing applies not only to great Railway Companies but to
little tradesmen who send out a cart and horse in the care of
an apprentice," 43 he was merely handing down one more decision, typical of the period, restricting liability to protect grow44
ing industry.
But the society of the 19th century is not the society of
today. The era of revering the individual has subsided. Through
such policies as medicare, welfare, and mandatory insurance,
we have accepted the principle that to a certain extent in our
society each person is the other's insurer. Nor is industry in
such an infant stage that it needs vigilant protection, even
when it commits a tort. Through the medium of insurance
policies, society has spread the risk to insure that small
merchants are not wiped out by one large tort action. Given
this change in society it is not surprising that in the 20thcentury many of the 19th-century limits on liability have been
erased or modified, and that the modern trend is toward more
extended liability. Yet in Colorado, as in many American jurisdictions, our wrongful death law continues to reflect 19th-century principles.
B.

The Child Cases

The injustice of the pecuniary loss rule is most obvious in
the cases in which the deceased is a small child. Because in
modern society children are a pecuniary burden to their parents,
damages in such cases have frequently been very small. Typical
of such cases is Kogel v. Sonheim. 45 In Kogel the defendants
negligently stored a spot welder, which fell, killing the plaintiff's 4-year-old son. The jury returned a verdict of only $700,
over $600 of which went to pay for the dead child's funeral
expenses. The plaintiff appealed the judgment claiming that:
(1)
the damages awarded by the jury were grossly and manifestly inadequate; and
(2)
in wrongful death actions of this type the measure of damages should not be the net pecuniary loss sustained by the parents but rather the replacement value of the child as measured
care, clothing, support
by the cost of infantile hospitalization and
46
and education up to the child's death.

Nevertheless, the court, restating the pecuniary loss rule, af4

. Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q.B. 93, 111-12, 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 42 (1852).
The clcse circle of the English aristocracy which controlled the courts
during this period probably accounts for a greater homogeneity of judicial attitudes in 19th-century England than we have in America today.
For example, Lord Abinger, the judge most famous for his decisions
restricting liability, was Lord Campbell's father-in-law.
45 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962).
46 Id. at 318. 372 P.2d at 732.
44
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firmed; the parents of the deceased child were "compensated"
for their loss by only $700.
The application of the pecuniary loss rule to child death
cases has been widely criticized, 47 and for good reason. Nineteenth-century England was highly agricultural. Children on
farms were expected to work, and were a real pecuniary asset
to their parents. Even in the cities, employment of children, at
least among the working class, was common, and a child's in48
come was frequently a benefit to his whole family.
In the modern setting, however, children are rarely a pecuniary benefit to their families. Few minors work before their
teens. Even then work is usually limited to part-time or summer
jobs, the profits of which are generally kept by the child himself and not contributed to the family. Additionally, the costs
of raising children are high, especially if the child goes to college. 49 Thus in a modern setting, the parents' loss is emotional,
not pecuniary; but this very real injury remains virtually incompensable, at least in Colorado.
Recognizing that an old rule of law does not fit modern
times, some courts have rejected the application of the traditional pecuniary loss rule to child death cases. The leading case
is Wycko v. Gnodtke,50 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan
stated:
The interpretation of the requirement of pecuniary loss found in
the early cases, which even today are followed as precedent, re5
flected the mores and legal standards of their times ....

After summarizing the social conditions of the times, the court
continued:
This, then, was the day from which our precedents come, a day
when employment of children of tender years was the accepted
practice and their pecuniary contributions to the family both
substantial and provable. It is not surprising that the courts of
such a society should have read into the statutory words "such
damages as they [the jury] may think proportional to the injury
resulting from such death" not only the requirement of a pecuniary loss, but, moreover, a pecuniary loss established by a
wage benefit-less-costs measure of damages. Other losses were
unreal and untangible and at this time in our legal history the
47 See, e.g., Decof, Damages in Actions for Wrongful Death of Children, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 197 (1971); Johnson, Wrongful Death and Intellectual
Dishonesty, 16 S.D.L. REv. 36 (1971); Comment, Damages for the
Wrongful Death of Children, 22 U. CH. L. REV. 538 (1955).
48 Comment, supra note 47, at 545-46.
49 Id. at 546-47.
50 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960). Wycko has since been severely
limited by Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 383 Mich. 251, 174 N.W.2d 836
(1970). Neverthless, Wycko remains one of he best reasoned cases
in this area, regardless of the scope of its authority in Michigan.
51 361 Mich. at 334, 105 N.W.2d at 120.
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courts would have no truck with what Chief Baron Pollock
termed . . "imaginary losses." Less meant only money loss, and
money loss from the death of a child meant only his lost wages.
All else was imaginary. The only reality was the King's
52
shilling.
In short, the Wycko court said that the object of damages is,
as far as possible, to make the wronged party whole. As time
has gone by, and our economic system has changed, there has
come a realization that lost earnings are simply a part of
the damage suffered by the parents of a dead child.
Wycko deals with the measure of damages for actions in
which the decedent is a child. Perhaps the injustice of the
present rule of damages shows itself most strongly in child death
cases, but the logic of a broader rule of damages applies equally
well to cases in which adults have been the victims. A middleaged person may be totally dependent on his spouse emotionally, but not financially. Yet if that spouse is killed wrongfully,
the survivor may collect almost no damages at all. A small
child whose nonworking mother is killed certainly suffers a
severe injury. Yet unless that child can show a pecuniary loss,
his injury is incompensable. 53
III.

CIRCUMVENTING THE RuLE

The Colorado Supreme Court has long recognized the
inequity of the pecuniary loss rule. After stating the general
rule, the court in Pierce v. Conners5 4 added: "This may seem
cold and mercenary, but it is unquestionably the law."5 5 In
response to this, two lines of cases have developed in Colorado.
The first, which includes Pierce, Kogel v. Sonheim,56 and
Herbertson v. Russell57 has taken the traditional narrow view
of pecuniary damages. A second line of cases beginning with
Kansas Pacific Railway Co. v. Lunden,58 gives lip service to
the pecuniary loss rule, and then allows a broader rule of damages. In Lunden the court said:
As a matter of sentiment, life has no pecuniary value, but considered with reference to the relations of deceased with others,
Id. at 336, 105 N.W.2d at 121. For similar cases see Fussner v. Andert,
261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962): Lockhart v. Besel, 17 Wash. Dec.
2d 109, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).
53 For an analysis of the rule of damages in such cases see Comment, The
Unemployed Housewife-Mother: Fair Appraisal of Economic Loss in a
Wrongful Death Action, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1971).
54 Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 37 P. 721 (1894).
5 Id. at 182, 37 P. at 722.
56 Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 372 P.2d 731 (1962).
57 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962).
58 3 Colo. 94 (1876).
52
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it is capable of such estimate. In this sense a parent is entitled
to the services of children during their minority, and to support
and maintenance from them in his declining years; a husband is
entitled to the assistance of his wife in the affairs of life, and a
wife is entitled to support from her husband; children may demand nurture and education from parents, and all these services
may be compensated in some sort and degree by money. It is in
this sense, with reference to the probable benefits that would
have been derived by survivors from the life of the deceasd, if he
had lived, that the phrase should be understood in the law, for
59
otherwise all will be left to the discretion of the jury.

In Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestance6 the court allowed
a recovery of $5,000 although there was no evidence that the
deceased son had ever contributed any pecuniary benefit to his
parents' household, or ever would. The court said:
Are the damages excessive? We think not. The son was a
steady, hard-working, healthy, active, intelligent college boy,
working to earn money to finish his college course. His parents
were between fifty and sixty years old. Without including any
solatium, the jury might well have found that the probable pecuniary loss to these parents was five thousand dollars. The son
was bound by law to support them in their old age, and his physique, character and conduct, as shown by the evidence, proves
his ability and willingness to do so. It is never possible in such
cases to prove the damages with any approximation to certainty.
The jury must estimate them as best they can be reasonable
probabilities, but that is no reason for denying them altogether.
... The boy might have turned out an invalid and not supported
his parents at all, or a millionaire and supported them in luxury;
the probability is between the two.61

Similarly in Longmont v. Swearingen62 the court approved
a verdict of $3,500 for the wrongful death of a minor who was
not contributing financially to the household. In St. Lukes Hospital Association v. Long6 3 the defendant hospital had placed a
3-year-old boy in an adult bed from which he took a fatal fall.
The jury returned a verdict of $5,000. In affirming the court

cited Lunden and said:
The objection is based solely upon the ground that there was no
evidence in its support other than mortuary and cemetery bills.
There was testimony that the boy was in good health and the
court sustained objection of defendant to further evidence along
that line. It is impossible to establish with any definiteness or
certainty the future earning ability of a three-year-old boy or
his future generosity toward his parents. To hold that no recovery could be had in the absence of such showing would be
in effect to abolish the right to recovery by parents of young
59 Id. at 102-03.

60 80 Colo. 375, 251 P. 224 (1926).
61 Id. at 379, 224 P. at 226.
62 81 Colo. 246, 254 P. 1000 (1927).
63 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
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children and such was not, we think, the legislative intent in the
64
enactment of the statute.

St. Lukes was approved in McEntyre v. Jones65 a case in
which the court affirmed a judgment of $7,500, awarded the
parents of a 13-year-old girl even though there was no evidence
to indicate that the parents had suffered any actual pecuniary
loss. Finally, in Dawkins v. Chavez66 the court upheld an award
of $10,000 to the parents of a 9-year-old child who had been
killed while crossing a street. Again, there was no evidence to
indicate that the parents had suffered any pecuniary loss.
The two lines of cases are irreconcilable. While indicating
that Colorado follows a pecuniary loss rule, in those cases where
juries have failed to follow the trial court's instructions, the
supreme court has frequently refused to reverse. One can only
speculate as to why the supreme court has acted this way. However, one answer may be that the court has recognized the
injustice of its own rule, and rather than overturn it, has occasionally merely refused to follow it. If both courts and juries
were consistent in granting more liberal damages than the traditional pecuniary loss rule would dictate, there might be little
problem. Since courts and juries have not been consistent, it
is purely fortuitous as to whether a plaintiff will receive a
large or small amount of compensation.
IV.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

Critics of the pecuniary loss rule have proposed different
solutions to the problem. The most common of these is to add
some flexible item of damages so that jurors may in fact bring
back the verdict they deem to be "fair and just." At least 14
states, in adopting a more liberal rule,67 have included at least
one item of damages which when put in the hands of a jury
becomes extremely flexible. While different states have different terms for such flexible items, they can roughly be
divided into three categories: (1) mental anguish, grief and sor-

64

Id. at 33, 240 P.2d at 922.

65 128 Colo. 461, 263 P.2d 313 (1953).
66 132 Colo. 61, 285 P.2d 821 (1955).
67

These states include Ariz., Cal., Fla., Idaho, Minn., Miss., Mont., Pa., S.C.,
Tex., Utah, Wash., W. Va., and probably Mich. For a complete state-bystate analysis, see SPEIsER, supra note 26, § 3:1 nn.6, 16.
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row, solatium; 68 (2) loss of society, companionship and consortium;6 9 (3) loss of care, guidance, and support.7 0
The manner in which these states have adopted a broadened
rule of damages is worthy of note. In only one state, West Virginia, does the local wrongful death statute specifically provide
for nonpecuniary damages. 71 Seven states have judicially abandoned the pecuniary loss rule. 72 The remaining seven states
have retained a pecuniary loss rule, but have a broader definition of pecuniary loss than does Colorado. 73 Thus it has been
held in California that:
Althcugh damages must be measured by pecuniary loss to the
plaintiffs, in fixing such loss the trier of facts is not limited to
proof of loss in dollars and cents, but may properly consider
pecuniary value of such non-economic interests of a family as
74
toss of comfort, society and protection.

Consequently, it would be possible for Colorado to broaden
its present rule of damages without abandoning its long-standing commitment to the pecuniary loss rule.
Unfortunately, none of these solutions has been seriously
considered in Colorado. Rather, the path of reform has been
muddled by a series of constitutional arguments which have
been rejected by the Colorado Supreme Court. The leading
proponent of such an approach was Justice Albert Franz.
68 See, e.g., Sanders v. Green, 208 F. Supp. 873 (E.D.S.C. 1962); City of

Tuscon v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 466 P.2d 383 (1970); Lynch v.
Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963); Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195
Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); Stamper v. Bannister, 146 W. Va. 100, 118
S.E.2d 313 (1961).
69 Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 113 N.W.2d 355 (1962); Delta Chevrolet
Co. v. Wald, 211 Miss. 256, 51 So. 2d 443 (1951); Mize v. Rocky Mt. Bell
Tel. Co., 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971 (1909); Spangler v. Helm's N.Y.-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959); Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963); Van Cleave v. Lynch, 109
Utah 149, 166 P.2d 244 (1946); Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co.,
57 Utah 566, 196 P. 556 (1921). See, e.g., Boies v. Cole, 99 Ariz. 198, 407
P.2d 917 (1965); Kemp v. Pinal County, 8 Ariz. App. 41, 442 P.2d 864
(1968); Hale v. San Bernadino Valley Traction Co., 156 Cal. 713, 106
P. 83 (1909); Tyson v. Romey, 88 Cal. App. 2d 752, 199 P.2d 721 (1948);
Holder v. Key Sys., 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 200 P.2d 98 (1948); Lithgow v.
Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130
P.2d 859 (1942); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118
(1960).
70 See, e.g., Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1968); Gilmore v. Los Angeles Ry., 211 Cal. 192, 295 P. 41 (1930); Duncan v.
Smith, 376 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); David v. North Coast
Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 295 P. 921 (1931); Aronson v. City of Everett,
136 Wash. 312, 239 P. 1011 (1925).
71
72

SPEISER, supra note 26 app. A.
Ariz., Fla., Idaho, Miss., S.C., Va., and Wash. See SPEIER, supra note 26,

§ 3:1 n.6, 16.
73 Cal., Mich., Minn., Mont., Pa., Tex., and Utah. See SPEISER, supra note 26,

§ 3:1 nn.6, 16.

74 Holder v. Key Sys., 88 Cal. App. 2d 925, 940, 200 P.2d 98, 106 (1948).
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In both his dissent in Kogel v. Sonheim 75 and his concurrence in Herbertson v. Russell7 6 Justice Franz attempted to do
away with the duplicity involved in the Colorado Supreme
Court's treatment of wrongful death actions. Franz's disagreement with the majority opinion in these cases was based on his
interpretation of the Colorado Bill of Rights. In particular, he
felt that the following sections made imperative a broader rule
of damages in wrongful death actions:
Section 3. Inalienable rights-All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be
reckoned the rights of enjoying and defending their lives and

liberties

....

77

Section 6. Equality of justice- [there shall be] a speedy
remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character .... 78

Section 25. Due process of law- No person shall be deprived
79
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Examination of each of these sections, however, reveals the
weakness of Franz's argument. In attempting to apply sections
3 and 25, Franz fails to take into consideration who the plaintiff is. The Colorado wrongful death statute does not transfer
an old cause of action to new plaintiffs, but creates an entirely
new cause of action by which the beneficiaries may be compensated for their own injuries.80 Consequently, it is the rights of
the survivors, not of the decedent which must be infringed
upon before the constitutional protections can mandate a
broader rule of damages. First, it is clear that neither the
survivors' lives nor liberty are at issue; the survivors are both
alive and free regardless of what rule of damages is applied.
Second, the right to be compensated for lost property is similarly irrelevant, for property losses are already covered under
the present pecuniary loss rule. It is rather the more intangible losses - mental anguish, companionship, solatium- which
are not yet compensable in Colorado. Third, to argue that section 6 is grounds for a broader rule of damages is circular. This
section says, in essence, that every legal injury must be compensated. What Blake and Pierce hold is that absent a statute,
wrongful death is not a legal injury. Thus if judicial modifica75 Kogul v. Sonheim, 150 Colo. 316, 323-25, 372 P.2d 731, 735-36 (1962).
7GHerbertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 118-26, 371 P.2d 422, 427-31 (1962).
7T COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 3.
78 Id. § 6.
79 Id. § 25.
80 Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1-3 (Supp. 1969), amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-3 (1963)
states that damages are to be awarded "with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties ....

phasis added)..

."

(em-
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tion of the pecuniary loss rule is desired, it must be done
through statutory construction not constitutional interpretation.
Given the weakness of his arguments, it is not surprising
that Justice Franz was unable to persuade his colleagues to
take a more enlightened view of the pecuniary loss rule. It is,
nonetheless, unfortunate. The real question is not a constitutional one; it is how best to tailor the law of torts to a modern,
industrial setting.
The basic premise of tort law is that wrongful injuries
should be compensable. It is, therefore, of paramount importance
that rules of damages approach, as closely as possible, the injury suffered. The language of the present Colorado wrongful
death statute is broad enough to allow just compensation; only
judicial fiat has interfered.
CONCLUSION

We have seen that the pecuniary loss rule is based on insecure underpinnings. The rule in Baker v. Bolton was probably ill-advised when it was handed down, for it failed to recognize that the doctrine of merger was no longer applicable.
Lord Campbell's Act was a step in the right direction, but the
strict construction it was given in Blake v. Midland Railway
reflected the court's 19th-century concern over extended tort
liability. Colorado adopted the rule in Blake and has consistently
upheld it despite the change in social conditions which has
taken place since Blake became law. Applying the pecuniary
loss rule to child death cases makes clear its archaic character,
but analytically there is no reason why any modification in the
case of children should not apply to adults as well. The Colorado court is not bound; many other jurisdictions have judicially
expanded or abandoned the pecuniary loss rule.
The real point of the underlying tort theory is that wrongdoers should compensate the people they injure. In a 19thcentury setting it may have made sense to limit liabiilty, but
in a modern society there is no reason why injured parties
should not be compensated. While mere money can never fully
compensate the loss of a loved one, it is a beginning, and is
certainly more complete compensation than nothing at all.
Given these social realities, it is time that Colorado changed its
rule of damages by adding some flexible item such as loss of
companionship. If the supreme court fails to act, then the legislature should modify the present wrongful death statute. Whatever the source, there should be quick and immediate action,
for as the court in Wycko pointed out, "[tihat this barbarous
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should control our decisions today
David K. Rees

81

Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 337, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1960).
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Bruckman v. Pena, 487 P.2d 566 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).

ON

July 21, 1964, William Pena, the plaintiff, suffered extensive injuries in an automobile accident with defendants.
Some 11 months later, plaintiff was involved in a second
accident with resultant aggravation of the injuries sustained
in the first. The parties involved in the later accident settled
the plaintiff's claim against them in return for a covenant not
to sue and were therefore not joined in the instant action. In
the trial below, a medical expert testified that the plaintiff had
suffered permanent brain damage in each of the accidents, but
that it was impossible to apportion the injury between the two
accidents. The trial judge instructed the jury that if the evidence did not support an apportionment of damages between
the two injuries the defendants would be liable for the entire
amount of damages.' A verdict of $58,0632 was returned in
favor of the plaintiff and judgment was entered thereon. On
appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals, held, reversed. The
defendants cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's subsequent
injury whether or not such damage can be apportioned between
the two injuries. Heretofore, the question of whether the first
of several tortfeasors can be held jointly liable for an indivisible injury had not been litigated.
Central to an appreciation of the instant case and its implications for Colorado tort law is an understanding of the rule
previously laid down in Newbury v. Vogel.:3 The court there

1Instruction No. 15:

If you find that after the collision complained of Plaintiff, William
Pena, had an injury which aggravated the ailment or disability
received in the collision complained of, the Plaintiff is entitled to
recover fcr the injury or pain received in the collision complained
of; but he is not entitled to recover for any physical ailment or
disability which he may have incurred subsequent to the collision.
Where a subsequent injury occurs which aggravated the condition
caused by the collision, it is your duty, if possible, to appcrtion
the amount of disability and pain between that caused by the subsequent injury and that caused by the collision. But if you find that
the evidence does not permit such an apportionment, then the Defendants are liable for the entire disability. (emphasis added).
2 It is at least of passing interest to note that the tortfeasor involved in
the later accident settled out of court with the plaintiff for a sum of
$9,500.00. The wide latitude between the two figures is not indicative
of the relative merits of the two causes. But, if the jury found that
they could not apportion the injury between the two accidents and
therefore made their award for the entire disability (according to Instruction No. 15), the $9,500.00 figure represents a double recovery.
3 151 Colo. 520, 379 P.2d 811 (1963).
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held that where a pre-existing diseased condition is aggravated
by trauma caused by the negligence of the defendant, and no
apportionment of the disability between that caused by the preexisting condition and that caused by the trauma can be made,
the defendant is responsible for the entire damage. This is true
notwithstanding the fact that a portion of the present and future
disability is obviously attributable to the pre-existing condition.
In Hylton v. Wade4 this rule was extended to cases where the
pre-existing condition was of traumatic origin. Therefore, in a
case where damages are proximately the result of more than
one causitive agent (including a pre-existing condition), and
there is no evidence to support an apportionment between such
causes, the plaintiff can recover his entire damage from the
tortfeasor who aggravates the pre-existing condition.
Inherent in the principle enunciated in Newberry is the
requirement that once the plaintiff makes his case, it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove apportionability in order to
limit his liability. This position has been adopted by the Restatement 5 and has received judicial expression in the case of
Summers v. Tice,G where the court, in resolving a similar
dilemma, said that for "reasons of policy and justice," so that
"the innocent wronged party [is] not deprived of his right to
redress," the burden should be upon the defendant to absolve
himself of liability.
The rule in Newbury can be rationalized in several ways.
It is said that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him,
and if his wrong aggravates an existing disability, and apportionment is not possible, then he should be liable for the entire
damage. 7 Another rationale is that when a latent condition
itself does not cause pain or disability, then the injury, and not
the dormant condition, is the proximate cause of the pain and
disability. s In yet another approach, the court in Sutterfield v.
District Court,"' in explaining Newbury, seemingly elevated Rule
20 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (on permissive

4 29 Colo. App. 98, 478 P.2d 690 (1970).
OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1965).
" 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91 (1948).
7 Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); citing,
Harris v. Los Angeles Transit Co., 111 Cal. App. 2d 593, 245 P.2d 35
(1952).
8 Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W.2d 913 (1946); Conner v. City of
Nevada, 188 Mo. 133, 86 S.W. 256 (1905); Bennett v. Messick, 76 Wash.
2d 474, 457 P.2d 609 (1969).
9 165 Colo. 225, 438 P.2d 236 (1968).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

COMMENT

joinder)10 to the status of substantive law when it stated:
"[W] e point out that the claims for relief asserted here arise
out of a single injury which resulted from the two accidents.
Thus it is the injury which is the 'occurrence' giving rise to the
claim for relief."'" Finally, the Newbury rule may be explained
as a statement of judicial policy.' 2 Thus the court in Holtz v.
Holder 13 asserted rather candidly:
[Ilt is more desirable, as a matter of policy, for an injured and
innocent plaintiff to recover his entire damages jointly and severally from independent tortfeasors, one of whom may have to
pay more than his just share, than it is to let two or more wrongdoers escape liability altogether, simply because the plaintiff
cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the respective
or because the tortfeasors have not committed
shares of causation
14
a joint tort.
In addition to Newbury, also noteworthy is the line of cases
arising out of the so-called chain reaction type automobile
accident. In Maddux v. Donaldson"5 the two successive tortfeasors were held jointly liable for damages arising from an
indivisible injury caused by collisions 30 seconds apart. The
court said that the fact that one wrong occurs a few seconds
after the other is without legal significance. What is significant
is that the injury is indivisible.'6 In Ruud v. Grimm, 7 where
the first accident occurred in the morning and the second occurred in the afternoon of the same day, the court, citing
Maddux, stated that "where two or more persons acting independently are guilty of consecutive acts of negligence closely
related in point of time, and cause damage to another under
circumstances where the damage is indivisible . . . the negligent
actors are jointly and severally liable.""' Lip service to the time
10

COLO. R. Crv. P. 20 (a). Permissive Joinder. "All persons may be joined
in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or

occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action." (emphasis added).
11 438 P.2d at 239. This reasoning was specifically rejected in Ryan v.
Mackolin, 14 Ohio St. 2d 213, 220, 237 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1968) where
the court said "their permissive joinder in one action . . . does not

ipso facto entitle the plaintiff to a joint judgment against them for the
entire damages incurred following the second collision." Accord, Fitzwilliams v. O'Shaughnessy, 40 Wis. 2d 123, 161 N.W.2d 244 (1968);
Caygill v. Ipsen, 27 Wis. 2d 578, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
12 L. GREN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 142 (1927).
13 101 Ariz. 247, 418 P.2d 584 (1966).
14 Id. at 251, 418 P.2d at 588; accord, Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453,
207 P.2d 876 (1949).
15 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33, 100 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
16 Accord, Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965); see also,
Gulf, C.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 273 F. 946 (D. Del. 1921).
17

252 Iowa 1266, 1272, 110 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1961).

18id. (emphasis added).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

element was abandoned in Treanor v. B.P.E. Leasing.19 where,
in fixing liability for accidents occurring 2 months apart, the
court held that the rule of joint liability for indivisible injuries
should not be confined to accidents that occur almost simultaneously. The court stated that the phrase "closely related in
point of time" in Ruud had been given undue emphasis. In
effect, the court held that to find consecutive tortfeasors jointly
liable for an indivisible injury the plaintiff must go no further
than to prove proximate cause. 0
Further discussion of the rule of joint liability for indivisible injuries caused by consecutive tortfeasors is not within
the scope of this comment. Suffice it to say that in the majority
of jurisdictions, joint tortfeasors who have contributed to an
injury not susceptible to apportionment would be held jointly
liable under one of the foregoing theories. Moreover, in Colorado, with the rule in Newbury and Hylton, the subsequent
tortfeasor would be held liable for the entire damage if no
apportionment could be made.
As previously noted, Bruckman was decided as a case of
first impression on the question of whether an injured plaintiff
will be allowed to recover his entire damage from the first of
several tortfeasors, each of whom was the proximate cause of
an indeterminate amount of that damage. The reverse factual
situation was found in Newbury and Hylton; and in cases like
Maddux, Ruud and Treanor it seemed not to matter which of
a series of tortfeasors was at bar.
The Bruckman court reasoned that the general rule is that
one injured by the negligence of another is entitled to recover
the damages proximately caused by that negligence, and that
the burden of proving such damages is upon the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court found error in the trial judge's instruction permitting the plaintiff to recover damages against the
defendants for injuries which the plaintiff received subsequent
to any act of negligence on the part of the defendants and from
21
causes for which the defendants were in no way responsible.
1q 158 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1968). Contra, Close v. Matson, 102 Ga. App. 669,

117 S.E.2d 251 (1960); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 P. 782 (1923).
2-1158 N.W.2d at 6.
21 The first hint that the court would refuse to apply Newbury came at
oral argument when one of the judges asked when a defendant's vulnerability would end if the defendant remained liable for subsequent
aggravation. Of course, the answer to that question, if Newbury is
applied, is that payment and release, res judicata, or expiration of the
6-year statute of limitation would terminate the defendant's liability for
such subsequent injury. The first tortfeasor would become, in effect,
an insurer of the plaintiff's condition until one of the above occurred.
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Further, the court found the instruction to be infirm because
it placed upon the defendants the burden of proving that the
plaintiff's injury could be apportioned between the two accidents in order to limit their liability.
Apparently, the court was not impressed by the plaintiff's
"impossible burden of proving" 22 the amount of damage attributable to each of several causes. Neither have been a number
of other authorities. McCormick states that:
When the entire disability sustained by the plaintiff is contributed to both by the injury for which the defendant is responsible and from other causes, such as disease, weakened condition
from the use of alcohol, or the like, then the evidence must make
clear how much of the disability proceeds from the former source
in order for the plaintiff to recover at all, and the jury should
be instructed to give damages only for that part of the resulting
23
disability.

Cooley takes a similar view. He states that "[a] tort which
is several when committed cannot be made joint by matters
occurring subsequently, over which the tortfeasor has no control.

' 24

Furthermore, because a plaintiff cannot prove the wrong

done by one person this is no reason for him to recover his
damages from another who did not cause them.23
The court's adoption of the strict technical view in Bruckman has resulted in the unlovely spectacle of a plaintiff turned
away without redress even though he has shown the aggregate
amount of the damages that he has suffered at the hands of
several tortfeasors.2 1, It is submitted that the more modern
view is in line with the rule set out in Newbury. The Restatement provides that "[w]here two or more causes combine
to produce such a single result, incapable of division on any
logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm, the courts have refused to make an
arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes

is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.
22

F. HARPER & F.

23 C.

JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS

MCCORMICK, DAMAGES

27

Prosser

1128 (1956).

273 (1935).

24

1 R. COOLEY, TORTS 284 (1932).

25

Id. at 285.
It should be noted that in the recent case of Alexander v. White, which
involved the same facts as Bruckman, the court softened the sting of
Bruckman somewhat by stating:
On the whole, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
a finding of some damages occurring strictly as a result of the first
accident. Plaintiff presented evidence that he suffered pain and
underwent medical treatment for the injuries caused by the first
accident. The cost of this treatment and related expenses could
then be strictly apportioned to this accident, and therefore he would
be entitled to recover at least these damages.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, comment on subsection (2) at
440 (1965).

26

27
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agrees. He states that "[w] here no such basis can be found,
and any division must be purely arbitrary, there is no practical
course except to hold the defendant for the entire loss, not'2s
withstanding the fact that other causes have contributed to it.'
This is not to say that this theory is of very recent origin. Wig2
more essentially stated this principle in 1922. 1
Practically speaking, Bruckman, operating with Newbury,
will produce some startling results. Assuming facts similar to
those in the instant case, consider what would happen if, instead
of the first, the second tortfeasor were sued. In proving damages, the plaintiff would have only to show the aggregate
amount of his damages from both accidents and that those damages could not be apportioned between the two accidents. 30 He
would then be entitled to the Newbury instruction, 31 and would
recover his entire damages. 32 In other words, the mere substitution of the second tortfeasor for the first, would have compelled
a different result in Bruckman. Even more startling, if both
tortfeasors were named as co-defendants, the parties would be
entitled to instructions on the law of both Bruckman and Newbury with the result that the first tortfeasor would escape
liability completely while the second would be liable for the
33
entire amount.
Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative to these inconsistent principles, and the inequitable results they tend to produce. In Loui v. Oakley, 34 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, when
confronted with facts similar to those faced by the Colorado
court in Bruckman, held that where the jury cannot determine
by a preponderance of the evidence the extent to which the
(4th ed. 1971).
Joint-Tortfeasors and Severence of Damages; Making the
Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1922).
30 McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir. 1966).
31 COLO. JURY INST. § 6:8.
If you find that before the accident plaintiff, (name), had a physical ailment or disability, and because of the accident this ailment or
disability was aggravated, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for
any disability or pain caused by such aggravation; but he is not
entitled to recover for any physical ailment or disability which
may have existed prior to the accident, or for any ailments or disabilities from which plaintiff may now be suffering which were
not caused or contributed to by the accident.
Where a pre-existing condition exists which has been aggravated
by the accident it is your duty, if possible, to apportion the
amount of disability and pain between that caused by the preexisting condition and that caused by the accident. But if you
find that the evidence does not permit such an apportionment,
then the defendant is liable for the entire disability.
32 Alexander v. White, 488 P.2d 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
28 W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 314

2

9Wigmore,

88

Id.

34 50 Hawaii 260, 438 P.2d 393

(1968).
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damages are due to the defendant's negligence, then it may
make a rough apportionment; and if it is incapable of even
making a rough apportionment, it must apportion the damages
equally among the various causes. 3 5 In apportioning the damages under this rule, each accident is considered, regardless of
the possibility that the plaintiff may not be able to recover the
damages attributable to a given cause.3 6
In adopting the foregoing rule, the Hawaiian court was concerned primarily with steering "a careful course between the
Scylla of denying the plaintiff any remedy and the Charybdis
of imposing on one defendant all the damages, at least some of
which would not have occurred without the independent acts of
other persons. '3 7 The court accomplished its objective by rejecting the rule adopted in Bruckman and by limiting the
Hawaiian version of the Newbury rule38 to the situation where
a latent pre-existing condition is aggravated by the defendant's
negligence.
The approach of the Hawaiian court in Loui finds support,
albeit by analogy, in the well-settled principle that "where the
cause and existence of damages has been established with
requisite certainty, recovery will not be denied because such
damages are difficult of ascertainment. '39 The obvious rationale
for this rule is that a plaintiff who has met his burden of proving damages and has established the requisite proximate cause
should not be denied redress. This same rationale is equally
applicable to the situation involving damages which cannot be
accurately apportioned among several different causative agents.
Clearly, in such a situation the plaintiff should not be denied
recovery altogether. This is not to say, however, that he should
be entitled to recover his entire damages from a single defendant where some undefined portion of such damages is attributable to other causes. Hence the Hawaiian court's arbitrary
apportionment rule.
Based on the foregoing, it is submitted that the court in
Bruckman should have taken the approach adopted by the
Hawaiian court in Loui. The Loui rule, correctly applied, would
have the effect of limiting the application of Newbury to cases
involving the aggravation of a pre-existing latent condition. 4"
35 Id. at 264-65, 438 P.2d at 397.
36 Id.

371d.
38 Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 410 P.2d 976 (1966).
39 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 23, at 102.
40
Bachran v. Morishige, 469 P.2d 808 (Hawaii 1971); Matsumoto v. Kaku,
484 P.2d 147, 151 (Hawaii 1971) (dissenting opinion).
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In all other instances, the damages would be apportioned among
the various causes, either strictly or arbitrarily.4 1 That this
approach is more equitable and doctrinally consistent than that
taken by the Bruckrnan court is obvious. It can only be hoped
that the Colorado Court of Appeals will recognize this and take
steps to replace the Bruckman rule with the approach taken in
'
Loui. Such a change is one of the "felt necessities of the time, 42
and should not be postponed beyond the next opportunity to
effect it.
John F. Head

41

Cases cited note 39 supra.
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Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen. New York: Dial Press, 1971.
Pp. xi, 424. $10.00. Why did the four American auto manufacturers spend $1.5 billion on the 1970 model "face-lift" to produce vehicles which, from an engineering standpoint, were
demonstrably inferior to the 1969 models? Why are hugely
profitable oil companies taxed at rates comparable to those
enjoyed by migrant farm laborers and the other disadvantaged
members of our society? The answers to these and similar
questions relating to contemporary America's extreme concentration of corporate wealth form the basis for a compelling
and important probe into what Ralph Nader has referred to as
the "morality of the balance sheet." The respective backgrounds
of Mintz, a former investigative reporter for the Washington
Post, and Cohen, former general counsel for the Senate Antitrust and Monopolies Subcommittee, are very much in evidence
in this detailed and disturbing look at America's corporations,
a book both readable and superbly documented. That the unchecked growth of powerful industrial concerns is a major
threat to both the free enterprise system and democratic processes in general is a thesis neither novel nor startling; the
authors' conclusion, that the giant corporate concerns should be
dismantled and regulatory power reinvested in the federal government, is an equally well-established view. What sets
America, Inc. apart from other renditions of the "who owns
America" theme is its reliance on painstaking and careful research, coupled with a sprightly, literate style. Despite a tone
which occasionally shades into the polemic, America, Inc. is
must reading for anyone seeking to understand the role played
by the prevailing "corporate conscience" in shaping the fabric
of our daily lives.
Civn. DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY. Elliot M. Zashin. New York:
The Free Press, 1972. Pp. xiii, 350. $7.95. Professor Zashin's
work, which focuses primarily on the historical and philosophical
development of civil disobedience subsequent to the fifteenth
century, provides the framework for his development of a
modern, broadly defined theory of civil disobedience to which
he attributes much of the protest which has taken place in the
United States during the last 10 years. In asserting this modern
theory he rejects present day restrictive conceptualization of

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 49

civil disobedience as being strictly nonviolent with no attempt
to avoid penalty. In its stead he advocates the legitimacy,
within prescribed limitations, of civil disturbance as a viable
alternative to grudging acquiescence or more violent forms of
protest by persons faced with the American dilemma that results when conventional political techniques are either unavailable or not effective. This book is highly recommended to the
lay reader as well as those directly involved in law enforcement
and related fields.
J.H.C. Morris. London: Stevens and Sons
Ltd., 1971. Pp. xxxiv, 570. £3.25 (paperbound). Dr. Morris,
a Fellow of Magdalen College and Reader in the Conflict of
Laws in the University of Oxford, has, in this work, provided
student and teacher alike with an invaluable aid in the difficult
area of conflict of laws. Using the general framework of the
classic Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, Dr. Morris
sets out in a clear yet scholarly manner the general principles
of the English conflict of laws. He devotes particular attention
to the difficult areas of torts, marriage, divorce, nullity, legitimacy, legitimation, adoption, succession, and foreign judgments.
The final chapter provides an excellent summary of the various
theories and methods which have been advanced by numerous
American scholars writing in the area. Although the book is
heavily weighted toward English law, it neverthless has much
to offer the American reader in search of a clear exposition of
the often confusing principles of this body of law.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Irving Brant. New York:
TRIALS AND ERRORS.
Constitutional historian
$5.95.
Pp.
200.
1972.
Knopf,
A.
Alfred
Irving Brant's description of the 12 American impeachments
argues persuasively for a return to the founders' intended
restraint in its use. The book proceeds from the proposition
that the legislature is the most corruptible branch of the government and calls Andrew Johnson's impeachment "the most insidious assault on constitutional government in the nation's
history." Equally complimentary words are directed at the 1970
attempt to remove Associate Justice William 0. Douglas, a movement managed by Gerald C. Ford. Mr. Brant's book is a meaningful addition to the literature of constitutional history and a
cogent recommendation for reform.
IMPEACHMENT:

THE Locic OF THE LAW. Gordon Tullock. New York: Basic Books,

Inc., 1971. Pp. 208. $7.95. This book presents both a suggestionthat the foundations of law need restructing, and an
answer -that the most efficient legal system is one based on
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modern welfare economics rather than ethics. Analogizing to the
fundamental economic principle that market-related changes
should be such that substantially everyone benefits, the author
would similarly structure law on logic. After making certain
basic assumptions about men and scientific procedures, Tullock
presents his concept of civil and criminal law, which he sees to
be grounded in a system of behavioral norms. While understandably enthusiastic about his innovative application of the
tools of social science to develop a logical legal structure, the
author also compels the reader into his own reconsideration
of the foundation and justification of law.
Jacques Rueff. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1972. Pp. 214. $6.95. This book gives one
a view of the world monetary system through the eyes of a
Frenchman. The author, who was the Minister of Finance to
de Gaulle and who is presently the Chancellor of the Institute
of France, analyzes the gold exchange standard and its development since World War I. He urges abandonment of the gold exchange system and criticizes American resistance to that concept. The book is largely a collection of previous pronouncements by the author on monetary reform with corresponding
commentary which attempts to explain the official French
governmental position. One can only marvel at the all-pervasiveness of the spirit of General de Gaulle.
THE MONETARY SIN OF THE WEST.

Gerald Abrahams. London: Calder &
1971.
Pp.
220.
This book, written by an English
Boyars,
barrister, demonstrates the degree to which British law expresses morality through the interplay of legal and moral acts
and judgments. The moral coefficient of law is most evident
when laws change, argues the author, and his thesis is abundantly illustrated by examples of cases in areas of law such as
workmen's compensation, products liability, and criminal procedure. In the criminal law, the problem of defining the nature
and extent of criminal activity in areas such as homosexuality,
prostitution, and obscenity is dealt with extensively. Analogies
with American law are numerous, and the author makes frequent mention of the significant variations between the British
and American legal systems. Both students of philosophy and
those who wish to analyze the development of a particular
area of law will find this book valuable.
MORALITY AND THE LAW.

NEW LIFE STYLE AND THE CHANGING LAW.

Libby F. Jessup. Dobbs

Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1971. Pp. v, 121. $3.25. Ms. Jessup,
Librarian to the Supreme Court Library, Brooklyn, New York,
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has updated her Law for the Family Man in this compact laypeoples' cookbook which surveys a dozen legal concepts that
affect us all. There are sections on forming (and dissolving)
marriages, womans' rights, consumerism, credit purchasing, the
inevitables- death and taxes-civil liberties, and more. The
author neither promises nor delivers more than a cursory
acquaintance with these areas of the law. Lawyers will have no
use for this book, and a layman would be foolhardy, indeed, to
appear in court armed only with Ms. Jessup and her cause. But
the editors of the Legal Almanac Series, of which this work is
a part, point out that while this survey will not supplant the
advice of an attorney, ". . . they can introduce you to your legal
rights and responsibilities." That is a tenable claim, and for that
reason, New Life Style and the Changing Law is a bargain at
the price.
Henry David Aiken. Bloomington/London: Indiana University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 396. $11.95.
Mr. Aiken presents a collection of essays which describe his personal efforts to define the nature and problems of the American
university today. In the introduction he inquires as to the
future of the American university and questions whether it has
a future at all. The first portion of the book deals with the
author's move from a secure teaching job at Harvard to a job
at Brandeis, a move reflective of his desire to find creative
answers to the problems of higher education. In the second portion of this work, Mr. Aiken discusses the conflicts between
liberal and professional education at both the graduate and
undergraduate level and expresses his concern that the universities are failing to uphold the cultural and ethical values
of society. The book as a whole reflects the author's basic suspicion of the "ideology of rationalism" and presents his plea for
a method of ensuring that technology and "Science" do not
become ends in themselves. The final segment of this work is
philosophical in nature; therein, Mr. Aiken suggests the contributions which liberated analytical philosophy might make to
educational reform and to our perception of the situation facing
young people in contemporary society. This extensive critique
should interest a varied audience and serve as a foundation for
further analysis of the problems of the universities today.
PREDICAMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY.

REGULATING THE POOR:
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE. Francis
Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward. New York: Pantheon
Books, 1971. Pp. xvii, 389. $10.00. The authors take a close look
at the American public welfare system, its roots and purposes.
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Piven and Cloward contend that when taken in its social context, welfare is not a function of public largesse and charity,
but rather a function of society's need to mollify the poor during periods of economic instability and to create a low-wage
labor pool during periods of relative economic and political
stability. The welfare system becomes, in effect, a system
for regulating the poor. To illustrate their thesis the authors
examine in depth the two major relief explosions in the United
States- the Great Depression and the 1960's- and briefly treat
the intervening period as well. In doing so, they hypothesize a
causal connection between social unrest and the government's
decision to grant relief. Moreover, they allege that benefits
may be shown to have certain normative effects; relief both
moderates civil disorder in times of turbulence and regulates
the labor supply during periods of stability. This book should be
of interest to anyone with more than a passing concern for
the American socio-political process.

ABSTRACTS OF
LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL PUBLICATIONS*
CRIMINAL LAW
David Lawrence
Sjoquist. College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minn., December 1970.
Pp. 131. The objective of the study was to statistically estimate
the efficiency of law enforcement in reducing the number of
major crimes against property. Using cross-sectional data for
the United States, statistical estimates of the parameters of an
economic model of criminal behavior were ascertained. The
study was based on the hypothesis that the criminal is a rational
being, and the model was based on a combination of a production function for law enforcement activities and a supply
function for the crimes against property. The author considered
the possibility that crimes, such as robbery, larceny, burglary,
and auto theft, may be explainable, at least in part, by economic
theory. The hypothesis tested was whether, under some conditions, criminals can be treated as rational economic beings,
assumed to behave in the same economic manner as any other
individual making an economic decision under risk. The approach utilized followed the analysis of behavior under risk.
Order Number PB-203 144. $3.00.
PROPERTY CRIME AS AN ECONOMIC PHENOMENON.

A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE
Ronald E. Wiley and C. D.
Cochran. Stetson Univ., Deland, Fla., 1971. Pp. 137. The primary
objective of the study was to determine the relationship between the physical appearance of police officers and the emotional responses of persons coming in contact with the officers.
The idea was to conduct laboratory experiments to investigate
whether the type of clothing worn by police officers has any
measurable variations on the perceptions and attitudes of citizens. The major finding in the study concludes that it is advisable for officers to use a uniform that is designed flexibly in
order to convey the civilian impression under certain circumstances and the more traditional police-type impression under
other circumstances. Order Number PB-203 547. $3.00.
RESPONSES TO THE POLICE UNIFORM:

CIVILIAN BLAZER IN POLICE WORK.

*

These abstracts are reprinted from GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANNOUNCEMENTS and UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORTS. Unless otherwise indicated, the studies abstracted may be ob-

tained in their entirety by ordering from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. 22151. Payment must be enclosed with
the order, and orders must include the "order number" given after
each abstract.
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EDUCATION
THE

NONPUBLIC

SCHOOLS

AND

THE

PUBLIC

PURSE:

A

FINANCIAL

Herbert J.
1970.
Cal.,
December
Monica,
Kiesling. RAND Corp., Santa
Pp. 26. The paper examines the causes of economic difficulties
in Roman Catholic schools. Topics discussed include the financial condition of the schools, analysis of financial problems, considerations concerning demand, and determination of public
policy with respect to parochial school subsidies. Order Number
AD-731 249. $3.00.
STUDY OF ROMAN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN

RHODE ISLAND.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS AS AN AID TO MAKING

DECISIONS IN

EDUCATION.

Polly Carpenter. RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., December
1970. Pp. 9. The purpose of the paper is to argue for cost-effectiveness analysis as an aid to decisionmaking but not as a substitute for it. An attempt is made to demonstrate that it is possible to present information about educational programs that
is far more useful to decisionmakers than the oversimplified
and often dangerous approaches now in use. Order Number
AD-731 277. $3.00.
ENVIRONMENT
P.A.
Morgan and C.G. Rice. Southhampton Univ., Inst. of Sound and
Vibration Research, England, December 1970. Pp. 40. A behavioral awakening study involving subjection tests of eight
persons (mean age 22.9 years) who were each variously exposed
to double event impulse noise simulations of a sonic boom over
Order
a period of seven consecutive nights is reported on.
Number N71-32865. $3.00.
BEHAVIOURAL AWAKENING IN RESPONSE TO INDOOR SONIC BooMs.

COORDINATION OF INDUSTRIAL AIR AND WATER QUALITY PROGRAMS AS

Dennis P. Tihansky. RAND
Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., January 1971. Pp. 6. The paper recommends the coordination of air and water quality management
programs in industry as an effective approach for the minimization of abatement expenditures as well as schedule delays in
meeting pollution control regulations. Complementarity of
waste treatment projects is evaluated in terms of both regional
(out-of-plant) and intrafirm advantages. Order Number AD731 261. $3.00.
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONS OF WATER USERS. Charles
W. Meyer. Iowa State Water Resources Research Inst., Ames,
Iowa, August 1971. Pp. 29. The investigation began with the
generally accepted hypothesis that uncoordinated action by individual water users will result in an inefficient use of water
AN EFFECTIVE

MANAGEMENT POLICY.

ABSTRACTS

resources, including water quality. The concepts of a private
good, public good, joint supply of private and public goods,
public "bads" such as pollution (provided in conjunction with
the production or consumption of a private or public good), and
ownership externally are introduced and employed to demonstrate the various ways in which the market fails as an allocative mechanism for water resources. Because of the publicgood nature of water quality, no organizational structure can be
expected to overcome completely the misallocation that results
from market failure. Internalization under a single decision
unit will still result in arbitrary decisions on matters affecting
Order Number
both allocation and distribution of costs.
PB-203 347. $3.00.
ENVIRONMENTAL

APPLICATION

OF

REMOTE

SENSING

METHODS

COASTAL ZONE LAND USE AND MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.

TO

THE

POTENTIAL OF REMOTE SENSING AS A DATA BASE FOR STATE AGENCIES:

THE VIRGINIA MODEL.

H.G. Goodell and W. Reed. Virginia Univ.,

Dept. of Environmental Sciences, Charlottesville, Va., March
1971. Pp. 134. A study of the structure of the governmental
hierarchy of Virginia as it is organized to carry out its responsibilities is reported. The investigation includes the data used in
the function of each agency, the method of its collection and
dissemination, and the rationale for its use in decisionmaking.
It also includes the potential impact of remote sensing as an
alternative or supplemental data base in the function of these
agencies and an evaluation of required imagery and resolution
and sensory frequency. Order Number N71-33693. $3.00.
Frank J. Trelease.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW.
September 1971.
Va.,
National Water Commission, Arlington,
Pp. 357. The paper describes the sources of conflict between the
federal government and the states (and citizens claiming rights
under state law); it presents a number of recommendations for
resolving the conflicts. Specifically, the paper deals with reserved rights, the navigation servitude, sovereign immunity, and
eminent domain procedures. A National Water Rights Procedures Act dealing with those subjects is proposed. Order
Number PB-203 600. $6.00.
Roger
Revelle. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., January 1970. Pp. 29. The summary on Environmental Aspects of
Foreign Assistance Programs by the Agency for International
Development (AID) presents conclusions on the following
topics: Which aspects of AID international assistance have the
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF MAN'S EFFECT UPON ENVIRONMENT.
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possibility of creating problems of environmental degradation;
Which of the problem areas should receive priority attention;
How may AID strengthen the capabilities of the United States
and the developing countries in dealing with environmental
problems. A list of fourteen major areas in which man is having seriously deleterious effects upon his environment is attached. Order Number PB-203 379. $3.00.
SoNic

BooM ANALOGUES FOR INVESTIGATING INDOOR WAVES AND STRUC-

Sui Lin. Toronto Univ., Ontario Inst. for Aerospace Studies, Toronto, Ont., Can., November 1970. Pp. 47. Experimental results indicate the maximum amplitude of the
indoor pressure wave induced by a sonic boom for the case of
a partly open window is, larger than the maximum amplitude
of the incident sonic boom. In such a case, the two undesirable
effects of the sonic boom are the annoyance it causes people
and the effect it has upon structural members. The effects of
the window size, room dimension, the dimensions and the
properties of structural members, and the shape of the sonic
boom, which influence the indoor acoustical pressure and the
structural dynamic response, are investigated by using an electrical analog. The method of design for the electrical analog
is described. The agreement between the results from the electrical analog and those of Vaidya shows that the electrical
analog is a suitable device for investigating the sonic boom
problem. Order Number N71-33964. $3.00.
TURAL RESPONSE.

URBAN GROWTH, NEW CITIES, AND THE POPULATION PROBLEM.

Peter

A. Morrison. RAND Corp., Santa Monica, Cal., December 1970.
Pp. 37. Construing the "population problem" exclusively as a
crisis of numbers neglects several related issues of greater
urgency. These include the social and environmental effects of
maldistribution, the disparity between the individual and collective social consequences of geographic mobility, and the
terms on which the pressure of numbers eventually will be confronted. A new cities program has been proposed as part of a
national strategy to ameliorate an adverse distribution of existing population and absorb a portion of its projected future increase. The paper highlights the principal dimensions of maldistribution and the dynamics of population movements. The
rationale for new cities is then discussed in relation to the
above objectives, and the feasibility of using new cities to shape
population distribution is examined in light of existing research
findings. Order Number AD-731 270. $3.00.

ABSTRACTS

POVERTY LAW
INITIAL HOUSING ELEMENT AND OPERATION BREAKTHROUGH PLAN.
South Carolina State Planning and Grants Div., Columbia, S.C.,
June 1971. Pp. 60. The initial housing element describes general housing conditions, site problems, obstacles, and sets forth
possible solutions. The operation breakthrough plan analyzes
the potential market for factory-built housing in the SanteeWateree Region. It identifies sponsors and builders of lowcost
housing, discusses constraints to such housing, and analyzes sites
for such housing. Order Number PB-203 461. $3.00.
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY: A HANDBOOK OF MODEL STATE STATUTES. William J. Pierce. National
Council of Senior Citizens, Inc., Washington, D.C., March 1971.
Pp. 223. The report contains suggested state and local legislation designed to ameliorate problems of particular concern to
the elderly. Order Number PB-203 165. $3.00.
National Civil Service League, Washington, D.C., February 1971. Pp. 107. The program of public employment for the disadvantaged was undertaken with the support of the Department of Labor and the
Office of Economic Opportunity for interrelated threefold purpose: to meet the needs of the disadvantaged; to help government recruit needed personnel; and to help change state and
local personnel systems in order to meet present day needs.
Order Number PB-203 405. $3.00.
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND THE DISADVANTAGED.

AN EXPERIMENT IN USING HOUSING
RENOVATION IN AN URBAN RENEWAL AREA TO TRAIN UNEMPLOYED
YOUTH. Citizen's Committee on Youth, Cincinnati, Ohio, August
1968. Pp. 197. The Urban Conservation Project (U.C.P.) was
created to explore how to meet two needs common to most
cities: skill training and housing renovation. It provides job
training and work experience for un- and underemployed young
men in the urban centers, and it provides housing rehabilitation
in Concentrated Code Enforcement and Urban Renewal areas.
Initial training consisted of a twenty work day orientation, with
trainees receiving a stipend of $25 per week. During orientation,
trainees were taught remedial reading, arithmetic, and basic
skills in five building trades: cement masonry, plastering, painting, electrical wiring, and carpentry. After orientation the project director, case workers, and the trainee determined the most
suitable trade, followed by work assignment. Order Number
PB-203 428. $3.00.
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PSYCHOLOGY
INHIBITION IN HEARING. T.
Houtgast. Institute for Perception RVO-TNO, Soesterberg Netherlands, 1971. Pp. 35. Although there are some indications of the
possible role of lateral inhibition in hearing, there has been no
clear demonstration of it in psychophysical experiments. Either
the phenomenon plays only a minor role, or it has escaped
psychophysical verification. Accepting for a moment the second
possibility, it is argued that the threshold of a test-tone presented simultaneously with a masker does not reflect clear
lateral inhibition effects since the inhibition affects both the
test-tone and the masker. Two different methods in which the
test-tone and the masker were presented successfully give clear
psychophysical evidence of lateral inhibition in hearing. First,
the threshold curve of short test-tone bursts (noise with a steep
negative or positive gradient at a particular frequency) shows
marked edge effects. Secondly, the results of psychophysical
measurements on two tone suppression indicate that the nervous
activity due to one frequency component may be suppressed by
another component. The effect at the edges of the frequency
spectrum is comparable with visual Mach bands, and the interaction of two tones is suggestive of the two tone inhibition
found in auditory nerve fibers. Order Number N71-33859. $3.00.
PSYCHOPHYSICAL EVIDENCE FOR LATERAL

REACTION TIME:

A

BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS.

SUPPLEMENT

I.

E. Symington.
Human Engineering Labs, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., July
1971. Pp. 122. The bibliography is an extension of Kamlet, A.S.
and Boisvert, L.J. REACTION TIME: A BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS.
It is a compilation of 351 abstracted references dealing with reaction time in selected human information-processing tasks
through December 1970. The references are arranged in alphabetical order by author. An alphabetic index of pertinent parameters of investigation for the 891 references of both this extension and the original bibliography is also provided. Order Number AD-731 471. $3.00.
WITH INDEX FOR ENTIRE BIOLIOGRAPHY.

Lawrence

SOME DETERMINANTS OF ERROR RESPONSES IN THE AURAL IDENTIFICA-

John W. Black. Ohio State Univ., Columbus,
Ohio, August 1971. Pp. 9. E.W. Scripture proposed that errors
in aural identification come with associations, ones of phonetic
similarity and ones of meaning. An object of this study was to
investigate the relative potency of these factors. Two sets of
hypotheses were tested. First, errors in word perception are not
identified with either associations of sound or semantics. Second,
TION OF WORDS.
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there is no relationship between the intelligibility of a word and
the relative similarity-dissimilarity of the word and listeners'
error-responses to the word. Additionally, a test was made of the
extent to which the different intervals of a 9-point equalappearing intervals scale is utilized in making judgments pertinent to the foregoing hypotheses. The results demonstrated that
acoustic association is somewhat present in the errors that occur
in speech perception. Scripture's further attribution of these
errors to semantic association was also borne out to the extent
that errors in aural perception of speech may have roots and
derivations in common with the stimulus words. Thus, both portions of the hypothesis that prompted the study were rejected.
Likewise, the hypothesis that there is no relationship between
the intelligibility of a word and the similarity in sound between
it and the error responses that are made to it was rejected.
Order Number AD-731 411. $3.00.

